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Problems of COMMUNISM

The Sino-Soviet Dispute
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Communist Fronts
ROBERT H. BASS

Tibet in Captivity
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MICHAEL MATHOS

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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Pattern and Limits of the Sino-Soviet Dispute,
by Zbigniew Brzezinski 1

NONCOMMUNIST AREAS

Communist Fronts: Their History and Function,
by Robert H. Bass 8

Communism in Holland: A Study in Futility,
by Frits Kool 17

THE FAR EAST

Tibet in Captivity,
by George Ginsburgs and Michael Mathos 25

THE SOVIET UNION

More for the Common Man?
Living Standards and Consumer Goods,
by Marshall I. Goldman 32

Popular Participation: Myths and Realities,
by Howard R. Swearer 42

EASTERN EUROPE

"Socialist Transformation" in the Countryside,
by Victor Meier 52

BOOK REVIEWS

Reportage—or Wishful Thinking?,
review by Donald W. Treadgold 57

Communism in Asia,
review by Gene D. Overstreet 60

NOTES AND VIEWS

Who Pulled the Trigger?,
by Otto Pick 64

Peaceful Coexistence and Piecemeal Distortions,
by Lazar M. Pistrak 68

Correspondence 70

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Pattern and Limits of the Sino-Soviet Dispute

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

EDITORS' NOTE: The May-June 1960 issue of this journal carried the widely-discussed article by Donald S. Zagoria, "Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," which offered a thorough and detailed exposition of the various issues and tensions which have arisen between the two major Communist powers within the past few years. In the article below, Professor Brzezinski's aim is not so much to amplify this discussion in terms of actual developments, but rather to offer an explanation of why *some of these differences have emerged, and* why *they must, given the present relationship between Moscow and Peking, remain "frozen" at a certain point. In delineating both the causes and the limits of the current conflict, he places it in a more meaningful historical, ideological and political perspective.*

THERE CAN NO LONGER BE any doubt that in the course of recent months a significant and sharp disagreement has developed between Moscow and Peking. The essence of the argument concerns the question of methods to be used by the Communist camp in its struggle for a world-wide victory. More specifically, the following issues have generated particular heat: 1) the problem of war in the period prior to a complete Communist victory; 2) the matter of peaceful coexistence and the related problems of how to capitalize on the anti-colonial struggle; 3) the issue of disarmament and the sharing of nuclear weapons;[1] 4) the stages of the domestic construction of communism.[2] The Sino-Soviet dialogue evokes echoes of the violent disagreement in 1909 within the Bolshevik movement between Lenin and A. A. Bogdanov and his supporters. The latter rejected the view that a phase of "organic development" was transitionally at hand, and they charged Lenin and his group with drifting in the Menshevik direction, with abandoning the revolutionary struggle which, according to the Bogdanovites, was "more essential . . . than ever before."

The very existence of Sino-Soviet differences has far-reaching implications for the future of the Communist

[1] In a militant speech Liu Chang-sheng, vice-president of the Chinese trade unions, has hinted strongly that only by sharing its nuclear weapons with the other Communist states can the Soviet Union exert pressure on the West to accept a nuclear ban: "We hold that the utmost efforts must be made to reach agreements on the banning of nuclear weapons and to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war in the world. Soviet mastery of nuclear weapons has not deprived US imperialism of its monopoly of such weapons. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries should continue to develop their lead in the sphere of atomic energy and, at the same time, the people throughout the world should wage a more extensive struggle against imperialism and against nuclear weapons. Only in these circumstances can such agreement be reached." (Radio Peking, June 8, 1960.)

[2] The reader will find an able recapitulation and analysis of these issues in D. Zagoria, "Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1960.

A frequent contributor to this journal, Mr. Brzezinski was recently appointed Associate Professor of Public Law and Government at the Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York. His latest book, The Soviet Bloc—Unity and Conflict *(Harvard University Press, 1960) was reviewed in the July-August issue of this journal.*

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bloc. Even if the dialogue initially began over matters of method, the argument inevitably has become an ideological one, given the close relationship between theory and practice, between ideology and power, in the Communist system. But before turning to these broader implications, it would be helpful and revealing to define the limits within which the argument is taking place and to elaborate on the pattern of bargaining between Moscow and Peking, thus setting the issue in perspective. The discussion which follows is an attempt to formulate a tentative framework for a more systematic analysis of the complex Sino-Soviet relationship.

The Limits of Conflict

The disagreement between the Soviet Union and China is one between two members of an international revolutionary and ideologically-oriented movement, or more precisely between two ruling national parties of that movement. One has been the recognized leader of the international movement and heads the most powerful state within the complex of nations controlled by the movement; the other gained power through its own efforts, is still physically much weaker, but already commands great prestige because of its potential power (and in our age consciousness of the future affects the present to an unprecedented degree); it also postulates more radical conceptions.

The argument between them appears to be taking place within the framework of certain mutually recognized limits. By limits is meant a measure of common agreement despite conflict. In the Second World War, such limits between the Allies and the Nazis were very few: perhaps the best example involves mutual acceptance of certain norms for the treatment of POW's. In the Korean War, such limits were more extensive and involved mutual abstinence from measures which might expand the war. The cold war between the US and the USSR was limited by a mutual desire not to detonate the bomb lest both perish. It is axiomatic that the more extensive the limits, the more contained the conflict. The more conscious of these limits the parties involved in the conflict, the more inhibited their behavior.

In the case of the Sino-Soviet disagreement, the limits would appear to be these:

1). There is no *conscious* effort on the part of the weaker unit to displace the major party as the leader of the camp. There *is* an effort to get Moscow to adopt a different point of view. However, if this should succeed, the nature of leadership in the camp would change. For this reason, the stakes for Moscow are extremely high, even though the Chinese proclaim that what is involved is merely an effort (in Liu Chang-sheng's words, see fn. 1) to clarify "some problems involving basic principles" concerning "the question of war and peace." The Chinese have, therefore, sought to reassure the Soviets by reiterating, over and over again, their allegiance to the principle of Soviet leadership.[3] However, the more open the disagreement becomes, the greater the difficulty in obtaining a change in the Soviet position without affecting Soviet leadership.

2). Both parties are *very conscious* of the fact that their unity is a decisive factor of strength in relation to the non-Communist world, which both of them (but perhaps not to the same degree) interpret as hostile. The importance of unity has been stressed and restressed by both in the course of the dialogue, with both placing special emphasis on the November 1957 declaration of unity issued by all bloc parties. Both have used this theme in part in an effort to buttress their particular arguments but also in part as a mutual reassurance. Chou En-lai made it very clear recently that the Chinese consider unity "the surest guarantee" of eventual victory, that only by "relying on this great unity" could communism triumph.[4]

3). Unlike the situation of 1948 with respect to Yugoslavia when the Soviets erroneously calculated that an open condemnation would result in Tito's fall, Moscow presumably realizes that Mao Tse-tung's leadership is firm; similarly, the Chinese probably entertain fewer illusions concerning the stability of Khrushchev's regime than do many Western commentators. As a result, both regimes realize that in one way or another they will have to deal with each other.

The Balance of Power

What then is the pattern of bargaining between Moscow and Peking, between the stronger and the weaker, between the gradualist revolutionary and the radical? The Soviet task is to maintain the regime's leadership (and therefore also its policies) as well as unity. The Chinese task is to influence or pressure the Soviet regime to change its policies without, however, depriving it of its leadership and without disrupting bloc unity. Of

[3] Almost every Chinese ideological statement, including those which would be interpreted as critical of the Soviets, have ended with spirited assertions that the Communist camp is led by the Soviet party and that all parties should rally around it. One recent example of many is contained in the greetings of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Rumanian Party Congress (Radio Peking, June 22, 1960).

[4] Radio Peking, June 6, 1960.

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the two tasks, the Chinese is the more problematical since it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the first objective without provoking the noted consequences.

The disagreement (or conflict, if one wishes to use a stronger word) can therefore be described as one between two unequal units which can win, given their own individual assumptions and purposes, *only if they stay together,* or lose if they fall apart. This results in a conflict of a very special type, one with an overriding common interest. In this conflict, furthermore, both parties share certain broad assumptions and use the same terminology for purposes of communication. As a result, there is less ambiguity when they communicate but there is also a need for great precision in the choice of words or in their omission.

In the bargaining process between them, *unity* plays a role analogous to that of a hostage restraining both parties.[5] In a situation involving the exchange of hostages (an ancient practice for ensuring an orderly relationship), one may threaten the life of a hostage, but such threat can be effective only as long as the hostage is alive; once he is dead, the threat is meaningless. The same applies to unity. Since loss of unity is the worst eventuality for both, the weaker partner must limit his efforts at self-assertion, the stronger must limit or make oblique his counter-moves. Moreover, as long as the hostage is alive (*i.e.,* unity of sorts is maintained), the imbalance of strength between the two partners is diminished (or disappears altogether): it makes the weaker stronger, the stronger weaker. In fact, it makes the one who can pretend successfully that he cares less about unity the stronger of the two partners. Hence the fact that the Soviet partner has greater actual strength does not mean that in Sino-Soviet bargaining the scales are necessarily tipped in its favor.

In the writer's view, the preceding reasoning points to at least a partial explanation for the openness of the dialogue on the Chinese side. Being physically weaker, the Chinese leaders must prove to Moscow that they are serious in their views, that they are even willing to run risks. For this reason, they cannot only communicate informally—that would not carry the necessary weight. They must create agitation in full view of the public to make everyone believe they *mean* what they say. This is particularly necessary since the Soviets are aware of the limits which the Chinese accept and, given these limits, the Chinese threats would not carry credibility unless a situation of tension was created.

In brief, Peking must practice "brinksmanship"—that is, through its own actions let the situation get *somewhat out of hand,* leaving it up to Moscow to accommodate or risk a split, even while asserting all along its devotion to unity. This puts the burden of response (and of protecting unity) up to Moscow. In the Sino-Soviet relationship, this "brinksmanship" takes the form of open criticism by one of the other. Such criticism involves a commitment designed to establish credibility of the threat. Since only a subsequent face-losing disavowal can withdraw the threat, a situation meeting the requirements of "brinksmanship" is created. It is noteworthy that it has been the Chinese, the weaker partner, who have initiated and pushed the open dialogue.[6]

Variations on a Theme

Another possible variant of this tactic is intimidation by purposeful error. This involves committing an act which could provoke fatal consequences (which everyone recognizes) but then disowning the act, stating that it was accidental. The threat of the fearful consequences would persist independently of the denial. For instance, if the Soviets were to fire a rocket at a Turkish base, annihilating it and some surrounding communities as well, and then explain that the firing was accidental and even indicate a willingness to make reparations, the intimidating impact of the act on other states would nonetheless persist. By the same token, the Chinese might sanction extreme statements by some of their leaders (*e.g.,* the June 8th speech by Liu Chang-sheng, which went very far in criticizing Moscow) and then contradict them in more conciliatory editorials. The effect on those anxious to protect the unity of the bloc might be similar.

In the practice of "brinksmanship," Chinese ignorance lack of sophistication can make Moscow feel that they are "sincere" but ignorant, that allowance should be made for their errors, and that patience should be applied—even perhaps that something concrete should be done to eliminate the roots of their ignorance (which is presumably what the Chinese wish). Similar considerations could apply to the question of Chinese "irrationality" or fanaticism. Indeed, one of the neatest

[5] The hostage concept was suggested by T. Schelling's book *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960), in which he develops the analogy in terms of American-Soviet nuclear relations.

[6] Examples are the Chinese statements on Yugoslavia, revisionism, imperialism, and war, since the spring of 1958 and particularly in March 1960. See Zagoria, *op. cit.*, for recapitulation.

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tricks in international politics is to convince your opposite number that 1) you can be quite "irrational" in your determination to promote what you consider to be your vital interests and 2) once your opposite number recognizes your vital interests as *you* perceive them, you are prepared to go no further—*i.e.*, you recognize some limits. The Western allies sometimes compromised with the USSR because they thought that the Soviet leaders were fanatical but that they would eventually learn better.[7] The Russians might well be under some pressure to appreciate "the sincerity" of Chinese ignorance and to show tolerance in adjusting to it. By convincing the Soviets of their recognition of limits and also simultaneously creating a situation that threatens these limits, the Chinese put the pressure on Moscow to make the compromise.

If the Chinese purpose is to influence Moscow and the international Communist movement in general, one could even hypothesize that no secret extensive and explicit discussion of the major issues has been held. (Quiet and informal probing must have taken place, but the Chinese could have adopted the stance of smiling politely and generally agreeing but leaving room for subsequent equivocation. That was the method they used repeatedly *vis-à-vis* their American allies during and after World War II and they might well be using the same technique towards their new friends). If there had been a complete but secret airing of differences, one may presume that there would also have been an informal agreement not to carry the argument into the open. In such a case the offense of subsequently publicizing differences would be far more serious and a greater violation of the code of "proletarian internationalism" than if the Chinese had simply begun to speak up, pretending that no debate was involved[8] (*i.e.*, the intimidation through ignorance technique).

Finally, because China might suffer more than the Soviet Union from a break, it does not follow that China must hesitate more before engaging in actions which could bring it about. Threats simply do not work that way. Even if the Chinese do have more to lose, once they succeed in convincing the Soviets they have gone so far that control over the execution of the threat is beginning to slip from their hands, the Soviets can no longer afford the luxury of calculating who will be hurt more by a split, but must decide what it is worth *to them* (the Soviets) to avoid such a split. Besides, how does one calculate who has more to lose? The incalculable factor is precisely the subjective one.

For this reason, the economic lever that the Soviets wield over the Chinese loses much of its importance. The Soviets presumably recognize that shutting off their economic aid could push the Chinese into an even more

[7] *E.g.*, a concession was made to Stalin in making Eastern Europe a Soviet "sphere of influence," in part on the rationalization that Stalin was "irrational" in his demand but that his arguments made sense in terms of *his* experience, and that once this concession was granted he would rest content. Chamberlain did exactly the same with Hitler during the Munich crisis.

[8] The Chinese might recall that one of their charges against the Yugoslavs was that Tito should have discussed his differences quietly within the bloc and not aired them in public (see *Jen-min-jih-pao*, Dec. 29, 1956). The only way Peking could avoid the same charge would be to speak out seemingly on its own initiative, as if there were no debate; this could only be done if there was no prior secret exchange of views. The first open Sino-Soviet disagreements took place in the spring of 1957 (see chapter 12 of the writer's *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*); but there is no evidence to suggest that at the unity meeting of November 1957 Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev discussed the areas of their disagreement.

Who Is Deviating—How?

The Communist parties, deeming revisionism the chief danger, at the same time draw attention to sectarianism and dogmatism which may also represent a great danger in individual stages of this or that party's evolution.

The guarantee of success in the struggle for the cause of peace and socialism lies in fidelity to Marxism-Leninism, in the ability to apply creatively its great concepts. . . . Those who do not take into account the aspiration of the peoples for peace may slip down the path of sectarianism.

—From *Pravda* (Moscow), respectively June 12 and June 29, 1960.

Only renegades like the Tito group will brand our resolute implementation of the two slogans ["Workers of the world, unite" and "workers and oppressed nations, unite"] and our firm support of these two kinds of revolution [national democratic and proletarian] as "stiff dogmatism" . . . while lauding their own shameful actions of betrayal of these two slogans and opposition to the two kinds of revolution as the "creative development of Marxism-Leninism."

. . . in no case is it permissible to discard the fundamental theoretical positions of Marxism-Leninism on the pretext of combatting dogmatism or to substitute revisionism for Marxism-Leninism.

—From *Jen-min jih-pao* (Peking), respectively June 21 and June 29, 1960.

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intransigent position and thus produce the break which the economic sanction was designed to prevent. It may be safely assumed that the Soviets are very conscious of their political miscalculation in 1948 with respect to a much weaker partner, Tito, and would not repeat the same mistake on the economic plane.

The Soviet Vantage Point

The preceding suggests that the Chinese are by no means necessarily the weaker partner in the process of Sino-Soviet bargaining. But are all the cards therefore stacked in their favor? Why don't the Soviets compromise?

The fact of the matter is that the Soviets *have* compromised, and a great deal—first of all, through pained silence, secondly through only very timid and indirect responses (*e.g.,* oblique comments by Khrushchev and Mikoyan). These reactions have been very much out of character with the usually assertive pattern of Soviet behavior. Over a period of time, however, the situation has become increasingly aggravated (climaxing, as of this writing, in Liu Chang-sheng's extreme remarks on June 8th, which even ridiculed the recent Soviet disarmament proposals). Continued passivity, even if accompanied by a persistent maintenance of the position which the Chinese criticize, could threaten Soviet leadership within the movement, and ultimately (although less likely) even Khrushchev's personal power. Acceptance of the Chinese position by the USSR has to be ruled out: first, it would mean the abdication of Soviet leadership; second, it would run counter to a presumably sincere Soviet belief that international communism would not be best served by the policies the Chinese recommend; third, it would be contrary to the domestic needs of Soviet society and of its ruling elite, since a measure of international relaxation is required for the achievement of the Seven-Year Plan and the concomitant "transition to communism."

Still, the Soviets have had to give some response to the Chinese. In that response (though limited by the overriding consideration of the importance of preserving unity) Moscow is helped by certain factors inherent in the Sino-Soviet bargaining situation. It is to be recalled that Peking's leverage against the Soviets lies primarily in its being the more "orthodox" or radical partner. In any ideologically (or theologically) oriented movement, a physically weaker partner is better off on the side of orthodoxy than in a posture of seeming compromise with the enemy (imperialism or the devil, as the case may be). Greater orthodoxy, or radicalism in this instance, gives the Chinese a lever which they can use in the current post-Stalin phase of relatively greater bloc diversity to make themselves heard, possibly in the guise of "sincere but over-eager" Communists, but at least not as traitors.

By the same token, the Soviets can find the Chinese super-orthodoxy reassuring. To the Kremlin, the intensity of the Chinese convictions makes them less likely to split the bloc and thereby give comfort to the imperialists than if China were more moderate. Hence the Chinese threats tend to carry less credibility than Peking might wish or expect. One may suspect that the Soviets would have been much more concerned by, let us say, a Chinese adoption of Bernstein's view of Marxism than by their Bogdanov-like militancy. Furthermore, knowing of the Chinese fear that the Communist movement might be slipping down the path of revisionism, the Soviets can take advantage of a known device in bargaining: coupling any potential concession desired by the Chinese to circumstances which make that concession undesirable on balance. Thus the repeated Soviet linkage of revisionism with dogmatism (usually based on the formulation adopted at the November 1957 unity meeting) may be not only a matter of maintaining a centrist position but also a way of communicating to the Chinese that if their dogmatism is to be tolerated within the international Communist movement, then in effect a situation of polycentrism is created. The Chinese should know that such polycentrism would benefit not only the enemies of communism but also the "revisionist renegades," who would take advantage of the existing dialectic to promote their views.

Moscow's Present Course

Beyond all this, the Soviets have the task of bringing the Chinese face to face with the limiting character of their own ideology—of making it clear to them that they cannot insist on being more "revolutionary" and still remain dedicated to unity and to the principle of Soviet leadership; that they cannot, in a word, have their cake and eat it too. However, the Soviets may not wish (and perhaps would not even be able) to drive home the lesson explicitly or by sheer force, since economic sanctions or an outright condemnation would be equivalent to their killing of the hostage. On the other hand, a mere partial response is likely to encourage the Chinese in feeling secure that they can continue to *threaten* unity. Somehow, therefore, the Soviets must communicate unambiguously yet not use means equivalent to an open condemnation or force.

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If the Soviets can manage, as they now seem to be trying, to restate their principles firmly and clearly—that is, to free themselves of the element of debate—and to recommit themselves formally to their position, they will have more cause to feel that the Chinese could not cause a split without in effect denying the essence of Peking's own position. That position is torn by an internal contradiction—as long as the Chinese are more radical in their attitude towards the enemy they tie their own hands, since they could not possibly undertake actions which, in their own words, would primarily benefit the enemy. Thus, while the Chinese may have succeeded in putting the burden of response upon Moscow, they have also made it relatively less urgent for Moscow to respond immediately or forcefully. As a result, Moscow has been able to afford the luxury of only gradually increasing the firmness of its response—from oblique hints, through indirect warnings (as in the Matkovsky article on leftwing deviationism in *Pravda* of June 12, 1960, which was careful to avoid an unambiguous condemnation of the Chinese), to an explicit postulation of the Soviet position by Khrushchev in Bucharest in late June, designed to dispel any Chinese uncertainty about the Soviet attitude. This Khrushchev did by formally restating Soviet views, linking them to the authoritative decisions of the 20th and 21st Party Congresses, and warning against a mechanical application of old Leninist formulas to entirely new situations. At the same time, Khrushchev went out of his way to assert that between the various parties "there has been no different interpretation or even different shades of interpretation of essential international questions" (speech of June 21st), thus adopting the formal position that no debate is involved.

The Impasse Ahead

It would appear, in sum, that the Soviets are unwilling to test directly the degree of Chinese commitment to unity or the extent of their "irrationality," and for this reason will not meet the issue head on: are Peking's implied threats a mere bluff, or if not a bluff, are they nullified by the contradiction in the Chinese position? The emerging pattern is one of an impasse between the two partners, an essentially dynamic situation involving continuing maneuvers on both sides to test each other's commitment to its position and the extent of its willingness to risk an open condemnation by the other. Yet neither, given their ideology, is quite willing to precipitate an open clash by being the first to make an implicit condemnation.

Formal unity is thus likely to be preserved, at least until such time as the more radical partner can feel that unity, which it now describes as the necessary prerequisite for victory, is no longer needed.[9] A repetition of the Yugoslav situation of 1948 is therefore improbable. Nonetheless, the divergence between the two is likely to persist, and in effect it already amounts to a denial of the homogeneity of the Communist camp. Under the cloak of formal unity, the differences between the Soviets and the Chinese are more acute and more substantive than those which led to the Soviet-Yugoslav split, and they already have been articulated to a greater extent.

However, the mutual recognition of limits helps to preserve formal unity, and mutual hostility towards the common enemy is likely to draw the regimes closer together in any moment of international tension. For this reason, there is no point in expecting a split between them, as in the 1948 Yugoslav case. The situation is unprecedented and we ought to search for a formulation which best describes it. Perhaps a contradictory term like *divergent unity* might be helpful, and preferable to more traditional notions of either "a split" or "an alliance." The Chinese-Soviet relationship is in many ways much closer than the traditional alliance: both regimes are rooted in a movement viewed as part of an historical process whose course they understand, and whose outcome they can predict; they share the same long-range aspirations and the same enemies; they are striving to reconstruct their societies on basically similar lines; they use similar operational concepts and organizational devices. At the same time, however, their commitment to a basic ideology can generate intense conflicts of interpretation precisely because both adhere to that ideology.

The foregoing reasoning suggests that no simple projection of the present dialogue can be made. While the impasse between the two parties is likely to continue, the allegiance of other parties to Moscow may help to restrain the Chinese by underscoring their isolation within the camp. This, by itself, however, suggests a greater interdependence in the bloc between the leader and the led, and a greater accommodation of interests. The future could even see an adjustment of perspectives between the Soviets and the Chinese, particularly if Soviet foreign policy should be crowned with major successes. The Chinese, like Bogdanov, may then con-

[9] Such a point might come when the Chinese develop both nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery. In the process, however they might also develop greater strategic sophistication and hence also restraint.

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clude that nothing succeeds like success and get in step with the marching company. Furthermore, the death of either Khrushchev or Mao Tse-tung might contribute to the elimination of the element of personal animus which presumably has already crept into the relationship. In any prolonged succession struggle, the other party might even be tempted to make its position unequivocal in order to ensure the success of a faction more sympathetic to its views.

However, even if that did happen, the situation of divergent unity would probably persist, given the relative independence of each regime and the resulting absence of clearcut subordination. A crisis between them could come about if international communism, toeing Soviet prescriptions, fails to score successes sufficiently impressive to satisfy the impatient in the camp. At such a point, much would depend on the ability of the Soviet regime to shift gears and to adopt a forceful and militant revolutionary line. To assume that the passage of time would not make this easier is only a speculative guess: on the other hand, any Western failure to maintain its own political, economic or military development would certainly facilitate a change in the Soviet posture.

Looking at the Communist camp alone, its long-range problem is the absence of a recognized ideological arbiter. It was Lenin's ability to combine ideological creativity with political skill that finally drove the more extreme Bogdanov back into the Bolshevik ranks. It was the unity of ideology and autonomous state power that made Stalinism into a homogeneous system. But without a common power center jealously protecting certain universal ideological imperatives, Marxism-Leninism has already shown itself to be inadequate in providing unity for international communism. Differing perspectives and differing interests, still defined within the framework of the ideology, can lead to differing prescriptions for action and in turn undermine unity.

It is to be remembered, however, that these processes take place within an ideologically-oriented system that is highly hostile to the outside world. A situation of divergent unity can endure for a long time, with many ebbs and flows. Naive and persistent talk about a Sino-Soviet split is not only senseless but may well have the effect of drawing the regimes closer together. One does not promote a heresy in a church to which one does not belong.

ON WAR AND WARS

We must stand for and uphold just revolutionary wars, and oppose and stop unjust war. . . . The question of whether war can be averted, in our opinion, refers mainly to a world war. . . . With imperialism and the exploiting system still in existence, wars [of oppression and liberation] are still unavoidable. The belief that wars of this kind can be avoided is entirely wrong and contrary to fact.

Only when the socialist revolution is victorious throughout the world can there be a world free of war, a world without armament; such a world is inconceivable while imperialism exists.

—Liu Cheng-shen's speech of June 8, 1960.

The peoples of the socialist states cannot be of two minds as regards the question of war and peace. They think that under present conditions there is no fatal inevitability of war and that disarmament is not only necessary but possible.

—Pravda editorial, June 20, 1960.

To prevent war—in this respect even a local one, because it can grow into a world one—the people in every country must bring pressure to bear on their governments to force them to hold to the principles of peaceful existence among states with different social systems.

—N. Khrushchev's speech of June 21, 1960.

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COMMUNIST FRONTS:

Their History and Function

By Robert H. Bass

PERHAPS AT NO TIME since the end of World War II has the complex and dynamic nature of the Communist challenge been so obvious as it is today. The numerous acute tensions and crises which the world has endured for well over a decade have necessarily pointed to the conclusion that communism cannot be "contained" along any clearly discernible perimeter, either by the formation of military alliances or by selective grants of economic aid. The Communist intrusion into the Middle East; the assiduous efforts of the Soviet Union and the bloc countries to exert political influence on the emergent states of Africa; the persistent attempts to exploit nationalist ferment to Communist advantage wherever it may occur; the efforts to capitalize on popular fear of nuclear warfare in social and political circumstances as different as those of England and Japan: all these demonstrate that the current conflict is one of depth, calling for the use of an almost bewildering variety of instrumentalities and tactical devices. Understood in this sense, it is ultimately a conflict of wills and, by extension, a contest between societies and the groups, organizations and individuals within each of them, all working toward the effective assertion of their respective beliefs and aspirations.

Thus the evolving relationship between the Communist bloc and the rest of the world community is shaped not only by the official foreign, economic, or defense policies of various governments, but by the constant interaction of influences on many levels. In this context, the study of Communist front or peripheral organizations becomes a subject of interest as well as of timely importance.

It would be an exaggeration to assert that fronts are a paramount instrument of Communist international policy. To some degree, existing front organizations have become bureaucracies that tend to perpetuate themselves largely for their own sake even after their operational utility has apparently become minimal.[1] On the other hand, it would be unwise to underestimate or dismiss the front groups as fully exposed, discredited or outmoded weapons in the Communist arsenal. Significantly, they are almost as old as Bolshevism itself and their role in international Communist strategy was long ago acknowledged and even explicitly defined by both Lenin and Stalin. Although conditions today are wholly different from what they were 40 years ago, the fronts still serve a useful purpose within the overall framework of Communist strategy, and it is wholly unlikely that they will be discarded.

Theoretical Formulations

As early as 1902 Lenin expressed awareness of the need for differentiating between the party itself and a variety of mass organizations capable of attracting wider

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[1] See Bernard S. Morris, "Communist International Front Organizations," *World Politics*, Vol. IX, No. 1 (October 1956), p. 76 ff.

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support for the socialist cause.[2] After the revolution, the question of forming such organizations became a matter of practical necessity. The job of spreading influence was a paramount concern, and one made the more difficult by the fact that the party organization was, by definition, to remain a small and tightly disciplined minority—the "vanguard of the proletariat." In the circumstances, Lenin was quick to see the importance of trade unions, professional organizations and other comparable groups existing on the periphery of the party's own narrow base. He employed the term "transmission belt" to characterize these organizations and left no doubt that without their continued existence, under either open or covert party control, the party itself would have little chance of survival as a political and ideological force.[3]

Stalin later adopted Lenin's view and further elaborated on it. Discussing the role of the Communist Party, he wrote:

> **[The party is] the only organization capable of centralizing the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-party organization of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the party with the working class . . . . The proletariat needs these transmission belts, these levers, and this directing force, because without them, in its struggle for victory, it would be a weaponless army in the face of organized and armed capital.[4]**

These, of course, were policy statements formulated during the early years of the Soviet regime and may, in consequence, appear to have a defensive quality. Yet Lenin and Stalin were concerned not only with the defense of what they had won but equally with the creation of new avenues of access. They really wanted more than a simple link between the party and the "masses." In fact, they looked forward to the transformation of "a diffuse population into a mobilizable source of [Communist] power." [5] The latter might be termed the major and certainly the ideal function of every front organization, whatever its specific character and ostensible purpose. This point was made expressly and in some detail by O. V. Kuusinen at the 17th session of the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist International in March 1926:

> **The first part of our task is to build up not only Communist organizations but other organizations as well, above all mass organizations sympathizing with our aims and able to aid us for special purposes . . . . Besides this we require a number of more or less firmly established (organizational) fulcrums which we can utilize for our further work, ensuring that we are not condemned to the task of influencing the mass politically merely to see this mass influence constantly slip through our hands. We must create a whole solar system of organizations and smaller committees around the Communist Party, smaller organizations, so to speak, actually working under the influence of the party but not under its mechanical control.[6]**

From Theory to Practice

In point of fact, by the mid-1920's Kuusinen's program was already in operation on a substantial scale under the unusually talented and exceptionally resourceful direction of the German Communist Willi Muenzenberg. Born into a working-class family, Muenzenberg as a young man had sought refuge in Switzerland during World War I. There he met and worked with Lenin, Trotsky, Radek, Krupskaya and other members of the Bolshevik exile community. A charter member of the German Spartakusbund after the war, he was elected President of the Communist Youth International in Moscow in 1920. A year later, with the outbreak of famine in the Soviet Union, he founded the International Workers' Aid (IWA), the first and perhaps in some ways still the most extraordinary of all front organizations.

Initially, the IWA was a genuine relief organization that collected funds for emergency food shipments to the USSR, even though its contributions were never large. It was Muenzenberg's genius, however, to understand at once the potential versatility of an instrument such as he had created, working independently of any local Communist Party and capable of raising its own funds. He saw immediately that its emphasis must be on solidarity first and only secondarily on any charitable activities. In this way, it could help mobilize party sympathizers, maintain the loyalties of people in many walks of life and of different degrees of influence, encourage international acceptance of Soviet policies, and engage in ramified propaganda activities in support of many Communist causes.

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[2] See V. I. Lenin, *What is to be Done?*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1952.

[3] Lenin, "The Trade Union, The Present Situation and the Mistakes of Comrade Trotsky," *Selected Works*, Vol. IX, New York, 1943, pp. 5-6. Reference to the same point is also made in "Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder," *ibid.*, Vol. XXX, Part II, p. 592.

[4] J. V. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1940, pp. 77-78, 131-32.

[5] P. Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon*, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1952, p. 114.

[6] O. V. Kuusinen, "Reports of the Commission for Work Among the Masses," *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. VI, No. 28, April 1926, p. 429.

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Before long, the IWA was active in several areas—in Germany as a result of the economic crisis of 1923-24, in Japan in connection with the industrial unrest of 1925, and in Great Britain during the miners' strike of 1926. Moreover, the organization's initially modest production of propaganda literature was soon expanded into a veritable publishing empire. Muenzenberg's *Arbeiter Illustrierte* which had started with a print run of 5,000 copies in August 1921, reached a circulation of over a million within five years. Other enterprises were then added to the growing "solar system" of front organizations, including two daily newspapers in Berlin, a number of periodicals for radio and photo amateurs and other hobbyists, a book club, a motion picture distributing company with branches in Berlin, London, Rome, Amsterdam and New York, and an entire newspaper chain in Japan. They were operated in some cases under the direct and in others under the covert control of Muenzenberg's apparatus.

The Nazi triumph in Germany necessitated moving the home base of operations—in fact, Muenzenberg himself escaped to France on the night of the Reichstag fire. There, he laid the groundwork for the plethora of organizations which were to have their heyday in the years of the so-called "popular" or "united" front by founding the League Against War and Fascism, the World Committee for the Relief of Victims of Fascism, and several other groups.[7]

Other Precursors

Despite his unusual talents, Muenzenberg was neither the only nor even the most representative organizer of Communist front activities during the 1920's and 1930's. In fact, the measure of his ability was the fact that he was able to surmount the difficulties of a period when the strategy of the CPSU was essentially opposed to any real collaboration with non-Communist groups, and when other front organizations were consequently evolving along wholly different lines.[8] Because his concept of the front organization was both subtle and flexible, it actually drew large numbers of non-Communists into Communist-oriented activities. His work played a major role in changing the public image of the Soviet Union in the years following the revolution. Yet Muenzenberg's success was predicated precisely on his independence from the Comintern and the network of national Communist parties, and for this reason during the Stalin era his activity was never accorded the degree of official sanction given to other front organizations, although many of them were clumsy instruments compared to his own.

Among the latter, the Red International of Labor Unions (RILU), usually referred to as the Profintern, and the Young Communist International (YCI), where Muenzenberg had started his own career, may be considered archetypes—only interesting, however, because they anticipated the type of front organization which was to emerge after World War II.

From its inception in 1921 as an adjunct of the Comintern, the RILU clearly strove to foster dissension in the international labor movement and to weaken rather than infiltrate the International Federation of Trade Unions. If not always its avowed aim, its actual purpose was first to deepen the split in the world's socialist parties and later on, during the crucial years preceding Hitler's advent to power, to wage an undeclared war on all non-Communist trade union organizations.[9] In this sense, therefore, it can serve as an early example of a front organization created specifically to implement certain political-ideological directives officially adopted in Moscow for, and allegedly by, the world's Communist parties. Its limited and generally negative function made it an obvious liability after the Communists' adoption of "united front" tactics, and it was dissolved without fanfare in 1937.

The YCI, which traced its origins to an international conference of youth organizations in 1907, and which was brought into the socialist camp during World War I, had come to boast a membership of more than two million in 40 countries by 1928. Yet it too was very different from the type of front which Muenzenberg had created. Although it claimed in name to be an international organization and dealt often with international issues, some 95 percent of its membership came from the Soviet Union and Communist-occupied portions of China, so that it served rather as a reservoir from which to recruit younger people for responsible party work than as a genuine multinational youth organization.[10] Its affiliates in non-Communist countries had

[7] Willi Muenzenberg, *Die Dritte Front.* Berlin, 1930, *passim.* Interesting but fragmentary accounts of his extraordinary career also appear in Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, and Arthur Koestler, *The Invisible Writing.* The Macmillan Co., New York, 1954.

[8] This period of strategy can be dated from the Fifth Congress of the CPSU in 1924 to the Seventh Congress in 1935.

[9] See George R. Donahue, *The World Federation of Trade Unions: Facts About a Communist Front,* International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, Washington, D. C., n.d., pp. 6-7.

[10] Nils M. Apeland, *World Youth and the Communists.* Phoenix House, Ltd., London, 1958, pp. 20-21.

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little importance except in the sense that their existence could be exploited for propaganda purposes within the Soviet Union itself. With the outbreak of war, the YCI was dissolved together with its parent organization, the Comintern.

Debacle and Revival

It is well-known history that a great number and variety of organizations which could legitimately be qualified as Communist fronts were in existence during the late 1930's. In retrospect, it is probably a fair assumption that few groups with an avowed anti-fascist orientation wholly escaped becoming in some ways the tools of Communist propaganda. Not all of them, of course, were under actual Communist control, but many did—at one time or another—engage in activities suggested by a section of their membership or certain of their officers whose chief interests lay in the furtherance of some covert Communist objective rather than in the pursuit of the organizations' stated aims.

For a while the Communists were able to preserve this elaborate facade, deisgned to exploit the world-wide reaction against the rise of fascism and nazism, while obscuring the totalitarian character of the Soviet state, the significance of the great purge trials of 1936-38, the Stalin cult, and so on. But the success of the prewar fronts was relatively short-lived. Not even the most ingeniously conceived front organization could withstand the shock of the Nazi-Soviet pact, the Russo-German partition of Poland, the predatory attack on Finland, the annexation of the Baltic states, and the seizure of a part of Bessarabia. The front as a Communist propaganda and policy instrument passed out of existence almost overnight. Its Communist members emerged as an embattled and despised minority, publicly enjoined to celebrate the newly-contracted alliance between Nazis and Communists and to denounce the allied defense against Fascist aggression. Those whom they had used as their tools disbanded in bewilderment and disgust.

Paradoxically, however, the German attack on the USSR and the subsequent military history of the war made the period of revulsion against communism in turn a brief one. Military alliance with the Soviet Union and the passionate hopes kindled by the prospect of Allied victory led to many forms and levels of cooperation between the West and the Soviet Union as a matter of both choice and necessity.

To exploit this situation for Communist interests became a relatively easy matter. The military operations of the Soviet Army and the record of various resistance groups in which Communists played a significant role inspired respect, and in the atmosphere created by joint effort, the Communists were able to formulate and to press certain demands for participation in common enterprises. Their successful assertion of these demands to achieve key positions of power in groups founded during and immediately after the war in effect paved the way for the resurrection of a new network of international front organizations.

Although, for instance, the ultimate outcome could obviously not be anticipated at the time, the formation of an Anglo-Soviet trade union committee during the dark days of 1941 proved to be the first step leading to the formation and the subsequent Communist capture of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Similarly, steps initiated in early 1945 by the British National Union of Students and a number of student organizations in other countries resulted in the creation of the International Union of Students (IUS) and the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), both of which became Communist mouthpieces within a few short years of their inception.[11] The same story applies to the International Organization of Journalists (OIJ), founded in Copenhagen in June 1946 as a successor to the wartime International Federation of Journalists of Allied and Free Countries; to the International Radio and Television Organization (OIRT), formed in 1946 at Brussels; as well as to almost a dozen other groups. All of them represented sincere attempts to establish genuinely international associations in the fields of labor, youth activity, education, science, medicine, law, journalism and broadcasting; they failed in their original purpose because the Communists, once entrenched in key posts in the organizational machineries, used the associations for the dissemination of Soviet-inspired propaganda and as tactical weapons designed to advance specific Communist interests.

The Postwar Hiatus

Examples drawn from the experience of several of these organizations will suffice to show the pattern of how they became, not what they had set out to be, but instead a group of rather crude instruments manipulated to support Soviet policy positions and propaganda themes.

In the case of the WFTU, it is revealing that even before its formal inception, Soviet Foreign Minister

[11] See John Clews, "Communism's Fourth 'Lever': The Youth and Student Fronts," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. V, No. 6 (November-December 1956), p. 39.

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Molotov had demanded that it be accorded special representation and status at the San Francisco United Nations Conference in August 1945. The appointment, in September 1945, of Louis Saillant as Secretary General of the Federation was promoted largely on the strength of his reputation as successor to Georges Bidault at the head of the French National Resistance Council, tending to divert attention from the much more crucial fact that he had also emerged from the war as General Secretary of the traditionally Communist-dominated and powerful French Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT). The appointment of a Soviet representative as Assistant Secretary for Press and Information, the physical location of the WFTY Secretariat in Paris, and the consequent tightening of its relations with the CGT, all prepared the ground for a Communist seizure of the organization and for its use as an instrument through which to assail the Marshall Plan, Western reaction to the Czechoslovak *coup d'état* and the Berlin blockade, and the concern expressed by independent trade unions about the fate of labor in Eastern Europe.

THE RECORD of the IADL (International Association of Democratic Lawyers) reveals that the spadework leading to its organization was started at the time of the Nuremberg war crimes trials in early 1946. The support initially accorded to this group by members of the legal profession in some 25 countries derived from its declared aims of working toward mutual understanding between lawyers of different nationalities and legal backgrounds, supporting the United Nations in efforts to further democratic liberties, and promoting respect for law in international relations.[12] Its successful application for consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council, granted in August 1947, further enhanced its appeal to a sizable number of jurists, who confidently believed that they had affiliated with a genuine professional association.[13] Under the circumstances, the fact that most of the initiative which went into the organization and subsequent management of IADL had come from the French Mouvement National Judiciaire, a former leftwing resistance group founded by the pro-Communist lawyer Joe Nordman (who became the first General Secretary of IADL), did not attract the attention it deserved. The real nature of the leadership became apparent only after the IADL proceeded to hold its Third Congress in Czechoslovakia, just a few months after the Communist *coup d'état*. At the same time it began to concentrate on openly propagandistic topics (*e.g.*, the alleged suppression of civil rights in the United States, the "leniency" of Western occupation authorities in Germany toward Nazis, and so on) and also launched an attack against the UN Human Rights Commission. As a result of these activities, a general exodus of democratic elements took place, thus leaving the IADL exclusively in the hands of confirmed Communist sympathizers.[14]

More blatant still were the tactics applied in setting up the International Union of Students. At the charter meeting in London (November 1945) that had recommended the formation of such an organization, the Communists were quite certainly in a minority. But through their representation on the Preparatory Committee—charged with making arrangements for a 1946 constitutional convention—they were able to transform the character of the IUS even before its official founding. The Committee began by vesting unlimited authority in the executive organ of the proposed convention. For tactical reasons and without anyone's consent it moved the convention from Paris to Prague. By controlling delegation credentials it assured Communist control of the convention, through such expedients as, for instance, refusing to recognize the Indian Congress Party delegation while sanctioning the presence of an Indian Communist Party student group. It ended by changing the convention's agenda on the day preceding the opening session and submitting no report of any kind on its work.[15] After the convention was held, other time-tested moves were made to assure control of the IUS Secretariat. As in the case of other fronts, devotion to the idea of an international association initially blinded non-Communist groups to the import of these tactics. Their enthusiasm was not long in waning, however: IUS attitudes toward the course of world events, climaxing in its pro-Soviet stand on the Communist seizure of Czechoslovakia, led one national affiliate after another to sever its connection with the organization.

What Price Loyalty?

Over the last decade the "solar system" of international "transmission belts" has presented a picture of several organizations acting in almost mechanical unison

[12] See Vladimir Kabes and Alfons Sergot, *Blueprint of Deception: Character and Record of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers,* Mouton and Co., The Hague, 1957, pp. 15-45.

[13] Recognition was rescinded at the Eleventh Session of the Economic and Social Council in July 1950.

[14] Kabes and Sergot, *op. cit.*, p. 54 and p. 66 ff.

[15] Apeland, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

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to support every major Soviet move in world affairs.[16] Discussion within any of the fronts is a thing of the past. Non-Communists have, for the most part, long since withdrawn. As if to belabor the obvious, each and every front has performed the ritual of expelling the representatives of Yugoslavia. Taking their lead from the overall "super-front," the World Peace Council,[17] they all joined to support the 1950 Stockholm and Vienna Appeals, respectively launched to demand a ban on atomic weapons at a time when the United States still had a demonstrable superiority in the nuclear-weapons field, and to promote a five-power conference (including China) aimed at ending the Korean war. Later on, all of them echoed charges concerning the UN forces' alleged resort to bacteriological warfare in Korea, publicizing "proof" which had been forcibly extorted from prisoners of war and refusing to support an impartial investigation by the International Red Cross. They assisted, to varying degrees, in the intensive campaign spearheaded by the WFTU against the projected European Defense Community (EDC) and against the rearmament of the German Federal Republic. To the best of their ability, they have worked throughout the 1950's to encourage industrial unrest in the name of "peace" and to pose as foes of Western "colonialism." [18]

This barely disguised record of direct political affiliation and ideological bias raises a question as to what conceivable utility the front organizations have today, having compromised themselves in the eyes of all who are not Communist partisans. What has prompted the Communists to continue pouring stupendous sums into the preservation of these fronts and the financing of their many conferences and congresses?

The answer appears to be relatively simple once a possible source of confusion has been set aside. The key to understanding lies in the fact that the postwar fronts were created for quite different purposes than their predecessors. With the possible exception of the World Peace Council, none of the fronts paid serious attention to the task of infiltration after 1948. This function, once widely regarded as their major task, simply became marginal. What instead assumed major importance in the paranoid atmosphere of Stalin's last years was the job of maintaining loyalty and enforcing a degree of discipline among such Communist sympathizers as could be found outside the Soviet bloc. Between 1948 and 1955 the fronts were, in one sense, operated more for the "benefit" of these people than for the purpose of beguiling the innocent. They may also have been viewed by the Soviet regime as useful props and auxiliary organs in a period when Communist Party strength was on the decline in Western Europe.

APART FROM these reasons, the fronts may have justified their existence along lines reminiscent of the purpose of the aforementioned Young Communist International, though much broader in scope. At no time perhaps since the Russian Revolution had the Soviet Union been so isolated from the outside world as in the years after the Iron Curtain went down, a fact that also held true for the Communist minorities which with Soviet help had assumed power in the East European "peoples' democracies."

In virtually all respects this isolation was necessary and desirable from the Stalinist point of view. At the same time complete isolation could not be enforced without injuring the regime's purposes. From a psychological standpoint, Soviet and satellite party members in the professions, the trade unions, youth organizations, the vast communications and propaganda machinery, could not be given the impression that they were all alone. They needed to see outsiders and needed to believe that individuals and groups in other countries were working along lines similar to their own. And knowing nothing of that outside world, they were clearly unable to judge the truth of what they heard. In this context, it is more than conceivable that the mere existence of international fronts, the closely-controlled movement of delegations, and the stereotyped exchange of messages and greetings played a role sufficiently impor-

[16] The major international Communist fronts in existence today are: The World Peace Council, World Federation of Trade Unions, World Federation of Democratic Youth, International Union of Students, World Federation of Teachers' Unions, World Federation of Scientific Workers, International Medical Association, Women's International Democratic Federation, International Organization of Journalists, International Federation of Resistance Fighters, and International Radio and Television Organization.

[17] The World Peace Council differs in certain significant respects from the other organizations which have been discussed. It did not begin to function on a full scale until 1949-50, nor is it, properly speaking, an organization as much as a committee currently numbering some 520 members, most of whom theoretically represent autonomous national "peace committees" or similar groups.

[18] The theoretical basis for disruptive activity to promote industrial unrest has been expressed with striking candor by the organ of the Czechoslovak trade unions: "A strike in a capitalist country is a very effective way of fighting for peace, since it aims at paralyzing war production and the transport of arms. But here, it is a question of building up the greatest possible strength in the shortest possible time. . . . To put the arms of outstanding quality which we produce into the hands of the defenders of peace . . . that is an act of peace." *Práce* (Prague), March 28, 1952.

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tant to justify their continued existence.[19] The notable raising of the curtain in recent years does not invalidate this line of reasoning; on the contrary, the promotion of "sympathetic" contacts with the fronts may be considered more crucial than ever as a counterbalance to the increase of contacts with non-Communist elements—as attested to in an outstanding instance by the crucial importance Moscow attached to the Vienna World Youth Festival in 1959.[20]

Whatever the Soviet regime's reasons for perpetuating the fronts in other areas, it plainly considers them to be an important tactical instrument in its recent strategy for spreading Soviet influence in the underdeveloped countries and regions of the world. The front groups promoted in these areas have included both the blatantly pro-Communist variety prevalent in the last decade and the prewar "instrument of access" which exploits vital issues as a facade for infiltration efforts.

New Policies—New Functions

The turning point of Soviet strategy can be dated about 1954-55. Characteristically, it was brought about by an ideological revaluation which led Soviet theoreticians to the conclusion that Asian—and later African—national movements were not necessarily "bourgeois" in character nor a deceptive concoction of "imperialist" forces. The decision once made, the strategy of access regained some of its old importance.

The various diplomatic initiatives which followed from the decision of the Soviet bloc to play an active role in Asian, Middle Eastern and, more recently, in African affairs, have received considerable publicity. The supporting activities of various front organizations, though less widely known, are considered a crucial aspect of the struggle to expand influence. A Soviet theoretical journal has described the tactical approach to be pursued by this effort as follows:

[The struggle must be pressed by] carefully, attentively and skillfully taking advantage of every—even the smallest—fissure among the enemies, every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie in the various countries; by taking advantage of every—even the smallest—opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this fail to understand even a grain of Marxism. . . . Lenin's theses about compromises, agreements and a flexible policy are the cornerstone of the activities of Communists in all countries and bring success to them. Suffice it to point here to examples of the struggle for the establishment and development of popular fronts in various countries and the emergence and solidification of the Peace Fighters' movements.[21]

Interestingly, signs of experimentation with new front tactics were evident some time before the general switch in Soviet strategy crystallized. The first such sign can be dated back to November 1953, when the World Peace Council began to plan for a "World Conference for the Relaxation of International Tensions." The conference, held in Stockholm in June 1954, was perhaps the first such meeting for which the WPC disclaimed all official responsibility. Great care was taken to prevent the dissemination of obviously pro-Communist mass propaganda as well as to insure attendance by a large number of genuinely uncommitted Asians.

The change of tactics was apparently deemed successful, for it was followed up by a call from a "preparatory committee" to a similar meeting in New Delhi in April 1955, obviously calculated to precede the Bandung Conference by a few days. It was announced that the most important agenda item would be a discussion of the Panch Shila—the five principles of the joint declaration signed by Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Chou En-lai in April 1954—and of the most suitable means for securing their acceptance and application.

THE NEW DELHI gathering did not have the sanction of the Indian government, though it falsely tried to give that impression. Yet it was still of outstanding importance precisely because it represented a reversion to more imaginative front tactics. The influence of the WPC on the tone and deliberations of the gathering was subtle and therefore rather effective. Some 200 delegates were present from Japan, the USSR, Syria, North Korea, North Vietnam, Lebanon, Mongolia, Ceylon, Burma, Pakistan, Egypt and Jordan; their most important move was to call for the formation of a permanent "Asian Solidarity Committee," which through a network of national affiliates was to work for the solution of "common problems" and to strengthen friendship between Asian countries by "collective" action.

[19] See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Harcourt Brace & Co., New York, 1951, pp. 353 ff. Specifically (p. 355): "The fellow-traveller organizations surround the totalitarian movements with a mist of normalcy and respectability that fools the membership about the true character of the outside world as much as it does the outside world about the true character of the movement. The front organization functions both ways: as the facade of the totalitarian movement to the non-totalitarian world and as the facade of this world to the inner hierarchy of the movement."

[20] See Morton Schwartz, "The Vienna Youth Festival," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1959, p. 53.

[21] *Moskovskyi Propagandist*, Moscow, No. 11, November 1957.

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Within a year the regional organization—along with national "solidarity" committees in Japan, Communist China, Burma, North Korea, Ceylon, the Soviet Union and several other countries—were in full operation. By December 1956, the parent organization had assumed the name of "Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee" and had begun publication of the *Asia-Africa Review*. Within another few months, it was calling for an Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference to be attended, not by government delegations as at Bandung, but by "true" representatives of the peoples of the two continents. The meeting took place in December 1957 in Cairo, at the crest of the wave of Soviet-Egyptian friendship; it got worldwide press and radio publicity, and was hailed in the Communist press as the "people's Bandung."[22] The two years which followed saw the establishment of a permanent Afro-Asian Solidarity Council with a professional secretariat, the spread of national "solidarity" committees in Africa, and the birth of a number of related Afro-Asian labor, youth and professional groups. A number of moves were made to increase contacts between the various new committees and associations and the older European front organizations.

To trace the growth of these new organizations, detail their activities, and attempt to discover the exact nature of their relationship with the European fronts and through them with one or more states of the Soviet bloc, would be a task of enormous complexity—if indeed it were possible at all. Still, while all the facts are not and probably cannot be known, the general trend is clear enough. The front organization has become a new and important phenomenon in Asia and perhaps to an even greater extent in Africa. Its appeals are emotional, playing upon the sentiments aroused by the issues of "peace," "solidarity," "national independence," and "anti-colonialism." Its organizational links with overtly Communist groups and individuals are far less apparent than those of its European counterparts; in fact, the political connections of the latter are in many cases unsuspected by the rank-and-file supporters of the new fronts. The result has been that the WFTU has found an audience in the current debate over the formation of a Pan-African trade union organization; that the WFDY received publicity when its Executive Committee met in Guinea in March 1960; that the World Federation of Teachers' Unions is making plans for a World Teachers' Conference on African soil; and that the WPC is almost invariably represented at Afro-Asian meetings and special events.

In support of these developments there has been considerable activity within the Soviet Union itself, aimed both at developing further appeals to the Afro-Asian groups and to the area populations in general, and at training a corps of Soviet area specialists to carry on this work in the future. A new University of Peoples' Friendship has been founded under the joint sponsorship of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the Council of Trade Unions, and the Soviet Association for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; it expects to have an enrollment of several hundred African and Asian students within a few months and of several thousands of them within a few years.[23] At the same time, the publications program of the Soviet Institute of Ethnography in the field of African studies has been greatly increased and accelerated.[24] The Soviet Institute of Oriental Studies has been expanded, and Moscow University has added a course of African studies to its curriculum.[25]

Successes and Failures

These developments, which reflect a considerable revival in Communist front activity in the non-European areas of the world, do not of course imply that front organizations have acquired primary importance in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The fronts remain essentially what they have always been: auxiliary weapons. Their function is not so much to implement foreign policy as to make official Communist policy more acceptable and effective.

It must be emphasized, too, that the transplantation of Communist front activities to Asia, Africa and Latin America has been far from smooth or uniformly successful. On the whole, those successes which have been registered have resulted from a skillful exploitation of legitimate grievances or from the serious lack of information available to the peoples of newly independent states, rather than from any positive actions and policies undertaken by the sundry organizations. Moreover, while recognition of the importance of nationalist movements has represented a major advance in Communist international planning, that recognition has not, of itself, reconciled the requirements of Soviet policy with the

[22] The most revealing source material on the organization and purposes of the Cairo conference is of Communist origin. See: "Cairo, the Continuation of Bandung," *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), February 1958; "From Bandung to Cairo," *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1958; *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 27, 1957.

[23] *New Times* (Moscow), No. 15, 1960.

[24] *Sovetskaia Etnografia* (Moscow), No. 3, March 1957.

[25] D. S. Jhabvala, *Afro-Asian Solidarity: An Idea Betrayed*. Workers' Publication House Ltd., Calcutta, n. d., p. 35.

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new issues raised by Chinese Communist ambitions, Asian neutralism and Afro-Arab nationalism.

To mention but a few examples: Soon after their formation in 1955 and 1956, the Asian Solidarity Committees began to receive adverse publicity in India and Burma, chiefly as a result of their tendentious interpretations of international developments—interpretations which clearly raised questions concerning the motives and organizational affiliations of the Committees. After the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, fronts everywhere were severely criticized for their slavish espousal of the official Soviet position on the intervention. Even though the headquarters of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council remains in Cairo, it has failed to receive that degree of official Egyptian encouragement which was confidently expected to follow from the intense Soviet effort to cultivate President Nasser's friendship in 1956 and 1957. Nor has Iraq become the safe base for Communist front activity which it was supposed to become after the 1958 revolution. In Africa, as evidenced most recently at the Second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference held at Conakry in April of this year, there has been widespread reluctance to accept Soviet participation as a self-styled Asian power. There has also been a growing awareness among Africans of the need for counterbalancing the influence of Peking and other Asian Communist elements at meetings which are essentially African in character.[26]

Finally, growing Sino-Soviet tensions within such major front organizations as the WFTU which, together with the WPC, has been among the most active in developing African and Asian ties, is likely to bode ill for the future of all fronts. Chinese opposition to the acceptance by newly independent states of non-Communist economic aid and technical assistance, as expressed at the WFTY Council meeting held in Peking at the beginning of June 1960, is not likely to sit well with many neutralists and nationalists. Similarly, Peking's current attempt to involve the fronts in the debate over the "inevitability" of world wars is likely to arouse apprehension among those who have hitherto lent their support to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committees, and to expose the entire movement as an arm of Communist policy, thus seriously damaging its chances for further success.

To sum up, therefore, if it is important to recognize that front organizations are a continuing factor in the implementation of certain aspects of Communist policy, it is equally important to understand the many difficulties that confront them. Even though there has been a notable revival of front activity, particularly in Africa and Asia, it would be a mistake to conclude either that the newer fronts have achieved their full potential, or that the older European organizations have lived down their discredited past. Recent evidence would indeed seem to indicate that the potential of the newer groups is unlikely to be realized, given the Communists' tendency to compound their own errors and also the steady if gradual growth of awareness of Communist objectives in those parts of the world which have hitherto had little if any first-hand experience with Sino-Soviet conduct. On the other hand, it would be unwise to disregard the continuing activities of Communist front organizations, or to fail to recognize that even as imperfect instruments they are still of considerable usefulness to the foreign policies of both Moscow and Peking.

[26] *The Observer,* London, April 17, 1960.

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COMMUNISM IN HOLLAND:

A Study in Futility

By Frits Kool

ALL COMMUNIST PARTIES—even those fully dominated by Moscow—are shaped to some degree by the national life and character of their home countries. The Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN), both despite and because of its negligible influence in Holland, makes an interesting case study in this respect. Its long history of ineffectual action and internal dissension reflects the impact both on and within the party of indigenous characteristics and traditions, shaped by the social, political and economic development of the Dutch nation over a period of centuries. An understanding of the party's situation today therefore requires preliminary mention of certain features of the national setting.

Historical Background

A marked characteristic of the Netherlands is its cautious approach to influences from abroad. Even compatible ideas and customs are absorbed gradually, never readily imitated, and the infiltration of extremist tendencies is quite foreign to the national tradition. The roots of this tradition were greatly strengthened and in part shaped during Holland's 80 years' struggle with Spain (1568-1648): religiously, the war expressed the struggle of Protestantism—chiefly Calvinism—against Roman Catholicism; politically, it was a struggle of local particularism against centralization as well as foreign domination; socially, it has been interpreted as the first "middle class revolution" in Europe, reflecting the rise of early capitalism and an independent mercantile class in Holland.

The combined factors of this situation were propitious for the development of liberal thought *avant la lettre.* Although Calvinism became the official state religion, Protestant dissenters and Jewish refugees from Spain and Portugal enjoyed relatively great religious freedom for the times and in turn contributed significantly to Dutch economic development; even the Roman Catholics succeeded in maintaining strength (their following has remained around 35 to 40 percent of the population ever since). The general attitude of tolerance was no less real for being rooted in the self-interests of a preponderantly commercial society.

The diversity of religious opinion, though reciprocally encouraging to tolerant thought, contributed to a theologization of Dutch public life, producing among broad sectors of the population a singular religious zeal that remains today a fundamental characteristic of the nation. The denominational parties (Catholic and Fundamentalist-Protestant) have constituted a majority of the Parliament, and more workers are organized in Roman Catholic and Protestant trade unions than in non-religious labor organizations.

The combination of doctrinairism and religious freedom, along with Holland's liberal traditions, has created a favorable breeding ground for ideological hairsplitting; on the other hand, the same characteristics, accompanied by a gradual democratization of political and social life, have served as powerful preventives against totalitarian tendencies. These national traits have been particularly important in the evolution of the political left and the labor movement, the history of which has been marked

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by a succession of splits along ideological and religious lines.

Although Holland had earlier spearheaded European economic development, its economy during most of the 19th century was characterized by stagnation and resistance to the industrial revolution, and the labor movement was correspondingly slow to develop. Not until the 1870's, when economic activity became livelier and urban growth set in, did workers' organizations begin to appear. In 1881 the first socialist workers' organization on a national scale was founded, the Social Democratic League. Although its initial program embraced both revolutionary action and reform (especially the aim of universal suffrage), it soon came to be dominated by anti-parliamentarian and anarchist tendencies, and in 1894 a minority withdrew to found the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP), with a Marxist platform that followed the German Erfurt program drawn up by Karl Kautsky.[1]

Early Socialism and Its Controversies

The SDAP in its turn was soon torn by controversies between ideological purists—mainly intellectuals who had been attracted to the party by the revolutionary ideal—and a pragmatic element that predominated among leaders of working-class background, who under Dutch conditions had faith in parliamentary democracy and therefore tended to favor reformist efforts. A new split took place in 1909, when a small fraction of the revolutionaries defected to form their own Social Democratic Party (SDP), later to be renamed the Communist Party of Holland (1918), and still later the Communist Party of the Netherlands (1935). The SDAP remained by far the larger and stronger party, veering steadily in later years toward democratic social reform.[2]

The dominant intellectual element of the SDP was originally characterized by highly individualistic radicalism, which inevitably gave rise to further internal dissension. Indeed, in the frequency and intensity of its feuding the Dutch party had no parallel, with the possible exception of its German counterpart. But if such struggles contributed to the party's weakness, they also reflected the relative freedom of opinion which prevailed in its early years. The victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia and the founding of the Comintern, with which the Dutch Communists (now the CPH) affiliated, foreordained the collapse of any initiative within the national party that might be considered alien to the official "line." As the mirage of a European revolution disappeared and the Comintern more and more became an organ of Soviet state policy, the ultra-internationalist radicals—the "left deviationists" of the CPH—gave up their protests against party conformance to the Comintern line and withdrew to form their own minuscule organization, thereafter little more than a theoretical debating society. The more moderate leadership of the party, which was essentially in agreement with the Comintern's trend toward the "right" —*i.e.*, toward a "united front" policy—in the middle 1920's, ran into trouble in 1925 when it protested against Comintern interference over an issue of trade union-party relations: its pleas that at least some freedom of action should be left to Comintern affiliates and that "mechanical discipline" was "crippling" the party were to no avail against counter-cries of "right deviationism" and "opportunism," and it was forced to abdicate in favor of a new leadership obedient to Moscow.[3] Still another party faction of semi-Trotskyite leanings, although it had had a hand in the downfall of the old CPH leaders, soon withdrew its allegiance from the party.

Thus 1925 marked the end of any independence in the CPH, paralleling the concurrent "bolshevization" of various other Communist parties and the ascendancy of Stalin. From then until World War II the party was no more than a weak though noisy mimic of Moscow, adapting itself without the slightest hesitation to the various shifts in Kremlin policy and contributing its share of Stalin worship. Its efforts to form a "People's Front" in 1935 were repudiated by the Dutch political left, and even in the impact of the depression it never won more than a 3.4 percent vote in general elections (1937). As in the case of other Communist parties, its subservience reached a new high (or low) in August 1939 when—in the wake of the Hitler-Stalin pact—it switched overnight from a vehement anti-fascist to as rabid an "anti-imperialist" line.

[1] The Erfurt Program, a political platform based on Marxist principles, was adopted by the German Social Democratic Party in 1891 and later served as a model for various young European Socialist parties. On the Dutch party see *i.a.*, D. J. Wansink, *Het socialisme op de tweesprong. De geboorte van de SDAP* (Socialism at the crossroads. The origin of the SDAP), H. D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon N. V., Haarlem, 1939, p. 196 ff.

[2] The early relative strength of the two parties is indicated by the results of the March 1918 general election—the first in Holland under a system of universal male suffrage and proportional representation—which gave the SDAP 22.5 percent of the popular vote to the SDP's 2.4 percent (supplemented by 1.3 percent won by two small allied parties).

[3] On the party struggles of this period see W. van Kavesteyn, *De wording van het communisme in Nederland: 1907-25* (The origins of communism in the Netherlands: 1907-25), P. N. van Kampen & Zoon N. V., Amsterdam, 1948, pp. 222-38; and *De Tribune* (the CPH daily), May 4, 8, 14, 19 and 25, 1925.

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Such was the situation when the German Nazis invaded Holland in May 1940. At first the Communists clung to the Moscow-dictated line, attributing the German violation of Dutch neutrality to the complicity of Dutch financiers and capitalists in England's "warlike policy," attacking the SDAP and the Socialist trade-union federation as the "Social Democratic servants" of the capitalists, and proclaiming the need for "peace and friendship with the German people."[4] Despite this obliging attitude toward the Nazis, the party was dissolved in July and had to go underground. Thereafter its line began to change, and to its credit—though not as much as it later claimed—it played a considerable role in the Amsterdam strike of February 1941, a unique protest demonstration against German anti-Semitic fury. After the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941 all equivocation ended, and during the war the Communists made an important contribution to the underground resistance movement.

This wartime role, combined with the devastating economic conditions of postwar Europe, afforded the Communists the one opportunity in their history for an effective increase in strength. Although right after Holland's liberation they failed in an effort to create a broad "people's party" of the left, leading to the reconstitution of the CPN in July 1945, the party succeeded in polling 10.6 percent of the popular vote in the general elections of 1946, and in Amsterdam managed to win the allegiance of a third of the electorate.

It is doubtful whether the Communists could have maintained this impressive gain, even if they had adopted judicious tactics and a constructive postwar program. The gradual restoration of the Dutch economy, along with healthy developments on the political and social fronts, almost certainly would have nullified the Communist appeal in any case. The CPN speeded up the process, however, by its blind persistence in a sterile adaptation of Stalinism that was to contribute ten years later—in the turmoil of 1956—to a new outbreak of its chronic disease of intraparty struggle.

Postwar Sterility and Strife

A key development in postwar Dutch political life was the fusion of Social Democrats, progressive liberals, and a number of former adherents of the denominational parties into a single Labor Party. At first many of the old SDAP workers were reluctant to join the new party, but it soon proved its effectiveness as an instrument of genuine social reform. Holland's remarkable economic recovery, coupled with an even more remarkable extension of social legislation, gave workers a larger share of national income and welfare benefits than they had previously enjoyed and prevented major labor conflicts from arising. In this situation the working class—especially the younger element—took little interest in the type of outdated radicalism offered by the Communists, and the CPN found it increasingly difficult to find issues to exploit. The growing distrust of the Soviet Union after the development of the cold war did nothing to help the party. The deterioration of its position was reflected in the drop of its electoral strength from the high of 1946 to 7.7 percent in 1948, 6.2 percent in 1952, 4.7 percent in 1956 and, most recently, 2.4 percent in 1959.

Contributing to the party's failure—if further contribution was needed—was the essentially Stalinist spirit of its top leadership, epitomized in the person of the General Secretary, Paul de Groot. A typical specimen of the intellectually-barren *apparatchik*, De Groot was well-entrenched with his own "cult of the individual" long before Stalin's death, and he has shown little change of nature in the years since. His leadership has been a major factor in the recent disputes that have racked the party, as will be shown.

Another important factor in the party's postwar troubles has been its trade union policies and tactics, which warrant a brief review. Toward the end of the war, the idea of trade union unity made headway among all labor groups. Even the leadership of the powerful Catholic and Protestant unions temporarily considered fusion with the Socialist-dominated Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions (NVV). However, negotiations fell apart over the issue of religious policy. The Communists, who in 1944 championed labor unity as fiercely as they did political unity, then joined together with a scattering of syndicalist and revolutionary socialist adherents, a number of dissidents from the NVV, as well as elements seeking trade union unity for its own sake, to form a union movement which, with the liberation, took the name of Unified Trade Union Organization of the Netherlands (EVC).

Very soon EVC proved as disappointing to its non-Communist adherents as did developments in the party. With Communists in control of the leadership, EVC became nothing but a front organization conforming with every shift of party policy. For example, soon after the war it waged a bitter struggle against the NVV for supporting what it called a "neo-fascist" coopera-

[4] See *Het Volksdagblad* (the CPN daily), June 26 and 27, 1940 and unsigned editorial, "Vijf historische dagen," (Five historical days), in *Politiek en Cultuur* (party monthly), June 1940, pp. 321-25.

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tive arrangement between employers, unions and the government aimed at speeding economic recovery. Then, in a revival of "united front" tactics, it turned right around to seek amalgamation with the NVV—a tactic decisively repudiated by the latter (in 1947) as an attempt at Communist infiltration.[5] The continuing failure of EVC to achieve even a start towards its avowed goal of labor unity led to a constant trickle of withdrawals among its politically non-committed membership. Between 1946 and 1952 membership dropped from 175,000 to a claimed 165,000, and that figure—the last ever issued—was doubtful. In the same period, NVV membership rose from 240,000 to 420,000, the Protestant trade unions from 100,000 to 175,000, and the Catholic unions from 180,000 to 320,000.[6]

Aside from its role as a front, the EVC, like the party, was doomed to decline as an anachronistic institution in a society of increasing social welfare and industrial peace. It had rallied workers brought up in the Marxist faith, who believed in the inevitability of class antagonisms and serious depressions. Yet in the healthy atmosphere of Holland, even the strikes which it succeeded in provoking met with small effect—except to dishearten the membership.

Thus it was that both the EVC and the CPN had been reduced to virtual stagnation and insignificance when the year 1956 brought its explosive developments, raising new issues for which neither organization was in the least prepared.

The Stalinists and the Opposition

Without doubt Khrushchev's "secret speech" and other developments at the 20th CPSU Congress hit the Stalinist-oriented CPN like a bombshell. The reaction of the party leadership was at first complete silence, then a belated and carefully-worded statement (dated April 10, 1956) that clearly reflected the reluctance and difficulty with which it was issued. In contrast to the livelier responses of a number of sister parties, it stated simply that the party executive, having been informed of the "criticism . . . of the errors made by Comrade Stalin," was "fully in agreement with the declaration of the CPSU to the effect that, in spite of these errors, the CPSU has always pursued a correct, Leninist, successful policy." Following this piece of spurious logic, the statement added that "Stalin will enter history as one of the most able thinkers and organizers of the Marxist-Leninist movement." [7]

While the CPN leadership would not have dared to refuse openly to endorse the policy line issued by Moscow, the Stalinist cast of its controlling element continued to show in its rather half-hearted response to any trends toward liberalization or detente, and its converse enthusiasm for retreats toward a "hard" Soviet line domestically or internationally. For example, in acclaiming the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, it showed none of the embarrassment apparent between the lines of the apologias of some other parties, and in fact seemed relieved at the return to a tough and crude language reminiscent of Stalin's time. It also welcomed the Kremlin's periodic moves towards a resumption of the anti-Yugoslav campaign. On the other hand it was extremely cool toward the phenomenon of Polish semi-independence. In short, De Groot has proved that he has much more in common with Ulbricht than with either Gomulka or Tito. (Rumor has it that he has even referred disparagingly to Khrushchev, distorting his name to the similar-sounding "Knoeichef," which in translation from the Dutch means "cheat-chief.")[8]

Elsewhere within Dutch Communist and fellow-travelling ranks, however, the events of 1956 combined to produce a very different reaction, and it eventually became apparent that the party was embroiled in internecine dissensions as bitter as any in its struggle-ridden history. Although these dissensions were at first kept secret, it was later revealed that the party executive had already divided on a number of issues during 1956. De Groot, maintaining that there was "no question of any cult of the individual" in Holland, refused to permit discussion of the issue at the 18th CPN Congress that year; yet some people did speak out at the Congress against the "sectarian spirit" in the party, blaming it for the fall of membership below prewar levels, and against the blanket endorsement of Soviet and bloc policies.[9]

The first open admission of trouble in the ranks came at the end of 1957, prompted specifically by disputes

[5] See A. J. C. Ruter, "De illegale actie voor de Eenheidsvakbeweging in historisch perspectief" (Underground action for the unified trade union movement in historical perspective), *Varia Historica*, Van Gorcum, Assen, 1954, pp. 259-75.

[6] Fr. de Jong, Edz., *Om de plaats van de Arbeid* (For labor's place), De Arbeiderspers, Amsterdam, 1956, p. 253 ff., 287 ff.

[7] *Politiek en Cultuur*, May 1956, pp. 309-11.

[8] Reported by G. Wagenaar, *De Brug*, No. 3, July 1958. "De Brug," as will be shown, is the label assumed by the latter-day opposition Communists. Initially their protests were issued in sporadic pamphlets and bulletins; their organ *De Brug* was started as a monthly in May 1958 and converted into a fortnightly (albeit elastically scheduled) early in 1959.

[9] Cf. *Politiek en Cultuur*, October and November 1956; *De Waarheid*, March 19 and April 4, 1958; *De politieke achtergrond van de crisis in de CPN* (The Political Background of the Crisis in the CPN), De Brug pamphlet No. 7, n. d.; also De Brug bulletin No. 4, n. d.

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over the policy and status of the long-foundering EVC, but revealing much broader divisive issues. Within the EVC, the idea of promoting amalgamation with the NVV had again been adopted—presumably at the party's instance—but was meeting with strong resistance from a growing portion (eventually a majority) of the members who favored preserving an autonomous organization, among them the EVC's chief, Bertus Brandsen. In December the party leadership, in announcing the expulsion of a lesser party member issued a public criticism of Brandsen and his supporters; at the same time it offered the admission that intraparty difficulties had arisen not only over EVC but over "criticism" of Stalin, the "leading role" of the Soviet Union, and attacks on General Secretary De Groot himself.[10]

The party leadership's plea—and then demand—for an end of "fractions" in the EVC and the CPN did nothing to silence the rumbling. In April 1958 a number of ranking party members urged the CPN Executive to open the columns of *De Waarheid* (The Truth) and *Politiek en Cultuur* (Politics and Culture), respectively the daily and monthly party organs, to a "principled" discussion of basic issues. The executive answered by abruptly expelling the opposition leaders—including Brandsen, the party chairman Gerben Wagenaar (until then second to De Groot in the hierarchy), and the popular Amsterdam party boss Henk Gortzak.[11] A barrage of vilification followed, attacking the "Wagenaar-Brandsen clique" as "accomplices of capitalism," whose "schismatic practices" had been a "noxious virus" undermining the party—which nevertheless had been "ideologically" strengthened by the struggle.[12]

The problem of EVC was tackled a few months after the expulsions, with crudely obvious tactics. In June a special congress of the party faithful was convoked and declared the formation of a separate organization, called the "EVC-1958." Party spokesmen denied that the CPN leadership had ever wanted to liquidate the union organization, and a resolution was adopted which accused the non-obedient EVC of using the "gutter-press" for support in this pretension, and of harboring "anti-communism."[13] Within just a year and a half, however, precisely what the EVC had charged took place. At an Extraordinary Congress in January 1960, the EVC-1958 was commanded to go over lock, stock and barrel to the NVV, a bitter pill that the party tried to sugar by founding an auxiliary "Center for Unity in the Class Struggle in the Trade Unions," the functioning of which was left in the dark. The NVV had different ideas, however: a short comment in its press organ headlined "No Place for Cell Builders" once again repudiated the Communists' "offer," declaring it would not tolerate the admission of "undesired elements."[14] Such was the tragicomic end of the CPN's dwarfish union establishment. The EVC proper, on the other hand, has managed to survive, although compelled of course to leave the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.

"Non-Revisionist" Revisionism

Meantime the opposition element, whose ranks had swelled somewhat, took shape as an organized group and created its own monthly organ, named *De Brug* (The Bridge), to replace previous protest bulletins. Its position was outlined in the inaugural issue of May 1958, in an introductory article by Wagenaar. Claiming that De Groot's leadership of the CPN had estranged its adherents, that he had made of the party "a kind of penal company with the discipline of a sergeant-major drilling his troops," Wagenaar stated that the opposition wanted to see "democratic centralism" restored and the party liberated "from sectarianism and dogmatism, as well as from rightist adventures." He and his comrades were "no revisionists" and their "solidarity" with the Soviet Union and other "Socialist" countries was beyond doubt: in fact, ". . . the ties have grown even closer for us since the 20th Congress . . . and the unflinching struggle [in the USSR] against dogmatism and sectarianism, and very concretely against the cult of the individual . . ." *De Brug*, he went on, hoped to stimulate discussion and would even open its columns to those non-Communists who might wish to write on the "struggle against rocket bases," the "Nazi *Wehrmacht*," and similar topics. Both Wagenaar's article and supplemental items in the journal expressed the conventional party position on NATO and other East-West issues.[15]

[10] *De Waarheid*, December 9 and 10, 1957; cf. *Politiek en Cultuur*, January and February 1958.

[11] See sources listed in footnote 9; also *Politiek en Cultuur*, March 1958, pp. 138-40.

[12] See *De Waarheid*, Sept. 22, Oct. 30, and Dec. 13, 1958; also CPN undated leaflet, *Veertig jaar Communistische Partij van Nederland* (Forty years [of the] Communist Party of the Netherlands).

[13] *Congreskrant. Verslag van het Buitengewoon Congres* . . . (printed report on the Extraordinary Congress held at Amsterdam, June 7-8, 1958).

[14] *Discussie-grondslag voor het Buitengewoon Congres van de EVC-1958* . . . (EVC-1958 report on the bases for discussions at the Extraordinary Congress of Jan. 30-31, 1960); *Een persoonlijk woord tot de (vermoedelijke) leden van de EVC-1958* (A personal word to the (presumed) members of the EVC-1958), leaflet; also *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, Feb. 2, 1960.

[15] Gerben Wagenaar, "Waarvoor wij staan" (What we stand for), *De Brug*, No. 1, May 1958.

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Throughout the rest of 1958 *De Brug* pursued essentially the same line. On some issues it took a fairly strong stand, as for example on the value of separate paths of party development and of intraparty discussion (". . . the various national Communist parties must come to political ripeness in order to take the necessary decisions in full independence. Socialism is no article for export; we shall not receive it offered to us like a present." [16]). On other issues it was more cautious—*e.g.*, when Nagy was executed *De Brug* criticized the CPN's monthly organ for trying to justify the execution "in a shaky way"—leaving it to the reader to interpret this somewhat enigmatic wording.[17] While never letting up on its criticism of De Groot, the journal tried to represent the CPSU's position on the Dutch schism as one of non-commitment.

However, any expectations the *De Brug* group may have had of support either from within CPN ranks or from Moscow probably went down the drain with the holding of the 19th CPN Congress in December 1958. De Groot's leadership was not only reaffirmed by the membership but was acclaimed in messages from various of the Communist parties, including the Soviet and the Chinese, congratulating the party executive in specific terms for having "dealt the revisionists in its ranks a smashing blow." [18] A month later, the 21st CPSU Congress manifestly confirmed Moscow's retreat toward a more dogmatic and rigidly anti-revisionist line.

The lengths to which the CPN leadership went in vilifying the *De Brug* group was indicated in a later report on the Dutch Congress by Marcus Bakker, since the eviction of the "traitors" the No.-2 man and theoretical mouthpiece of the CPN. In the best Stalinist tradition of dialectical disregard for logical obstacles, Bakker antedated the "original sin" of his antagonists by more than a dozen years to explain the rise of "revisionism":

> In 1942 and 1943, when it became clear that the Soviet Union would smash Hitler, the Nazis and the emigre bourgeois governments then in London worked might and main to undermine growing Communist influence. . . . People who frequently were serving the interests of the British intelligence service rather than those of the Dutch people wormed their way into the leadership of the party . . . [This] leadership sought to subordinate the political aims of the party to imperialist politics; attempts were made to weaken solidarity with the Soviet Union. . . .
>
> Immediately after the war the new leadership headed by Comrade De Groot . . . launched a struggle for the Leninist line. . . . Such figures as Wagenaar, . . . after the reactionary onslaught which followed the counterrevolutionary *putsch* in Hungary and Titoist activity, . . . discarded their masks and attacked the party. . . . It is now plain to every worker that the revisionists are directly supporting the reactionaries.[19]

Election Showdown

Having lost all hope of a reform within the party, the *De Brug* group decided to enter its own candidates in the national elections scheduled for March 1959. It did so with a program that on the one side demanded "tolerance towards all who strive after peace and socialism" and rejected a "campaign of slander . . . which artificially divides Socialist forces," and on the other, echoed in large part the established Communist line on the forces of "reaction," nuclear weapons, "social progress," compulsory military service, *etc.* The *De Brug* group itself stated that "what distinguishes us from the CPN is . . . not in the first place our election program. You will find in both programs in part the same demands and slogans. What distinguishes us is manner and method. . . . We aim at cleanness in the political struggle." [20]

The rivalry between the CPN and the *De Brug* faction undoubtedly helped to bolster the election bid of a new radical party, the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP), which had been founded in January 1957 in a merger of several minuscule political organizations and Labor Party defectors who opposed the LP's support of NATO. The small vote of the extreme left was thus split three ways in the election, with results that were very damaging to the CPN, disappointing to the *De Brug* group, and conversely favorable to the PSP: From its 4.7 percent vote in 1956, the CPN dropped to 2.4 percent, losing four of its seven seats in parliament; the *De Brug* faction polled only 0.6 percent, just short of the seat it had expected to win; the PSP won 1.8 percent and two seats. The *De Brug* people made light of their poor showing, asserting they had "not done badly" in view of their lack of an apparatus.[21] The CPN went much further, claiming victory out of obvious defeat. The "decisive fact," said one party spokesman, was that the "treacherous group of Wagenaar, Gortzak and Brand-

[16] *De Brug*, No. 8, December 1958.

[17] *Ibid.*, No. 6, October 1958.

[18] Texts of messages printed in *Politiek en Cultuur*, March 1959.

[19] Marcus Bakker, "Some Notes on the Dutch Party Congress," *World Marxist Review* (English-language edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, published in Prague), No. 3, Vol. 2, March 1959, pp. 58-59.

[20] *De Brug*, Nos. 9, 10, January and February 15, 1959; also campaign leaflet, *Verkiezingsprogram De Brug* (Election program, De Brug).

[21] *De Brug*, No. 13, March 1959.

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sen" had been "annihilated," while the CPN had been returned to parliament.[22] Bakker, ever ready with a glib explanation, claimed that rightist and "reactionary" forces, including NATO, had helped the "revisionists" with large funds and extensive propaganda, despite which the party had emerged victorious—in fact, he later quoted De Groot as declaring that the election battle against the *De Brug* group was the party's "biggest political victory during its 40 years of existence. . . ."[23]

CPN claims notwithstanding, the oppositionists were far from "annihilated" by the election. In fact, discussion in the columns of *De Brug* became livelier than before, and somewhat less inhibited about criticizing Communist policies and developments outside of Holland. For example, in succeeding months praise was bestowed on Togliatti, while the East German Communists were castigated for issuing "black-and-white" propaganda. Gortzak, after a trip to Yugoslavia, offered many favorable if cautiously-worded remarks on what he had seen, and added that he had been "badly and wrongfully informed" about that country by the CPN. Among "letters to the editor," one asked that attention be paid to a Communist opposition movement in France, and another offered an argument for the independence of national Communist parties. There was also a "debate" over the Chinese intervention in Tibet, offering opinions —albeit restrained ones—both for and against China. While much of the comment published betrayed naiveté, it nevertheless represented a move toward free discussion.[24]

Meantime, at a conference held shortly after the elections, it was decided to organize the opposition in a formal party, called the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP). Its first congress, held in January of this year, adopted a program which stressed specifically Dutch conditions: "Socialism is connected with the secular tradition in the Dutch people of a spirit of liberty, tolerance and justice." Wagenaar elaborated this principle in his speech to the Congress, declaring "it is . . . unacceptable for a Dutchman that the minority be silenced" and maintaining that the minority's viewpoint must be heard if "right decisions" are to be arrived at.

At the same time, the program retained orthodox Leninist positions, to wit: Although the Netherlands Constitution would not bar the road to a democratic realization of the majority's will, in Holland as in all capitalist countries, "bourgeois democracy is . . . essentially a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie." The transition to socialism will require a submission of the bourgeoisie to "the rule of the working class"—to be achieved peacefully if possible, but by "all revolutionary means" should the bourgeoisie have recourse to "undemocratic methods."

With respect to international affairs, the Congress reflected the same contradictory tendencies as had been evident in the pages of *De Brug*, exhibiting a certain degree of new realism but relying more on old shibboleths. The stock falsifications were duly repeated: Because the Soviet Union came out of the war increased in strength, the "imperialists . . . could not prevent the working class from winning power in a number of East European countries"; the struggle for independence in the former colonies is second in importance only to the safeguarding of the peace, for which the "merits" are due the Soviet Union and "all other Socialist countries" —and so on.[25]

It is too soon to tell how the SWP will fare, other than to remark on the obvious fact that it will remain—along with the CPN—a powerless minority in Dutch

[22] *De Waarheid*, March 13, 1959.

[23] Marcus Bakker in *Politiek en Cultuur*, May 1959, p. 197; also his "Bourgeois Democracy in Holland," *World Marxist Review*, No. 7, Vol. 2, July 1959, pp. 35-36.

[24] *De Brug*, Nos. 15, 16, May 1959; Nos. 1, 7, 14, of Vol. II, respectively June, August 27, and December 3, 1959.

[25] *Ontwerp Beginselprogram van de Socialistische Werkers Partij* (Draft program, Socialist Workers' Party), published as an annex to *De Brug*, No. 12, Vol. II, November 5, 1959; *De Brug*, No. 18, February 4, 1960; *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, Jan. 25, 1960.

"Unity"—At a Price

"The Communist," said Paul de Groot . . . , "is he who is also a member of a mass organization, primarily of a trade union. The Communist should study in detail all questions pertaining to the immediate interests of the workers, he should spare no effort on behalf of his workmates and his organization. He is obliged to adhere firmly to his political views, while not forgetting that in our country the sole way to the emancipation of the working class lies through the unity and cooperation of all workers—Socialists, Communists and Christians." . . . We Communists are aware that great difficulties remain to be overcome on the road to unity. It is necessary to expose the machinations of the right-wing Social Democratic and union leaders, expose their inimical policy on the issues affecting the working class, and rebuff their anti-communism.

—From "Real Step Towards Unity," by A. van Turnhout, Member of the CC, Netherlands Communist Party, in *World Marxist Review*, Prague, June 1960, pp. 64-65.

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political life. In view of the past record, it does not seem improbable that further splits and realignments may develop, though at this moment the only potential candidates for cooperation with the SWP are the numerically stronger PSP, along with a handful of radicals who find themselves misfits in the Labor Party.

The End Result: Isolation

Summing up the broad background of the developments described, the virtual insignificance of the extreme left in Holland reflects, on one hand, the unfavorable conditions for any brand of Marxism in the modern social welfare state, where class conflict has wholly lost the life-or-death quality that once spurred socialist radicalism. The Dutch "proletariat" has become a chimera; the small minority which, mostly for psychological reasons, continues to cling to the language of a radical and absolutist ideology, finds that the masses have long since lost all interest in its appeals, somewhat like officers whose army has disintegrated in a process they were powerless to stop.

The weakness of the extreme left also reflects the influence of that peculiar trait of strong factionalism which, in combination with the contrary disposition to tolerance, makes the Dutch national character resistive to authoritarian tendencies of whatever label. This trait has even operated within the extreme left itself to produce its exceptional history of schisms and dissensions. While the recent controversy over revisionism affected the entire Communist movement, its eruption into open struggle and a new split was in Holland, as in some other countries, certainly in part an expression of the national character.

Aside from these factors, the CPN proper has contributed to its own disintegration by the utter sterility of its program and its propaganda. It has contented itself with the endless repetition of outmoded proletarian ideas and slogans, taking no part in efforts to tackle the real national problems which need solution. Finding fewer and fewer domestic issues which it could exploit to its own ends, it has relied increasingly in its propaganda on the achievemntes of the USSR, especially in the scientific, industrial and military fields. Yet the boast that Soviet society has arrived technically at the level of modern capitalist countries, offering by its example the solution to rapid industrialization, has little meaning in Holland with its own well-advanced economy; in fact, the emergence of the modern Soviet empire has tended to destroy what was once a powerful Communist drawing card, the myth of a struggling socialist society in the making, with social utopia—not jet planes or sputniks—as the goal ahead. Moreover, the CPN's emphasis on Soviet military strength (notable in 1959 election literature), with its tacit threat to the Dutch as to any other nation, has constituted a psychological error of the first order, probably even in its effect among Communist-minded "internationalists." In short, the party has demonstrated on every front its utter alienation from the present-day mentality of the Dutch working class.[26]

On the other hand, the secessionists who have revolted against this very sterility of the party not only are stranded with the same empty dream of a "mass base," but also have failed to attract more than a minority from the small following of the Communists. The apparatus of party cadres has in large part remained faithful to the Soviet-backed CPN and has managed to keep the ranks in line. The dilemma of the SWP is that it does not have and does not want a "monolithic" organization, but neither does it have a myth of sufficient strength to fill the vacuum created by its continued denial of modern realities and its refusal to adopt a genuinely democratic standpoint. Freedom and Marxist-Leninist convictions are incompatible—and a party which swears by the latter must fear to see its adherents either return to the mother party or join the forces of democracy.

Thus the Soviet myth, though its magnetism is all but worn out in the Netherlands, seems still to have holding power among the Communist minority. The only other factor of appeal is the "peace" slogan, which can be exploited perfectly well, as the PSP has demonstrated, by people who are not adherents of Communist dogma and who will not be regarded as direct agents of Moscow. The dangers of the hollow kind of pacifism represented by PSP—another subject in itself—ought to be combatted by a reinforcement of dynamic democracy that makes clear the values it stands for and wishes to defend. But the Communist Party, in any case, may be ruled out as a force to be taken seriously in present-day Holland.

[26] For a typical sample of CPN propaganda, see the special election issue of *De Waarheid*, March 1959.

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Tibet in Captivity

By George Ginsburgs and Michael Mathos

EDITORS' NOTE: In "The New Expansionism" (Problems of Communism, *January-February 1960), Professor Robert C. North discussed the antecedents, nature, and extent of Chinese Communist imperialism. The article below presents a glaring illustration of this "new expansionism." Having already established political control over Tibet, the Chinese Communists proceeded, in the wake of the March 1959 uprising, to eradicate the last vestiges of Tibetan autonomy, and to absorb the country—economically, culturally, ideologically—into China proper. The authors trace the various developments step by step, thus illuminating what is by now a standard Communist strategy of conquest, compounded of force and indirect pressure, of subversion by "fifth columns" and pervasive indoctrination—all the more pervasive since it follows the total suppression of any oppositional forces and ideas whatsoever.*

IN RECENT MONTHS, persistent reports of the renewal of armed rebellion against Chinese Communist rule in Tibet have once again focussed attention on that remote but strategically vital region in the heart of Asia. These seemingly widespread and violent disturbances can by no means be regarded as surprising when viewed against the background of political events that have taken place in this troubled land since its so-called "peaceful liberation" by the Chinese Red Army in 1950-51. They are, indeed, only the latest explosive manifestation of the political, social and ideological struggle growing out of Peking's steadily intensifying drive over the past decade to transform Tibet into a "socialized" appendage of the Chinese Communist state.

At the start the Chinese "liberators" of Tibet were careful to avoid undue haste in initiating their program of revolutionary transformation. For the first few years following the reestablishment of effective Chinese sovereignty through military occupation, a period in which the country still remained only semi-pacified, Peking's representatives in Tibet chose to pursue policies of relative moderation and restraint.[1] Even as late as 1955, in fact, it was still possible for a sympathetically disposed outside observer to comment on the situation in Tibet in these laudatory terms:

> **By mild and polite government, the Chinese have made themselves surprisingly popular. Their troops have behaved in exemplary fashion. China is using Tibet as a forward base for political penetration, not military threats. . . . Word has been disseminated throughout the Himalayas about the friendly and helpful Chinese administration.[2]**

The succeeding years, however, witnessed a radical change. Abandoning its initial attitude of comparative tolerance, Peking gradually shifted to a harsh political line characterized by growing interference in local affairs and by efforts to impose ever more stringent controls

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[1] For an analysis of Peking's early policies in Tibet, see the authors' "Tibet's Administration in the Transition Period, 1951-1954," *Pacific Affairs*, 1959, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, pp. 162-177; and "Tibet's Administration During the Interregnum, 1954-1959," *ibid.*, 1959, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, pp. 249-267.

[2] *New York Times*, February 21, 1955, p. 20.

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over the Tibetan population. These new policies caused steadily mounting friction between Peking's emissaries on the spot and the native Tibetan hierarchy, and finally, in March 1959, the pent-up bitterness and antagonism of the population erupted in the Tibetan uprising, leading to the dramatic flight of the Dalai Lama and his entourage to India and the bloody suppression of the revolt by force of Chinese arms.

As the recent renewal of widespread fighting between Tibetan guerrillas and Chinese Communist troops indicates, the crushing of the March 1959 rebellion did not permanently end all challenge to the Chinese Communists' mastery of Tibet, but it did tighten their grip on the country to such an extent that the Peking regime at last felt itself in a position to implement its long-proclaimed—and equally long-postponed—program of sweeping political and social transformation for the area. Peking's official representatives in Lhasa immediately began decreeing major reforms in all spheres of Tibetan life, particularly in the fields of political administration, social institutions and policies, education and indoctrination. Even in the brief span of one year since the smashing of the 1959 uprising, the Chinese Communist program has apparently made considerable strides toward recasting the socio-political physiognomy of Tibet in the "socialized" image of the rest of mainland China, profoundly disrupting in the process the traditional political and cultural patterns of Tibetan society. It is undoubtedly this disruption which culminated in the new flare-up of violent Tibetan resistance in recent months.

Political New Order

The first concern of the Chinese Communist victors in the wake of the 1959 uprising was the elimination of the surviving remnants of Tibetan governmental autonomy and the substitution of a completely revised system of regional political administration subservient to the authority of Peking. The flight of the Dalai Lama and his advisers and ministers into political exile provided Peking with a golden opportunity to accomplish this objective. By a decree of the State Council of the Chinese People's Republic, promulgated on March 28, 1959, the "Local Government of Tibet"—that is, the formerly separate and autonomous administration of the Lhasan theocracy—was proclaimed officially dissolved.[3] Thus, by unilateral action, Peking put an end to the personal rule of the Dalai Lama notwithstanding the fact that under the Sino-Tibetan treaty of May 1951, which laid the legal basis of Tibet's future relationship to Communist China, it was expressly committed to respect his autonomous position and prerogatives.

The Peking decree simultaneously stipulated that the functions and powers of the abolished local government would henceforth be exercised by the so-called "Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region." This Chinese-sponsored body, formally created in 1955 with the ostensible consent of the Lhasan authorities, had actually begun functioning in 1956,[4] and ever since then had been represented by the Communists as the only lawful government and sole repository of autonomous competence for the unified province of Tibet. The Preparatory Committee itself, preponderantly composed of Chinese functionaries and hand-picked Tibetan fellow-travelers, had meanwhile striven by every means at its disposal short of outright coercion to undermine the traditional authority of the Dalai Lama—nominally the Committee's chairman—and substitute an administration of its own creation. This attempt had been largely unsuccessful, for in spite of the divestiture of many of his former rights and the circumscription of his political power, the Dalai Lama continued to wield considerable personal influence in Tibetan affairs up until the events of March 1959—much to the detriment of Peking's objectives. With his flight abroad, however, the path toward total control by the Communist-dominated Preparatory Committee was cleared at last.

To pave the way for this, Peking's decree of March 28 directed major changes in the leadership and make-up of the Committee. Of first importance was the elevation of the Panchen Ngoertehni (Panchen Lama), a complaisant tool of the Communists, to the chairmanship in place of the Dalai Lama. Preserving the official fiction that the latter had been "abducted" by reactionary pro-Western circles, the decree declared that "during the time that the Dalai Lama, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region, is under duress by the rebels, the Panchen Ngoertehni, Vice-Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, will act as Chairman." Pebala Choliehnamje was designated by the decree to fill the vice-chairman's post vacated by the Panchen Lama, and a second vice-chairmanship also was awarded to Kalon Ngaboo, a high Tibetan official who

[3] For text of the decree, see *New York Times*, March 29, 1959, p. 3.

[4] Cf. "Brief Regulations on the Creation of a Preparatory Committee for the Formation of a Tibetan Autonomous Region," as adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, September 26, 1956, *Kwang-ming jih-pao*, September 27, 1956; B. P. Gurevich, *Osvobozhdenie Tibeta* (The Liberation of Tibet), Izdatelstvo vostochnoi literatury, Moscow, 1958, pp. 205-209.

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had been a loyal collaborator with the Communists since 1951 and already had been serving as secretary-general of the committee.

These changes in the leadership of the Preparatory Committee were accompanied by a thorough purge of "traitorous elements" among its members. The March 28 decree not only relieved eighteen officials, all Tibetans, of their posts as members of the committee and of all other public duties, but also provided that they were to be "punished individually under the law." Sixteen new members—five Chinese and eleven fellow-traveling Tibetans—were appointed to the committee in place of those purged.

Administrative Take-Over

The reconstituted Preparatory Committee lost no time in initiating a sweeping reorganization of the administrative structure. At its first subsequent meeting on April 8, 1959, it adopted a resolution appointing General Tan Kuan-sen, political commissar in the Tibetan headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (at present the Peking government's acting chief representative in Tibet) to a post on the Committee's standing executive organ, called the "Permanent Committee." It also voted to create six new administrative departments (public health, industry and commerce, communications, agriculture and livestock, public security, and a councillor's office), which were in addition to six already existing subordinate bureaus (general office, religious affairs commission, and the departments of civil affairs, finance, culture and education, and construction). This expansion was indicative of the Committee's assumption of complete governing authority as the sole organ of Tibetan "autonomy", and it also marked a return to the administrative system which the Chinese had tried to impose in 1955-56 but had been obliged to dismantle in 1957 when Chinese policy in Tibet went through a phase of political retreat.[5]

Perhaps even more significant for the long-run future of Tibet was the fact that the reorganization of the administrative structure was also extended to the intermediate and local governing levels. This ambitious effort to establish a whole new administrative hierarchy topped by the Preparatory Committee and functioning all the way down to the district level had the immediate effect of aggravating a perennial problem—the shortage of trained, politically "reliable" personnel. The Chinese had attempted to solve the problem earlier through the wholesale importation into Tibet of Communist bureaucrats of Han (Chinese) nationality, but this policy had engendered such serious friction with the native population that many of these officials had been withdrawn during the political retreat of 1957.

Seeking a more feasible alternative, the Peking regime began in 1956 to build up a corps of native officials by sending large numbers of Tibetan youths to various Institutes for National Minorities in mainland China for indoctrination.[6] By the time the wholesale reorganization of the regional administration was undertaken in the wake of the 1959 uprising, this program had made sufficient progress to enable Peking to announce that the Chinese officials withdrawn in 1957 would not be returned to Tibet, but would be replaced instead by Tibetans who had completed their training in China proper. Already by June 1959, some 1,200 Tibetan graduates of the Central National Institute for Nationalities, the Southwest Nationalities Institute, and the Szechwan Public School for Tibetans had been sent back to Tibet (in addition to 200 Tibetan-speaking Chinese cadres) to assume administrative posts. At the same time, in order to insure an adequate supply of such graduates to meet the expanded personnel needs, the program for training young Tibetans was pushed ahead with still greater vigor.

PEKING'S NEW POLICY of manning the revamped regional administration as far as possible with Tibetans trained in China was highly astute on several counts. For one thing, the return of large numbers of Tibetan trainees from China served to placate native public opinion, which at the height of the March uprising had insistently demanded that the students in China be sent back home.[7] More importantly, the appointment of Tibetans to official positions helped to soften the shock of the sweeping political changes effected following the revolt, and avoided to some extent the injury to national sensibilities which had been caused by the earlier practice of importing alien Chinese functionaries. Finally,

[5] New China News Agency (NCNA) Daily News Release, December 11, 1956, p. 91; *New York Times*, January 20, 1957, p. 3, and April 28, 1957, p. 13; G. M. Valiakhmetov, *Organy vlasti i upravleniia Tibeta* (Organs of Government and Administration in Tibet), Gosyurizdat, Moscow, 1958, p. 38.

[6] At the same time, Chinese policy in Tibet shifted toward increased employment of Tibetans in official positions. Official Lhasan sources announced on December 10, 1956, that Tibet had 6,000 more government workers of Tibetan nationality than five months earlier, bringing the total to more than 9,000. NCNA Daily News Release, *loc cit.*

[7] *Survey of China Mainland Press* (SCMP), US Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 2012, May 10, 1959, p. 25; No. 2016, May 20, 1959; No. 2017, May 21, 1959; No. 2033, June 19, 1959, p. 36.

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these advantages were gained without any sacrifice of the real substance of Peking's controlling political power inasmuch as virtually all the Chinese-trained Tibetans sent back to serve in the new regional administration had become thoroughly indoctrinated party-members. (Ninety percent of those who returned were said to have enrolled in the party or in the Chinese Communist Youth League during their stay in China.)

In short, the political new order erected by the Chinese Communists in Tibet since the 1959 uprising is one in which the outward trappings of regional autonomy have to some extent been preserved, but merely serve to camouflage the subjection of the Tibetan people to the absolute authority of Peking. The liquidation of the Dalai Lama's government and the purging of his supporters from public office have been followed by the concentration of all local political power in the hands of the drastically reorganized Preparatory Committee and the Chinese Communist military headquarters in Tibet. At the same time, Communist control is being reinforced by the systematic infiltration of Communist-indoctrinated Tibetans into all levels of the regional administration. All this suggests that the "preparatory" phase of Communist China's political assimilation of Tibet is rapidly nearing completion. In all probability, there will be a further administrative change in the near future which will terminate the present interim set-up and endow Tibet with definitive status as an "autonomous region" according to the already established pattern in other national minority areas of the CPR, such as Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia.[8]

Social New Order

While the immediate purpose of the political changes described above was to assure Peking's absolute control over the regional administration, they also had the further objective of setting the stage for a comprehensive program of "social reform" which would transform Tibet into an integrated, indistinguishable part of the socialized Chinese state. Less than a month after the quelling of the Tibetan revolt, Premier Chou En-lai declared at the Second National People's Congress in April 1959 that the action of the rebels "in destroying themselves" had created "extremely favorable conditions for the democratization of Tibet."[9] The early launching of the reform program was also foreshadowed by a unanimous resolution of the Congress proclaiming the intention "to build a prosperous, socialist Tibet."[10]

Shortly thereafter, the Chinese Communist press began a vigorous propaganda campaign publicizing the alleged evils and decadence of the former ruling group in Lhasa and emphasizing the necessity of immediate action to reform the existing social order. On June 28, a directive issued by the Chinese Communist authorities in Lhasa called upon local government officials and the Chinese military garrison in Tibet to cooperate in paving the way for the institution of reform measures.[11]

The first substantive outline of the Communist reform program was presented by General Chang Kuo-hua, commander of the Chinese garrison in Tibet, at the second plenary session of the reconstituted Preparatory Committee in Lhasa early in July. According to a Peking communique summarizing the proceedings, General Chang opened the session by announcing a two-stage program of "democratic reforms"—the first stage aiming at the suppression of rebellion, the elimination of serfdom and other forms of unpaid forced labor, and the reduction of rents and interest; and the second stage to center on "redistribution of the land." Although reiterating that "the policy of the Communist Party . . . on freedom of religious belief will be firmly adhered to," General Chang warned that "a campaign will be carried out in the monasteries and temples to combat rebellion, privileges and exploitation." He further indicated that, in addition to steps for liquidating the old order in the countryside, the reform program envisaged the establishment of "peasants' associations" which would become the basic form of mass leadership and the basic units of local government in rural areas.

Also addressing the session as acting committee chairman, the Panchen Lama endorsed the main points of the program outlined by General Chang. Both speakers implied that Tibetan rebels loyal to the Dalai Lama would be punished, possibly by the confiscation of all their lands and property, with their herds to be turned over to herdsmen faithful to the new regime. Otherwise, it was indicated that, under the land redistribution program proper, those landlords who cooperated in sur-

[8] For a recent study of autonomy in Sinkiang, see K. F. Kotov, *Mestnaia natsionalnaia avtonomia v Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublike (Ne primere Sintszyan-Uigurskoi avtonomnoi oblasti)* (Local National Autonomy in the Chinese People's Republic: The Example of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region), Gosyurizdat, Moscow, 1959; also, A. G. Yakovlev, *Reshenie natsionalnovo voprosa v Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublike* (Solution of the National Question in the Chinese People's Republic), Izdatelstvo vostochnoi literatury, Moscow, 1959; and L. D. Voevodin, *Gosudarstvennyi stroi Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki* (State Structure of the Chinese People's Republic), Gosyurizdat, Moscow, 1956, pp. 120-133.

[9] *New York Times*, April 15, 1959, p. 1.

[10] SCMP, No. 2005, May 4, 1959, p. 1.

[11] *New York Times*, June 29, 1959, p. 24.

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rendering land or other property which they held in excess of the maximum limits to be fixed by the program would receive full compensation, and that herds would not as a rule be subject to redistribution.[12]

Practical steps to implement the reform program had not long been underway before official Chinese Communist sources already were claiming that major successes had been scored toward achieving the goals of the first stage. The chief means of enlisting popular support was the staging of a mass campaign after the familiar Chinese Communist pattern, carried out under the militant slogan of "the three anti's and two reductions"—anti-rebellion, anti-slavery, anti-forced labor; reduction of rents, reduction of interest. Campaign propaganda proclaimed that mobilization of the masses and the inculcation of class consciousness among the toiling strata (defined along classical Marxist lines) were the keys to the formation of a local revolutionary movement which could secure for the Tibetan people far-reaching political, social and economic improvements. The militant vanguard of the movement would be recruited largely (75 percent) from among the poor serfs and freed slaves, but it would ally itself with the middle serfs and other "progressive elements" (*i.e.,* persons of the upper social strata who proved themselves to be "patriotic and anti-imperialistic.")[13]

Parallel with the mass campaign, certain features of the organizational pattern already familiar in Communist China proper were introduced to ensure effective enforcement of the reforms decreed by the Prparatory Committee. "Residents' committees" were set up in urban areas and charged with the task of "leading the masses to develop production, assisting the municipal military control commissions, watching over the conduct of the civil administration, helping to assure the livelihood of the people, and leading the masses to engage in study." Twenty-seven such committees were established in the four central districts of Lhasa alone.[14]

Reform in Rural Tibet

Although progress was generally slower in carrying the program into the backward rural areas, persistent prodding by the Communist authorities had its effect, and by the fall of 1959 Lhasa and Peking were also claiming major accomplishments in the organization of peasants' associations and in other phases of agrarian reform. These claims were summed up in a report presented by the Panchen Lama at a session of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the CPR in October. The report said:

> Democratic reform is being carried out mainly in agricultural areas. In agricultural districts with an aggregate population of 400,000, the first stage of democratic reform, namely, the carrying out of the "three anti's and two reductions" has been successfully completed or will soon be completed. . . . In individual places, the second stage, that is, the abolition of land ownership by feudal lords, enforcement of land ownership by the peasants, and distribution of land to the peasants, has been completed In the remaining agricultural districts with an aggregate population of 500,000, preparations are being made for carrying out the campaign of the "three anti's and two reductions." [15]

Another Communist report claimed that 503 peasants' associations with 100,000 members had already been formed at the *hsiang* (county) level—an achievement which was described as a decisive step toward the total transformation of rural Tibetan life.[16] In November 1959, a new committee of 26 members was set up in Lhasa, under the chairmanship of the Chinese military chief, General Chang Kuo-hua, to make plans for pushing ahead with the main part of the land redistribution program. Chinese Communist press reports claimed in February 1960 that "democratic reforms" had successfully destroyed feudal serfdom in Tibet, implying that the process of breaking up the big estates and reapportioning the land among the peasantry was virtually completed. Peking dispatches also hinted that action had already been initiated to organize farmers' mutual-aid teams and cooperatives as the first step toward full collectivization of Tibetan agriculture and, eventually, the introduction of communes.[17]

Despite the changes effected in the predominantly agricultural sectors of Tibet, it appears that the pastoral areas have thus far remained largely untouched by the second stage of the reform program. The efforts of the regional administration among the nomadic population of the pastoral areas are said to be confined at present to combatting rebellion, doing away with slavery and forced labor, developing the economy and improving living standards. Except for the confiscation of herds belonging to participants in the March 1959 uprising, the manorial lords and herd-owners continue to retain possession of their livestock.[18] The regime, however,

[12] *New York Times*, July 4, 1959, p. 1.
[13] SCMP, No. 2120, October 21, 1959, p. 5.
[14] *Ibid.*, No. 2147, December 2, 1959, p. 18.
[15] *Ibid.*, No. 2120, October 21, 1959, p. 5; *New York Times*, October 15, 1959, p. 9, and November 14, 1959, p. 1.
[16] SCMP, No. 2139, November 19, 1959, p. 30.
[17] *New York Times*, December 15, 1959, p. 17, and February 29, 1960, p. 8; SCMP, No. 2209, March 4, 1960, p. 29.
[18] SCMP, No. 2120, October 21, 1960, p. 5; *New York Times*, July 4, 1959, p. 1, and November 14, 1959, p. 1.

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makes no secret of its intention eventually to bring socialism to these areas as well.

One point in particular should be underlined. In Tibet as in the rest of Communist China, land reform was carried out not as an end in itself, but merely as a maneuver to dispossess the propertied classes and win the support of the mass of the agricultural population prior to embarking on the established Communist path toward total collectivization of agriculture. Thus, the land reform represents a purely transitional policy which is eventually bound to give way to measures imposing the economic pattern already forced upon the countryside in the rest of Communist China—probably to the accompaniment of the same coercive methods and brutal pressures which drove the Chinese peasantry first into farm cooperatives and subsequently into the communes.

Education and Indoctrination

One of the most crucial facets of the Chinese Communist effort to remold Tibetan society—and one which has met with especially determined resistance—has been the attempt to transform the educational system into a weapon of political indoctrination. After the military take-over of Tibet in 1951, the Chinese Communists' efforts in this direction were relatively slow and circumspect, but they eventually gave way to an aggressive drive to gain control of education. Between 1954 and 1959, the effectiveness of the drive fluctuated with the repeated ups and downs of Chinese Communist authority and prestige in Tibet, reaching its nadir at the time of the 1957 political retreat. Since the 1959 uprising, however, complete Communist mastery of the regional political administration, and especially the suppressive measures taken against the monasteries—the traditional centers of Tibetan education—because of their implication in the revolt, have permitted the accelerated application of Communist educational policies.

Chinese statements and press reports over the post-revolt period have claimed steady progress in building up a secular public school system run by the state, along with a rapid growth in student enrollment. In the capital city of Lhasa, enrollment in public primary schools reportedly showed such a sharp increase soon after the revolt that it exceeded existing school capacity for the first time. One new primary school was reported already opened, as well as the first public school for spare-time attendance by workers. By June 1959, the total number of children and adults enrolled in the public schools of the capital was officially stated to have reached 5,000, as compared to a pre-revolt enrollment of 1,000 (children only) in the city's elementary schools. A further report towards the end of 1959 claimed that five regular primary schools and 42 spare-time workers' schools and study-groups had been established in Lhasa.[19]

A similar expansion of state-run educational facilities and school enrollment was claimed for the rest of Tibet. In the Chamdo district, for example, an August 1959 official statement reported that more than a dozen public primary schools were operating in addition to those in the main city of the district, that scholarships were being provided for the poor, and plans being made to double the number of pupils enrolled during 1960.[20] By February of this year, it was reported that approximately 150 primary schools, middle schools, and workers' evening schools were in operation throughout Tibet, and that rapid and impressive gains had been registered everywhere in student enrollment. More than 7,000 former serfs and their children, it was claimed, had already become literate thanks to the school program.[21]

The Communist drive to promote mass education conforms to the standard practice of Communist regimes wherever they have come to power, and again it represents only a means and not an end. That is to say, it reflects Peking's belief in the efficacy of mass public education as an indoctrinational weapon for winning over the younger generation of Tibetans to communism. Hence, it is safe to assume that the efforts of the Communist-dominated regime in Tibet to expand education will be vigorously pressed.

Long before their maneuvers to gain control of Tibetan education finally succeeded, the Chinese Communists also were utilizing other familiar, and more direct, methods of mass political indoctrination in an effort to win over the Tibetan population. In addition to the usual unremitting barrage of party propaganda via press and radio, the Communists were active in organizing a wide variety of social and cultural associations designed to attract mass followings among the Tibetans. Among such associations successfully launched between 1951 and 1959 were Tibetan branches of the Chinese New Democratic Youth Federation and Women's Patriotic Federation, a number of Tibetan Young Pioneer groups, and Study Committees of various types.[22] In 1956 the Communist press gave considerable publicity to the estab-

[19] SCMP, No. 2020, May 26, 1959, p. 19; No. 2041, June 24, 1959, p. 34; No. 2042, June 25, 1959, p. 23; No. 2074, August 12, 1959, p. 34; No. 2136, November 16, 1959, p. 26.

[20] *Ibid.*, No. 2069, August 5, 1959.

[21] *Ibid.*, No. 2186, February 1, 1960, p. 35.

[22] *Jen-min jih-pao*, August 28, 1956; V. P. Leontiev, *Inostrannaia ekspansiia v Tibete, 1888-1919gg.*, (Foreign Expansion in Tibet, 1888-1919), Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, Moscow, 1956, p. 208.

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lishment of Tibetan affiliates of the Chinese Buddhist Association and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, as well as to the admission of the first group of Tibetans (in Tibet proper) into the Communist Party.[23]

Although these activities suffered a temporary setback during the 1957 retreat, they were quickly revived after the 1959 revolt. Not only have the functions and activities of the already existing associations been considerably expanded, but a number of new organizations have been formed to supplement the party machinery in mobilizing public opinion at the lower levels in support of the present Communist regime and its policies.[24] The more recently established bodies include the first Lhasa Municipal General Federation of Trade Unions, formed in August 1959, and a Tibetan branch of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee, organized in October 1959. The political importance of these various mass organizations is indicated by reports that they were responsible for the election of some 100 delegates who attended a representative assembly called by the new Lhasa City Peoples' Government early this year.

The Future Outlook

In the light of the developments described in the preceding pages, the conclusion seems inescapable that within the next few years the Chinese Communists will greatly intensify their efforts aimed at the complete "socialization" of Tibet. Despite the recurrence of spontaneous armed resistance by Tibetan guerilla bands, often on an impressive scale, there would no longer appear to be any practical possibility of organized and effective mass opposition by the Tibetans to Chinese Communist rule.

Indeed, the Peking regime finds itself in a much more favorable situation than at any previous time since the 1951 take-over to realize its objectives in Tibet. From 1951 to 1954, conditions were such that it could not do much more than assure itself of the necessary instrumentalities for preserving its physical presence in the region. From 1954 to 1959, it was able to attempt social changes on a limited scale, but these efforts remained largely ineffective because of the continuing influence of the native ruling hierarchy and its opposition to Communist policies. The events of March 1959, however, radically altered the local balance of political power and created highly propitious conditions for launching an all-out assault on the traditional social order.

Few barriers now stand in the way of total Chinese Communist assimilation of the Tibetan nation. The Lamaist Church has been greatly weakened by direct oppression and indirect subversion. Its monopoly of education has been completely broken, and the Communist-imposed economic reforms have made its financial position untenable, thus placing it entirely at the mercy of the secular authorities. The feudal nobility, apart from a few "progressives" willing to collaborate with the Communists, has been expropriated and crushed as a political force. Where the Communists have not resorted to outright physical extirpation of so-called "class enemies," they have achieved the same objective through the application of social and economic pressures.

The prospects facing the former ruling groups look grim indeed. The fate of the nobility, the land-owning and propertied strata seems definitively sealed. The prospects for the preservation of Lamaism as an influential force in Tibetan life appear no brighter in the light of the tactics previously employed by the Communists in Outer Mongolia. Just as the Mongolian Living Buddha's theocratic authority was allowed to exist in emasculated form only until the Hutukhtu's death, after which no new incarnation was permitted, so the spiritual position of the present head of the Tibetan ecclesiastical hierarchy, the Panchen Lama, will most probably be preserved temporarily, only to disappear by default upon his passing.

Peking, then, seems irrevocably bent on achieving the total assimilation and integration of Tibet into the political, social and economic fabric of the Chinese Communist state. Thus far, its efforts—a blend of ruthless coercion, intensive indoctrination, and demagogy—seem to be succeeding. Whether or not it will accomplish its ultimate goal, however, time alone can tell.

[23] NCNA Daily News Release, July 1, 1956, p. 4, and October 11, 1956, p. 100; SCMP, No. 1449, January 14, 1957, pp. 32-33.
[24] SCMP, No. 2090, September 4, 1959, p. 34; No. 2133, November 10, 1959, p. 38 No. 2166, December 30, 1959, p. 30; No. 2186, February 1, 1960, p. 35.

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More for the Common Man?

EDITORS' NOTE: Most observers look upon the Soviet Union in terms of its political structure—the power and prerogatives of the ruling party, the centralized economic system, the mechanisms of control, and so on. These features are, indeed, the hallmarks of totalitarianism, and an understanding of them is essential to comprehension of Soviet society at large. But we also know that there is no such thing as a perfect totalitarian system, and that no ruler, however powerful and autocratic, can possibly rule without at least a token participation by his subjects. We know, furthermore, that Communist theory *lays considerable stress on "public control," as well as on the satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the people. How, then, is the balance between strict central control and popular participation achieved in practice? And what is actually being done to satisfy the needs of the Soviet population, so cruelly neglected during the Stalinist period of "primitive socialist accumulation"? The articles below offer some of the answers to these questions. In the first, Mr. Goldman centers his attention on the living standards of the Soviet common man, with particular reference to the production and retail distribution of consumer goods. In the second, Mr. Swearer discusses the means employed by the Soviet government for drawing a larger segment of the population into the* execution *of centrally directed policies, as well as the serious problems created by the acceleration of this process under Khrushchev.*

Living Standards and Consumer Goods

By Marshall I. Goldman

Today our task is to tip the scales in world production in favor of the socialist system against the capitalistic system, to surpass the most advanced capitalist countries in labor productivity and output per head of population, and to attain the world's highest living standard. In this stage of the competition, the Soviet Union intends to surpass the United States economically.—*N. S. Khrushchev, "Target Figures for the Economic Development of the Soviet Union,"* Soviet Booklets, *No. 47, London, 1959.*

IN OUTLINING THESE GOALS of the Seven-Year Plan, Khrushchev did not mean to imply that success would come easily. He knows that particularly with respect to the standard of living there is a wide gap to be overcome, for of all the areas of competition with the United States, it is in this field that the Soviet Union lags farthest behind. Nevertheless, the rapid expansion of consumer goods production in the USSR during recent years, as well as the reforms that have been introduced in marketing procedures, reflect the serious determination with which the Soviet Government is approaching its ambitious program. It is the purpose of this article to assess the consumer goods targets of the Seven-Year Plan and to consider the changes which the increased

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flow of consumer goods has thus far brought about in the structure and operation of the Soviet marketing system. An attempt will also be made to gauge Khrushchev's predictions against prospective consumption and marketing patterns in the United States.[1]

Growth of Retail Sales

By the time Stalin died in March 1953, the wartime destruction of a large portion of Soviet manufacturing facilities had been repaired, and industrial production had risen well above the prewar level. The long-neglected standard of living of the Soviet people, however, had improved only imperceptibly: it is estimated that real wage income in 1952, although slightly higher than prewar, was still below the level which prevailed in 1928, the year before collectivization.[2] A significant improvement in the material living conditions of the population took place only after Stalin's death.

An inspection of available trade data indicates the rapidity of the change. Retail trade increased by 23 percent in the second quarter of 1953, and by 26 percent in the second half of the year. This was, on the average, about double the quarterly increases in 1952, and triple the increase of the first quarter of 1953. Moreover, there appears to have been an even greater expansion in rural trade. Sales in the countryside increased by 30 percent during the first half of 1953, and by 32 percent during the second half.[3]

After the immediate post-Stalin surge, retail sales continued to increase at a somewhat more subdued but nevertheless fairly rapid rate. While consumer goods production has continued to take second place to heavy industry, and while many of former Premier Malenkov's more optimistic plans have been abandoned, the living conditions of the people have been improving steadily. By 1959, yearly sales of consumer goods were about double the sales of 1952, Stalin's last full year.[4]

Whether or not this rate of growth indicates that the Soviet Union can overtake the United States in living standards within the foreseeable future will be considered later. At this point attention will be focussed on the pressures created by the recent expansion of trade, both on the population and on the distribution network.

While life has materially improved for the Soviet citizen, there is every reason to believe that the increased supply of consumer goods has only whetted his appetite rather than satisfied his needs. The Russians have found that new apartments stimulate demand for new furniture, that new suits create a desire for new shoes.[5] So goes the unending process of demand generation, a phenomenon well known in the consumer-oriented economies of the West.

In addition, consumer demand in the USSR is being stimulated by the growing exposure of Soviet citizens to Western living standards. More accurate information on the way of life in the West is being provided by the large number of Western tourists visiting the Soviet Union each year, through the distribution of Western magazines such as *Amerika,* and by Western exhibits in Moscow. The frequent visits of Soviet delegations to Western Europe and the United States have had a similar impact. This was particularly true of Khrushchev's American trip, thanks to the relatively complete descriptive and visual coverage given in the Soviet press and news films of the sights the Soviet Premier had seen: the private homes, the farms, the highways, and the supermarkets.

In many respects, indeed, the Russian appetite for consumer goods needs little stimulation. The latent demand and the financial capacity for implementing it are in abundant evidence, at least among the favored groups of the Soviet population. The author personally met members of the upper and middle income strata who had the 25,000-40,000 rubles (two-and-a-half to four times the average yearly wage) needed to purchase a Russian car; they had been on the waiting list for three years and expected to wait several more. Khrushchev may be entirely correct when he asserts that the American system of individual automobile ownership and the resultant traffic problem demonstrate an irrational use of economic resources. However, his pledge to spare the Russians this problem by substituting a taxi pool for private car ownership hardly coincides with the dream of many Soviet citizens.[6]

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[1] The author wants to express his thanks to the Russian Research Institute of Harvard University for its assistance in the preparation of this article.

The article is an expanded version of "The Soviet Standard of Living," which appeared in the July 1960 issue of *Foreign Affairs.* Permission to republish must be obtained from the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., New York, N.Y.

[2] Janet Chapman, "Real Wages in the Soviet Union, 1928-52", *Review of Economics and Statistics,* May, 1954, p. 147. Even though it is probable that there were more workers per family in 1952, production of consumer goods was always of minor importance.

[3] Data from *Pravda,* April 20, July 23, Oct. 28, 1952; Jan. 23, July 17, 1953; Jan. 31, 1954.

[4] Because of changes of definition in data coverage, this is an approximate figure.

[5] *Sovetskaia Torgovlia,* April 15, 1958, p. 1.

[6] *Rabochaia Gazeta,* April 3, 1959, p. 2.

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The contrast in living standards, of which many Russians are now aware, has had a marked demonstration effect. Thus the author of one frank letter to a Soviet newspaper went so far as to criticize the emphasis on such technical triumphs as the Sputnik and the Tupolev jet airliner. He then dared to suggest—and significantly, the paper printed his suggestion—that a more important challenge to Soviet industry would be to produce a pair of shoes that would wear as long as those made in the West.[7] The realization that other nations, and even other members of their own society, have a vastly superior standard of living accentuates the desire of the average Russian to obtain the same things; and the political pressure for more living conveniences rises accordingly.

Reform of the Marketing System

The growth in consumption has also had important repercussions on the functioning of the trade and distribution network, and has led to considerable changes, both voluntary and involuntary, in the operation and structure of the marketing system. The resulting innovations can be divided into two categories: (1) those introduced to improve the efficiency of the existing trade network; and (2) those designed to cope with the phenomenon of "overproduction", an unusual planning problem for a Communist state.

Although the volume of trade turnover has shown an impressive increase, the trade network itself has been enlarged at a much slower rate. By 1958 the absolute volume of trade had increased by almost 170 percent over 1940, yet during the same period the number of retail and restaurant outlets rose by only 30 percent.[8] The slow growth of retail establishments has probably helped to check rising costs of distribution; on the other hand, the quality of service has suffered, and the consumer has been forced to queue up in front of stores at inconvenient locations. However, until there is a willingness to divert more investment funds from heavy industry and housing, all efforts will probably be concentrated on improving the efficiency of the existing trade network, rather than on expanding it.

To facilitate the flow of goods through the inadequate distribution network, the Soviet authorities have introduced a series of "progressive" marketing methods. Since 1953, over 1,500 stores have been converted to self-service in the RSFSR alone.[9] Similarly, vending machines dispensing everything from beer to eau de cologne have appeared throughout the country. A national mail order firm, Posyltorg, sends goods to provincial areas, thus reducing the need for retail outlets. These "progressive" institutional innovations, to be sure, do not always evolve in the operational forms familiar in the United States, and are often altered to meet Soviet conditions. Nor have they always improved efficiency or saved labor.[10] Yet, on the whole, they have permitted the existing distribution machinery to dispense an increased volume of goods.

Finally, in an effort to improve the collection and supply of fresh agricultural products, the authorities have expanded the functions of the middleman. Such products may now be transferred by the peasant or *kolkhoz* to an office of a consumer cooperative, which undertakes to sell them for a commission. Title is meanwhile retained by the peasant or the *kolkhoz,* who thus bear the risk until the produce is sold. The prime purpose

[7] *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* October 4, 1959, p. 4; also reported in the *New York Times,* October 19, 1959, p. 4.

[8] *Voprosy Ekonomiki,* No. 8, 1959, p. 55. Naum Jasny disputes the increased sales figure of 17%. *The Soviet 1956 Statistical Handbook: A Commentary,* Michigan State Press, East Lansing, 1957, p. 178.

[9] *Sovetskaia Torgovlia,* August, 1959, p. 7. For a more elaborate description of the operation of Soviet self-service, see this author's "Retailing in the Soviet Union", *Journal of Marketing,* April, 1960.

[10] A case where self-service has resulted in a larger work force instead of a smaller one is described in *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* August 1, 1959, p. 2. See also *Sovetskaia Torgovlia.* January, 1959, p. 10 and July 25, 1959, p. 4. A Polish cartoonist has bitingly summed up the difficulties connected with vending machine operation in the Soviet Union. He depicts a vending machine surrounded by a guard (the Russians are distrustful) and a nurse (they do not know how to operate gadgets safely). Reprinted in the *New York Times,* February 23, 1958, Magazine Section, p. 23.

Рисунок Л. САМОЙЛОВА.



ОСВЕЖИЛСЯ.

"He was refreshed," reads the caption under this cartoon. The citizen has a taste of eau de cologne from a new vending machine.

—From Krokodil (Moscow), July 20, 1959.

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of this arrangement is to reduce the importance of the *kolkhoz* market. While one may rightfully ask how Marx would have regarded such a resurgence of middleman activity, the essential fact remains that the experiment has resulted in increased competition for the *kolkhoz* markets, reduced prices, an improved division of labor, and, most important, a better supply of agricultural goods in urban areas.

More recently, other innovations of a somewhat different nature have been introduced.[11] In this case the purpose has been not so much to make better use of existing facilities, but to promote the sale of certain products, mostly expensive varieties of watches, bicycles, television sets, radios and cameras, whose sales have fallen below expectations.[12] Unusual steps were taken last year to dispose of such overstocked items. On July 1, 1959, the prices of almost all the more expensive models of these commodities were reduced 15-30 percent, and the "sale" was widely advertised and promoted. Subsequently it was also announced that the items in question would be sold on an installment basis, with interest charged on the unpaid balance.[13] Such techniques are, of course, familiar in the West, and they are almost always associated with a buyers' market and overproduction. The decision to adopt them in the Soviet Union—the interest charge in particular—must certainly have perturbed the more orthodox among the Communist leaders.

The phenomenon of advertising in a Communist economy warrants special attention. There has recently been a notable increase in its scope and importance in the USSR: not only billboards and truck-side advertising, but even radio and TV commercials are now being widely used. All this, along with the staging of the first All Socialist Advertising Conference in Prague in 1957, the holding of a nation-wide competition for the best window display in the Soviet Union, and the formation of several Soviet Republic Advertising Agencies in late 1958, represents a significant change in policy. What only three years ago was regarded as heresy is now considered an important marketing tool.[14]

Finally, the originally highly-centralized planning of distribution and retail trade is being gradually decentralized. Not only has the power to make major decisions been transferred to local planning units, but the operating enterprises themselves have been given increased discretion in conducting their own operations. Moreover, despite the strong ideological distaste for the participation of non-producing and non-consuming agencies in the flow of goods from producer to consumer, trade shows and exhibitions (*yarmarki*) have greatly increased in number and importance. Wholesalers of each commodity line hold at least two shows a year for the traditional purpose of matching buyers and sellers. Not only are newly manufactured goods marketed in this way, but slow-moving items, already on the shelves, are resold and recirculated by means of such intermediary operations.

To sum up, significant innovations in Soviet marketing have been introduced since 1953. While various reasons may be adduced for the reforms, including the desire to improve the living standard of the Soviet consumer, the increase in sales volume was probably the most important factor. The enlarged flow of consumer goods gave rise to two new developments. On the one hand, it inspired a series of ideologically unobjectionable institutional and technological innovations designed to improve the efficiency of the distribution network. On the other, it gave rise to economic phenomena that forced the introduction of marketing techniques theretofore traditionally stigmatized by Communists as distasteful features of capitalism.

The Seven-Year Plan

It may well be that as retail trade continues to expand, Soviet marketing methods will come more and more to resemble those of the West. But the crucial questions to be considered now are: How fast will the Soviet Union grow, and will it overtake the United States with respect to the standard of living?

Let us turn first to the Seven-Year Plan. By past standards the consumer goods targets originally announced under the plan were relatively modest. Whereas during the immediately preceding years the average increase in sales volume had been almost 10 percent an-

[11] For a more detailed discussion of these reforms as well as the preceding changes, see the author's "Marketing—a Lesson for Marx", *Harvard Business Review*, January-February, 1960, p. 79.

[12] Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1958*. Gostatizdat, Moscow, 1959, p. 704, indicates that radio, watch and bicycle sales in 1958 were lower than in 1957 and/or 1956. The First Deputy Minister of Trade of the RSFSR, D. D. Korolev, stated during a recent visit to Boston: "A few years ago, we discovered that we had produced too many radios and cameras. We produced more than we could sell under the existing conditions."

[13] *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, July 1, 1959, p. 4, described the price reductions. The issue of August 16, 1959, p. 4, outlines the procedures for installment sales.

[14] D. D. Korolev, during the visit mentioned in a preceding footnote, also stated that the Russians would welcome any information from American advertising agencies that might improve the technique of Soviet advertising.

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

A typical Soviet cartoon reflecting the maintenance problems faced in the Soviet Union by owners of industrial consumer goods. The structure in the background is an automobile repair shop covered with signs saying "Automobiles are not accepted for repairs" and "Spare parts are not available." The caption reads: "A many-day automobile race."

—*From Krokodil (Moscow), September 30, 1959.*

nually, the projected increase from 667 billion rubles in 1958 to 1,080 billion rubles in 1965 would have meant an overall increase of 60 percent, or only about 7 percent annually.[15] However, in October 1959, less than a year after the announcement of the Seven-Year Plan targets, the Soviet Government called for a much greater expansion in the production of consumer goods. Although the goals were projected only three years ahead, the planned average rate of annual growth from 1959 to 1961 was increased to slightly more than 12 percent, or by a total of 42 percent.[16] It seems fair to say that this sudden raising of the targets was the fruit of the psychological seeds mentioned earlier, the most fertile of which undoubtedly was Khrushchev's visit to the United States.

There is at present no indication that the Soviet government plans to maintain this pace beyond 1961. It may be assumed, however, that if they succeed in meeting the 1961 goals, maintenance of the 12 percent growth rate will be attempted through 1965.

As for food targets, the most significant aspect of the Seven-Year Plan was its call for the Soviet Union to surpass the United States in per capita production of butter, milk and meat. Indeed, on December 1959, Khrushchev announced that Soviet per capita production of butter and total production of milk had already exceeded that of the United States. Considering the low levels of agricultural production during the collectivization famine of the 1930's, this is quite an accomplishment. But as the American economists D. G. Johnson and A. Kahan have pointed out, the relation of Soviet production of meat and milk to American production of these goods has improved little if any over the prerevolutionary era when Russia was a major livestock producing nation.[17]

It must also be remembered that the standard of living is not solely a matter of production. Distribution and marketing must be improved with rising output. It is one thing to show that certain things can be produced; it is another to provide them to the consumer in a fresh state and when he wants them. Thus, in the same speech in which Khrushchev claimed that per capita butter production in the Soviet Union is higher than in the United States, he also complained that Omsk had no butter in its stores and that milk and meat shortages were reported in Kharkov, Rostov and other areas.

Soviet production and consumption of soft goods other than foods have similarly improved in the post-Stalin years and are to continue to grow under the Seven-Year Plan. While the over-all average increase in production of such items is to rise by approximately 50 percent, the output of specific items such as knitted underwear is

[15] *Sovetskaia Torgovlia,* March, 1959, p. 6. To some extent, this is a problem of numbers. As the base broadens, it takes a larger and larger absolute increment to maintain a given percentage growth rate. This was something Western statisticians had often cited when comparing early Soviet growth with that in more advanced Western countries. It is somewhat ironic to see the Russians now claiming the same defense. *Sovetskaia Torgovlia,* February 1959, p. 44, and April 1959, p. 10.

[16] *Pravda.* October 28, 1959, p. 3.

[17] Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies.* G.P.O., Washington, D. C., I., p. 222.

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scheduled to double. Soviet production of wool fabrics already exceeded American output by 1958.

Clearly, the Soviets have brought about a vast improvement in the supply of consumer goods, at least compared to the dreadful days of the early 1930's. While they should have done much more, and done it sooner, the fact remains that they are on the verge of overtaking the United States in total production and consumption of certain food and soft items. The more important test, however, will come in the field of durable goods.

Under the Seven-Year Plan, sales of consumer durables are to increase at a rate much higher than that envisaged for the field of consumer goods as a whole. Thus, for example, the original plan called for an annual increase of 26 percent in the sale of washing machines; the revised plan raises the figure to 38 percent. For refrigerators the corresponding figures are 22 and 30 percent, and for television sets 19 and 25 percent—all well above the over-all average sales growth projections of 7 and 12 percent, respectively.[18]

TABLE I, which includes a comparison of unit sales of various durable items in 1953 and 1959 with the planned sales for 1965 under the original Seven-Year Plan targets and the revised production estimates projected to 1965, gives some idea of the anticipated growth.

Taking the maximum variant, we find that by 1965 sales of Russian washing machines are scheduled to reach 4,750,000 units, which would exceed 1959 American sales of 4,010,000. For refrigerators, the original Seven-Year Plan goal for 1965 as well as the revised goal are lower than 1959 US sales. This is also true of the other durable goods included in the table. At best, sales of refrigerators in the USSR in 1965 will be three-fifths of US sales in 1959, or a little over two million units. Yet, considering that total sales of washing machines and refrigerators in the Soviet Union were only 3,600 and 50,000 respectively in 1953, and 670,000 and 415,000 in 1959, the 1965 goals point to a further significant improvement notwithstanding the fact that, at best, the USSR is expected to surpass the 1959 US figures in washing machine sales only.

The USSR is much farther behind in housing and automobile production. Even though housing construction under the Seven-Year Plan is to be 2.3 times greater than in the preceding seven years, a noted Soviet economist, V. Nemchinov, asserts that 55 percent of the housing to be completed under the plan will be needed just to maintain present low housing standards, taking into account demographic growth and normal housing depreciation.

[18] *Planovoe Khoziaistvo,* No. 2, 1959, p. 63.

TABLE I.

Production and Sales of Selected Consumer Durable Goods USSR and US

(in thousands of units)

	USSR					US
	1953 [1]	1959 [2]	1961 [3]	1965 [4]	1965 [5]	1959 [6]
Washing Machines	3.6	724	1,215	2,450	4,750	4,010
Refrigerators	50	426	796	1,390	2,127	3,750
Television Sets	122	1,300	1,928	3,095	4,424	6,270
Radios	1,607	4,000		5,800		10,245
Automobiles	77.4	124.5		200		5,590

[1] Figures represent sales. Data on appliances from *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR,* (National Economy of the USSR), Central Statistical Administration, Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1956, p. 57. Automobile figures from *Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1958,* Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1959, p. 162.

[2] Figures represent production. *Pravda,* Jan. 22, 1960, p. 2.

[3] Production targets announced in *Pravda,* Oct. 16, 1959, revised upward from original Seven-Year Plan figures.

[4] Sales figures originally anticipated under Seven Year Plan. *Planovoe Khoziaistvo,* No. 2, 1959, p. 63.

[5] Author's projections for 1965 production based on increased rate of growth implied in *Pravda,* Oct. 16, 1959 (see footnote 3).

[6] Figures represent sales. Appliance data from *Electrical Merchandising Week,* Jan. 18, 1960, p. 35; automobile figure from *Automotive Industries Statistical Issue,* March 15, 1960, p. 79.

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Figuratively speaking, the Soviet Union has to run merely not to lose ground.[19]

While the Soviet government seems bent on duplicating some day many aspects of American life, matching the US automobile output is not a part of their current plans. Thus automobile production is to expand from the 124,500 units produced in 1959 to 200,000 units in 1965, but the government does not exhort Soviet workers to overtake the 1959 US production figure of 5,590,000. It simply cannot afford, nor does it desire, to divert from heavy industry the resources which even a modest fraction of the US production would require. Consequently, instead of a rate of growth equivalent to that of the other rapidly expanding durable consumer goods items, the projected seven-year increment in automobile production, amounting to 64 percent, is not much larger than the planned over-all increase in retail sales.

Let us now evaluate briefly the prospects for achieving production increases of the magnitudes indicated above, and thus for realizing Soviet consumer goods goals. The past record in this respect is not encouraging for the Soviet consumer. The Soviet Government has always regarded heavy industry as the most important economic sector, and consumer goods as dispensable. During the prewar five-year plans the targets for consumer goods were almost never adhered to. This background warrants a certain amount of skepticism toward planned increases in the immediate future.

But while heavy industry still enjoys the highest priorities in Soviet planning, an improvement in the supply of consumer goods is clearly considered more important today than ever before. Retail sales in 1960 are to increase by 6.9 percent over 1959[20]—a very modest rise to be sure, but nonetheless significant. Moreover, Khrushchev apparently expects that the required production increases in consumer industries will be achieved through improved efficiency and productivity, with little new capital investment.[21] Better use of waste and scrap may, indeed, result in some added production. However, it seems unlikely that the 12 percent average annual increase required by the revised 1961 consumer goods targets can be achieved without substantial investment and a more rapid sales increase in 1960. If anything, the 6.9 percent rate of growth barely meets the 7 percent annual growth rate contemplated under the original Seven-Year Plan targets. By the same token, unless Khrushchev can be persuaded to allocate a considerably larger portion of Soviet economic resources to consumer goods production, his chances of fulfilling even the original 1965 goals are very slim.

Problems of Comparing Living Standards

But let us assume that the Soviets will attain their goals, and that they will reach or surpass American production levels of various consumer goods. Will this mean that they have overtaken the United States in living standards? To attempt to answer the question, it is necessary first to discuss some problems of measuring consumption levels where large stocks of consumer durables are involved. (These are well-known problems in measuring stocks and flows in the capital goods industry.) In addition to considering what has been newly consumed in the course of each year, it is also important to take into account goods that were purchased in previous years and are still in use. In other words, with the purchase of a durable consumer good, the standard of living is improved for the current as well as a number of subsequent years. Thus, if the volume of retail sales continues to grow at its present rate in the Soviet Union, one can almost anticipate a geometric rate of improvement as the stock of consumer durable goods is expanded.

The special characteristics of durable goods consumption have two further implications. First, we must assume that prior to Stalin's death actual Soviet living conditions were even worse than the simple retail sales data suggest. This is so because such a large proportion of consumption expenditures went into items that were completely consumed during each year. Second, the disparate content of consumption and the consequent variety in consumption cycles make comparative studies of relative standards of living, both internationally and over protracted periods of time, even more difficult than has already been suggested by various writers. How is one to describe in statistical language the relative standards of living of two countries when one country has a large stock of consumer durables and the other does not?

Any attempt to make such comparisons is further complicated by qualitative differences (regardless of durability) between consumer goods produced in different countries. To say, for example, that in 1965 the Soviet Union will produce 118 percent of the total 1959 washing machine production in the United States is meaningless unless some way is found of taking into account the different qualitative characteristics of the units produced in both countries. (At the present time almost all Soviet washing machines are of the wringer type, with a

[19] "Nekotorye problemy planirovania narodnovo khoziaistva" (Some Problems in the Planning of the National Economy), *Kommunist*, No. 1, 1959, p. 86.
[20] *Pravda*, October 28, 1959, p. 3.
[21] *New York Times*, November 1, 1959, 4th Section, p. 4.

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very limited washing capacity.) Or how can one compare housing when residential building in the United States consists primarily of private homes, as against a preponderance of semi-private apartments with jointly shared kitchens and toilets in the Soviet Union? Moreover, even if commodities somewhat comparable in nature can be found, the comparisons remain suspect because of the generally poorer quality of products in the Soviet Union.

Finally, "consumer sovereignty"—vague as this concept may be—must be considered before comparing standards of living in exclusively quantitative terms. It is not necessary to prove that the consumer in the United States is an absolute monarch in order to justify the conclusion that his ability to induce producers to cater to his preferences and offer him a widely differentiated selection of goods is vastly superior to that of his Soviet counterpart. To be sure, as consumer goods production has increased in the USSR, so to some extent has the range of choices available to the Soviet consumer; but because of the lack of competition among the distributing organizations, much of the incentive to offer the consumer variety and choice is still missing.

TO ILLUSTRATE the "stock" concept in the measure of living standards, an attempt has been made in Table II to calculate the stocks of various appliances as they existed in the Soviet Union in 1959 and as they are expected to be in 1965. The sales figures for 1950 and 1959 are readily available. To arrive at an estimate of existing stocks, it would normally be necessary to find also sales figures for the years preceding that period, but since sales of most consumer durable items prior to 1950 were almost nil, the danger of making any significant error by disregarding them is small. If anything, the present estimates are too high and represent maximum stocks. The fact that no allowance has been made for replace-

TABLE II.

Stocks of Selected Consumer Durable Goods USSR and US

(in thousands of units)

	Washing Machines	Refrigerators	Television Sets	Radios
USSR				
Total Sales to 1965				
1950	1	1.2	12	1,000
1951	3.2	14.5	54	1,000
1952-58	1,200	1,200	3,000	20,000
1959-65	10,500	6,700	13,800	35,000
1959-65 [1]	15,000	8,000	17,000	
Total Stock [2]	11,700	8,900	16,900	60,000
Total Stock [3]	16,200	10,200	20,100	
US				
1959—number of households possessing given appliances	47,100	49,600	45,500	49,950

[1] Author's projections derived by applying the revised growth rate indicated by the new goals announced for 1961 in *Pravda*, Oct. 16, 1959, p. 1.

[2] The sum of sales figures for 1950 through 1965 (first four listings under total sales), plus estimate for pre-1950 sales.

[3] The sum of sales figures for 1950 through 1958, plus author's projections for 1959-65, plus estimate for pre-1950 sales.

Sources: 1950 and 1951 data from *Sovetskaia Torgovlia*, Central Statistical Administration, Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1958, p. 57. Data for 1952-58 and 1959-65 from *ibid.*, January 1959, p. 12; and from *Vestnik Statistiki*, No. 5, 1959, p. 91. Author's projections based on figures in *Pravda*, Oct. 16, 1959. Data on US stocks from *Electrical Merchandising Week*, Jan. 18, 1960, p. 59.

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ment of scrappage, also tends to inflate the Soviet figures, for the poor quality of Russian consumer goods is common knowledge. Two possible estimates are offered for 1959-65. The larger, a projection of the revised goals for 1961, is certainly the upper limit. On the other hand, the original goals of the Seven-Year Plan are not necessarily the lower limit; they should be considered a median estimate.

Different problems arise in the search for comparable data for the United States. Because American stocks are subject to much wider fluctuations, it was considered safest to compare stocks of Soviet consumer durables with estimates of the number of American households possessing these goods. As many American families now own duplicate sets of radios, television receivers and even refrigerators, the comparison in Table II tends to overstate the availability of Soviet durables while understating the corresponding United States figures.[22]

Regardless of the sudden growth in production and sales, the stock of Soviet washing machines will equal only about 16 million units by 1965, or no more than 35 percent of the number of American households that already possessed them in 1959. The relevant comparison for refrigerators shows a maximum of 10 million Soviet units by 1965, compared to almost 50 million US households equipped with this appliance in 1959.

Similar disparities will continue to exist far beyond 1965 between Soviet and American stocks of other consumer durables. All this is not meant to imply that washing machines, refrigerators, television sets and radios are the only items to be considered in evaluating relative standards of living. Many more comparisons are necessary (and not just of material goods) before one can make a final judgment. Nevertheless, if precise comparisons of the stock variables for such other items as housing and automobiles were possible, the results would likewise be only to the advantage of the United States.

An approximate indication of the disparity between Soviet and American housing conditions is provided by the fact that in 1957 each Soviet urban resident had only 83 square feet of living space. Nemchinov, the Soviet economist mentioned earlier, admits that the Soviet goal of 129 square feet per person will not be achieved until much after 1965.[23] While an exact estimate of the corresponding American figure is not available, the most informed guess is that the per capita living area in the

[22] For example, compared with a stock estimate of 155 million radios in the United States, the number of American households possessing radios is about 50 million. *Electrical Merchandising Week*, January 18, 1960, p. 59.

[23] Nemchinov, *op. cit.*, p. 86. (See footnote 19).

CAVEAT EMPTOR . . .

The foreign visitor who finds himself roaming the streets of the great cities of the USSR—as this writer did in the summer just past—is impressed first and foremost by the odd and bewildering assortment of stalls, pushcarts, kiosks, stores, tables, crates, and holes-in-the-wall that make up the patchwork system of retail merchandising serving Soviet urban inhabitants. This, somehow, is the last sort of thing most visitors would have expected to find in a country where the whole trading system is supposedly a monopoly run by the state. They soon discover, however, that the realities of Soviet shopping are far closer to the worst practices of 1913 (as this traveler remembers them) than to the idealistic theories of 1917. Food stores, in particular, show the ravages of prolonged neglect. Once you pass beyond the well-kept downtown "parade" streets, the typical food store will be found tucked away in some random, uninviting location. Such stores come in odd sizes, but they are mostly of the dwarf variety, usually in the same places and the same condition in which they existed in Tsarist days. They are dingy in appearance and slovenly kept—inside as well as out.

Another feature which seems archaic to the foreign visitor is the narrow specialization of the stores. There are shops selling nothing but milk, easily recognizable by the queues of people lined up outside, carrying the family milk can. There are fruit stores, each with a few outdoor tables on which such special items as lemons are displayed for sale at 35 cents apiece (3 and a half rubles), attracting much smaller queues of buyers.

Everything about these shops seems designed to discourage customers. Yet the food stores are full of humanity at all hours of the day—and the evening, too, for they keep their doors open until midnight. Precisely what the government accomplishes by keeping in use such ancient, inefficient trading facilities is hard to guess. It may, to be sure, realize a saving in material resources, but in shifting the burden, in terms of time and energies spent, onto the customer, it also cuts down his efficiency as a producer in the economy.

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United States in 1950 was approximately 269 square feet, or more than double the 1965 Soviet goal.[24] Considering the housing boom since 1950, it is logical to suppose that the present US per capita figure is even higher.

Conclusion

What is to be concluded from all this? First of all, the Soviets are seriously determined to match not only the heavy industrial production of the United States, but also its standard of living. In attempting to do the latter, they have shown a realization that improved retail trade is a convenient political tool for assuring public allegiance. But in trying to overtake the United States in consumer goods sales, they have also encountered many problems familiar in America. As long as the consumption level is kept low and the consumer is given more money than goods to buy with it, there is no difficulty. Whatever is produced is sold. But when conditions improve even slightly, new troubles arise. The Soviets have found that the consumer is fickle and that demand cannot be precisely estimated and planned, as they had always assumed. Where the market is thinner, certain commodities (usually those with higher price tags) simply do not move. The result is that the Soviets have had to fall back on capitalistic expedients such as advertising, consumer credit, and middlemen.

The standard of living will doubtless continue to improve in the Soviet Union, regardless of the chances for partial or total world disarmament. But a visit to any Soviet apartment off the main street or a drive through any Russian village makes it only too obvious that the time when the USSR may overtake the United States in living standards is hardly in sight.

At the opening of the 1959 American fair in Moscow, Premier Khrushchev asserted that "after the fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan, we will need five years, maybe less, to overtake the United States in total and per capita production." Even if this were so, he should know that overtaking the United States in the production of specific commodities is not enough. Production must be sustained over a long enough period of time to allow the acquisition of these items by the average citizen. This is not to say that the USSR will never have stocks of consumer durables as large as exist in the United States; but considering the distance to be overcome and the past Soviet record in consumer goods production, the possibility of the Russians catching up within the present generation seems very remote indeed.

[24] This estimate is derived from data found in Leo Grebler, David M. Blank and Lewis Winnick, *Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1956, pp. 82 and 119.

. . . SOVIET STYLE

Inside the food stores, buzzing with the noise of humanity and flies, the shopper is caught in a dreary, time-consuming shuffle from counter to cashier and back again. The items on sale are obviously not equally in demand. Some sections attract large clusters of cheerless customers, who lean patiently against the counter waiting to be served, meanwhile planning their next move in the round-up of the family food supply. Other counters move their goods without any waiting in line, but whatever time the buyer gains here he loses wrestling with the cumbersome "cashier" system. Clerks in Soviet food stores cannot as a rule accept your money. You have to leave your package with the "controller", take your place in line, and bring back a paid receipt (kvitantsia) *for the amount of your purchase. No* kvitantsia, *no merchandise.*

As for the much-vaunted vending machines, they are indeed very much in evidence about the streets of Moscow. Yet, while they provide dashes of bright color, they do not really help much to relieve the basic lack of consumer facilities. If anything, these avtomats *underline the incongruous striving for a short cut to modernity in a sector of the economy that is visibly bogged down in official indifference and inertia. One of the most popular coin machines this summer was the* soda-avtomat, *usually in groups of three to five machines, dispensing flavored soda water for a 5-kopek coin. The first impulse of the curious visitor, bent on savoring the pleasures of the Soviet man in the street, is to try out the* soda-avtomat. *It is not long, however, before he becomes discouraged. In their rush to achieve modernity, it seems, the Soviets overlooked one thing: namely, to equip the dispensing machines with dispensable cups (a typical "American" observation, it might be claimed—but aren't vending machines American, too?). So, all the advocates of hygiene (including Lenin) notwithstanding, the community glass holds the key to this particular bit of pleasure. To everyone's health, Comrades!*

Leon M. Herman

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Popular Participation: Myths and Realities

By Howard R. Swearer

FROM THE PERSPECTIVE of the liberal democratic tradition, all popular mechanisms in the Soviet Union appear to be little more than decorative bric-a-brac screening the naked exercise of power by the Communist Party elite. While there is considerable justification for such a judgment, it ignores the fact that the Soviet regime is not merely an authoritarian government consisting, as it were, of a small elite group above the masses of a static, traditional society in the nature of some Middle Eastern countries. Rather, it is a dynamic totalitarian government which sets as its ideal the total and active involvement of all citizens in the affairs of a rapidly changing and ever more complex society.

It is true that "popular participation" in the Soviet Union is vastly different from that in democratic countries, and indeed in many respects a total inversion; but it is nonetheless an integral part of the Soviet polity. Moreover, the role of popular participation has become ever more prominent and diverse since the mid-1950's under the style of governing exercised by Nikita Khrushchev. This does not mean, of course, that Khrushchev is democratically-oriented or that the Soviet Union is gradually being transformed into a popularly-governed state. But it does mean that whether because of the relaxation of terror, the push of social forces, or the tactics of the present leadership, mass participation is an increasingly important technique of rule.

A tension between popular and dictatorial rule has existed in both theory and practice throughout the Soviet era. That popular participation was transformed by the demands of a totalitarian dictatorship into an object for manipulation in the furtherance of the regime's purposes had its roots in historical happenstance, in the dynamics of totalitarianism, and in the conflict between the popular and dictatorial elements in Marxism-Leninism.

Origins of Popular Participation

The problem was joined soon after the seizure of power when in the Constitutional Assembly of January 1918 the Bolsheviks had the choice—theoretically, at least—between establishing a government on a broad popular base, sharing rule with other parties, or tightly holding on to absolute power in opposition to the expressed wishes of the great majority of the people. The intransigence of opposition parties, the rigors of war, the disintegration of all semblance of government, the lack of a deep-rooted democratic tradition, and other circumstantial factors were contributants to a dictatorial solution. But of equal or more importance in foreordaining that the Bolsheviks' choice would be nondemocratic were their dogmatic belief in the corpus of Marxism-Leninism and their ability to interpret it, their drive for naked power, the centralist tendencies in the Leninist system of rule, and the Bolshevik contempt for "bourgeois democracy." The Bolsheviks ruled out the possibility of any popular control over their government as soon as it became evident that such control might be contrary to what they deemed their best interests.[1] As long as they did not bear the burden of power, authoritarian and democratic elements could coexist in their theory, albeit with some tension; but the realities of

Mr. Swearer is a young American student of Soviet affairs, whose articles have appeared in several learned journals. The article above is based on his Ph.D. dissertation for Harvard University, entitled "Local Government in the Soviet Union—Popular Participation in a Totalitarian Society."

[1] See Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. Random House, New York, 1960, pp. 180-181; Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 292-93; Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power*. Harvard University Press, 1951, pp. 121-23.

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rule—what Dr. Barrington Moore has termed the dilemma of power—shoved the authoritarian elements into ascendancy when theory was transformed into the ideology of a ruling group.[2]

The postulates of a single correct design for the organization of society at any particular historical stage, of the primacy of the collective over the individual, of the necessity for a highly disciplined party, and of a revolutionary mandate to restructure totally society and man, could not accept the premises of the liberal democratic tradition—*i.e.*, tolerance of trial-and-error methods, hesitation to claim total truth or goodness in any single political theory, and the allowance of various forms of independent activity outside the political realm. Moreover, Marxism, as "creatively" developed by both Lenin and Stalin, had an ambivalent view of the mass. The revolution was undertaken in the name of the people; but Lenin was convinced that the people on their own could develop only a "trade union consciousness." Hence, the party vanguard was needed. The masses were perfectable, but only within the collective and under party guidance.

The anti-authoritarian elements in the Communist creed were not discarded; rather, they were retooled to serve totalitarian rule. No regime can exist for long without a certain minimum of popular acceptance; and a revolutionary society undergoing rapid change needs more than acceptance. It demands active participation, however controlled.

Revitalizing Public Spirit

Stalin was not unaware of the values of "popular participation," but he placed more reliance on the witchcraft of the cult of the great leader and on cruder forms of opinion manipulation to generate popular "support." Soviet society during his reign in general was terrorized, tightly organized, and run on a strict command basis. Under these conditions, public bodies, including the soviets, were so blatantly regimented by party and government bureaucrats that they became stultified robots and increasingly atrophied with disuse. As a consequence, Stalin's successors found themselves confronted with the problem of widespread public indifference and cynicism toward soviets and other mass organizations. In contrast to Stalin, they have evinced marked concern over these attitudes. Proceeding pragmatically, they have groped toward new ways to rekindle popular élan and to channel its energies into a more responsive support of the regime and into state construction.

The new regime's increased stress on popular participation is intimately intertwined with the relaxation of terror. On the one hand an effort has been made to capitalize on improved public morale—resulting from the leashing of capricious terror and the rise in living standards—by attempting to infuse new spirit into public organizations. At the same time, the relaxation of terror has made it imperative that greater attention be paid to popular participation. In greatly oversimplified terms, any society is ordered and governed by an admixture of public acknowledgment of the ruler's authority and the use or threat of coercion, the pervasiveness of one ingredient being roughly in inverse proportion to that of the other. Although there have been no fundamental alterations in the classical structure and powers of public institutions, they have been activated to fill the vacuum created by the relaxation of terror.

Evidence of the post-Stalin regime's concern to revitalize mass participation is abundant. Central Committee decrees have demanded that greater attention be devoted by local functionaries to workers' complaints and suggestions, and to ideological indoctrination of the people. A December 1956 Central Committee decree "On Improving the Work of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies and the Consolidation of their Contacts with the Masses" touched off a widespread effort in succeeding years to revamp the operations of local governmental bodies.[3] In 1959 the number of deputies to local soviets was increased by 350,000 to bring the total to 1.8 million.[4] The work of soviets is now more widely publicized and regularized. In 1955 only 65 percent of local soviets met according to schedule, while in 1958, 91.3 percent met regularly.[5]

To focus attention on popular participation, new statutes have been promulgated since 1957 for local soviets, their standing commissions, and the public right to recall deputies. Replacing badly outdated statutes of the late 1920's and early 1930's, the new charters bring statutory prescription into line with current administrative practice. On paper at least, they also moderately expand the prerogatives of the local soviets. For example, a rural soviet, at the bottom of the soviet pyramid, has

[2] Dr. Barrington Moore has written the classic text on the juxtaposition of dictatorial and popular elements in Soviet theory and rule, *op. cit.*

[3] I. Sanaev, "Partiinoe Rukovodstvo Mestnymi Sovetami," *Sovety Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia.* No. 8 (August), 1958, p. 13.

[4] *Izvestia,* February 17, 1959.

[5] A. Gorkin, "O Sovetskoi Demokratii," *Partiinaia Zhizn,* No. 2 (January), 1957, p. 16; "Sobliudat Sroki Soiuza Sessii Mestnykh Sovetov," *Sovety Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia.* No. 4 (April), 1959, p. 107.

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been assigned powers formerly residing in the *raion* (district), to "affirm" its budget, to confirm the heads of cultural, educational and medical institutions under its jurisdiction, and to organize a full-fledged executive committee.[6]

As will be shown, this modest increase in the functions of the local soviets does not impair the ability of the party and state bureaucracy to control them. The main purpose of the statutes is simply to stimulate a fresh interest in public participation and to put local officials on notice that they must devote greater attention to mass organizational work.

The new look in popular participation was also manifested in doctrinal modifications about the withering away of the state voiced at the 21st Party Congress. Khrushchev declared that certain functions were to be transferred from the state bureaucracy to public organizations and that this process would constitute a long stride on the way to the final communist millennium:

> Now it is clear that many functions carried out by state organs must gradually pass into the hands of public organizations. For instance, take some questions of cultural services for the population. It is not at all necessary that they should be under the administration of state organs . . . questions of health protection in cities can be increasingly transferred to the administration of trade unions, and in the countryside at the present stage directly to that of the local soviets . . . a union of voluntary sports associations is being formed which will not be a state but a public organ.[7]

By stressing the increased use of public organizations as the proper method for initiating the withering of the state, the regime achieves several purposes. It ideologically sanctions and stimulates the more extensive tapping of free, part-time labor. It woos public support and involvement. And it is able to point to tangible achievements on the way to abolition of the state, implying thereby a closer connection between utopia and reality. Last but not least, it carves out a more important role for local party professionals who control the public organizations, including local soviets.

The Totalitarian Framework

Before elaborating on these purposes of the regime's policy, it might be useful to state the obvious: the emphasis on increased popular participation, public criticism and mass organizations in no sense constitutes the granting of any real power to the people or even to the local authorities to operate independently of central guidance and control. It is manifest that the regime has not relinquished in any degree its exclusive right to determine basic policy; what it has undertaken has been a cautious decentralization of the authority to determine how its policies will be implemented. At the same time, as has been pointed out by many observers, Khrushchev's so-called "democratization" and "decentralization" measures have been accompanied by an expansion of the powers and responsibilities of the party apparatus at all levels, and particularly at the local level; through the strict hierarchy of the party the leadership is thus assured of ultimate control over the implementation of its policies and can bring pressure to bear down the line whenever it deems necessary.

The call for public participation is mainly limited to the grass-roots level of the society. Despite all of the measures enumerated above to stimulate popular interest in the local soviets—which are in a sense the archetype of "public organizations"—and in other forms of mass activity, it is clear that effective control remains in the hands of the local administrative and party officials. Within certain strictly-circumscribed limits the soviets and other public groups do have the right to offer suggestions and criticism, as will be shown later; but they have no right of independent decision.

According to the constitution, the local soviet is the basic cog of government which decides all important questions at each administrative-territorial level; its executive committee is required to do its bidding. In practice, however, constitutional prescriptions are turned on their head: the executive committee (which consists of the local power elite, including the party secretaries) appropriates to itself all local governmental authority, and the soviet is transformed into the executive committee's arm, responsible mainly for mass organizational work. The soviet performs under executive committee direction; in fact, organizational-instruction departments of city and *oblast* soviet executive committees, as well as the instructors of *raion* executive committees, have both the authority and the responsibility to supervise and stimulate mass organizational work of all kinds.[8] Even standing commissions of local soviets, which in theory are subordinate to the parent soviet and not the executive committee, are in practice dominated by the executive committee.[9]

[6] *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta, RSFSR*, No. 1, October 22, 1957, pp. 10-18.

[7] *Izvestia*, January 28, 1959.

[8] N. Chentsov, "Orginstruktorsky Otdel Ispolkoma," *Sovety Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia*, No. 3 (September), 1957, p. 53.

[9] A. V. Luzhin, *Gorodskie Sovety Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia* (Moscow, 1954), p. 212; G. V. Nechitailo, *Organizatsionno-Massovaia Rabota Gorodskikh Sovetov Kazakhstana*, Alma Ata, 1957, p. 113; V. Kozlov, "Nekotorye Voprosy Raboty Sovetov," *Partiinaia Zhizn*, No. 18, 1956, p. 11.

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Even more decisive is control of soviets and public organizations by the party apparatus. The party statutes provide that in all mass organizations and soviets, the Communists present must form a party group, "whose task is to intensify the party's influence in every way, to carry out its policies among non-party members . . ." [10] These party groups are responsible to the professional party cadre, and are usually convened and advised by an instructor of the relevant territorial party committee. The party group is basically a tool enabling the cadre instructor to work the will of the local party professionals in public organizations by presenting a solid phalanx of Communist supporters on any issue. All decisions of a party group are "obligatory for every Communist deputy." [11]

With the current upsurge of popular participation, increased emphasis has been placed on the utilization of party groups to guide mass activities. The sway ordinarily held by the party group is neatly demonstrated by a negative example, in a case (at a session of a *raion* soviet in Latvia) where party members had not been adequately "briefed" on the stand that they were to take:

> A big argument flared up around this proposal. A number of Communist deputies began to argue with all their strength that it was not legal for the session to make an appeal to sponsoring organizations because this clearly contradicted the constitution. And here the session was clearly divided into two camps—into supporters and opponents of the proposal. The non-party deputies were confused. The proposal of the standing commission on agriculture was rejected . . . The fate of this valuable proposal would have been completely different if Communists of the *raion* soviet had held a meeting of their group as a preliminary.[12]

The Need for Endorsement

Despite the strictly circumscribed nature of popular participation, it has an important role in the Soviet governing formula. The soviets, and mass organizational work in general, are a means of achieving public recognition of the regime's authority and also of instilling popular discipline. Involvement in mass organizational work also gives the citizen a sense of his position in, and identity with, Soviet society. By enlisting popular participation, the regime eases the burden of coercion and thereby hopes to evoke a more receptive response to its dictates; it also taps a source of free labor in fulfilling its plans and implanting its values into society.

It is the effort to achieve popular endorsement which gives meaning to Soviet elections, for they obviously are not designed to select the governors of the state. The Soviet leadership may drape itself in the authority of its omniscient understanding of the scientific laws of history, but it also takes care to seek the sanction of a popular vote—however obviously rigged [13]—to affirm its leadership and its policy decisions. Elections, even though affording the citizen no real choice, help to legitimize the government in the mass mind and to identify the people with regime policies.

Since Soviet elections bear the visage of a plebiscite on the correctness of party rule, and indirectly on the promise of the perfectability of Soviet society under party direction, a Herculean effort is made to get out the vote. Normally, well over 99 percent of the electorate cast their ballots for the official candidates. An election campaign is a time for arousing emotions of patriotism and activism. The number of people involved in the election campaign is stupendous. In the 1959 elections to local soviets, over eight million persons were members of various types of election commissions and millions of others were recruited for agitational work.[14] The act of voting culminates the rite in a formal display of personal reaffirmation of the Soviet way of life and the party leadership.

Elections are not the only form of plebiscite in the Soviet Union. Grass-roots discussion of draft plans or "theses" at thousands of meetings has been a widely employed technique of Khrushchev's leadership in effecting any major changes in society. For example, theses on the 1957 industrial reorganization, the abolition of the Machine Tractor Stations, the Seven-Year Plan, and the aforementioned draft statutes on local soviets were presented for public scrutiny before they were officially

[10] Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies: Documentary Record of the 19th Communist Party Congress and the Reorganization After Stalin's Death*, F. A. Praeger, New York, 1953, p. 33.

[11] *Partiinaia Zhizn*, No. 3 (February), 1958, p. 74.

[12] E. Kotsens, *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii*, April, 1958.

[13] A single candidate per deputyship appears on the ballot. In the 1959 local elections only 182 of a total of 1.8 million candidates failed to receive the necessary majority vote. Soviet authorities claim that the public is consulted in the nomination of the single candidate. However, the party apparatus makes the selections, and mass nominating rallies, with rare exceptions, appear to do no more than ratify the party's choice. Khrushchev remarked to the American Observer Team to the 1958 elections that its members were "quite right in noticing that the party organization plays a major role in selecting candidates" and that nominations were made by "reliable persons." (*Cf.* Richard M. Scammon, "Why the Russians Bother with Elections," *The New York Times Magazine*, April 6, 1958.)

[14] N. Starovoitov, "Poriadok Provedeniia Predstoiashchikh Vyborov v Sovety," *Sovety Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia*, No. 2 (February), 1959, p. 4.

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promulgated, and a few modifications were made as a genuflexion to public comment. The aim was to cloak the programs with the mantle of popular consultation and approval.

It is probable that public discussions have at times been genuinely utilized to tap grass-roots sentiment on some particular features of a reform before a final decision was taken in Moscow. The number of regional Councils of the National Economy (*Sovnarkhozy*) established in mid-1957 was specified only after nationwide discussions of Khrushchev's theses; and the fact that the final number was considerably greater than originally anticipated seems to evidence the impact of local consultation—if not of the public in general, at least of local officials at the *oblast* (region) level who wanted their own area economic councils. Again, when announcing the abolition of the Machine Tractor Stations in January 1958, Khrushchev stated that the *raion* government would have new agricultural responsibilities; but he left open the nature of the new *raion* agricultural organ. The decision to establish *raion* agricultural inspectorates was taken only after two months of public discussions during which several proposals were forwarded, including: self-managing unions of collective farms, a group of specialists attached to the *raion* planning commission, and a streamlined version of the pre-1953 *raion* department of agriculture.[15]

Functions of Participation

Beyond the attempt to foster public support of the central authority, the leadership's aim in encouraging popular participation lies in a number of other specific contributions it can make to the Soviet system. It was Lenin in 1919 who enunciated the famous principle that mass organizations are "transmission belts" of party policy. Through mass organizations the party announces policy decisions and methods of their execution. Although contrived, this helps to identify the local populace with the policy. Mass organizations are also transmission belts in the sense that they can mobilize voluntary labor for various types of local projects and services, thereby helping to relieve the burden on the state apparatus. Since the state has assumed responsibility for a vast number of services performed by private endeavor in other countries, voluntary assistance is a valuable adjunct to the sorely pressed state administration. Moreover, do-it-yourself projects, utilizing local resources and free labor, permit increased capital investments in basic industry.

[15] *Izvestia*, March 6-26, 1958.

Not only is a local soviet itself the archetype of a mass organization; it is also the progenitor and center of a complex *aktiv* (activist) network which amplifies the range and intensity of its activities. In early 1959 over one million deputies of the 57,000 local soviets and one and one-half million activists were at least nominally recorded as participants in standing commissions of local soviets.[16] Depending on its size, a local soviet may have anywhere from three to fifteen or more standing commissions concerned with the budget, agriculture, public health, trade, education, local industry, cultural activities, and other spheres of local administration. Besides standing commissions a wide variety of other satellite public bodies surround a soviet. For example, in the city of Berezuili, Perm *Oblast,* there were in 1958 some 5,000 activists organized in 72 street committees, 65 parents' committees, 10 housing councils to enforce public order, sanitary commissions, commissions of assistance to house administrations, and other public bodies.[17]

Public assistance is especially needed and enlisted for such activities as education, law enforcement, public health, and sports. Many Soviet mass organizations bear resemblance to voluntary organizations in the United States, for the regime is aware that some activities are better left to local effort. The major difference is, of course, that the party and governmental bureaucracy are responsible for and have authority over the work of these public bodies.

"Socialist morality" and public order have been judged especially suitable areas for public action. A number of devices have been employed to generate social pressure and arouse the public conscience in raising the standards of citizens' behavior as prescribed by the regime. During 1957 and 1958 "anti-parasite" laws were passed, providing that general meetings of citizens can sentence "to deportation for two to five years, with obligatory enlistment in labor activity" at the place of deportation, "adult, able-bodied citizens who lead an anti-social parasitic life, and persistently shun socially useful work, as well as those living on unearned incomes." [18] New statutes have been drafted for various types of rural and workers' courts with somewhat lesser authority: these public tribunals do not try criminal cases but are to judge, in the words of one such statute, "gross violations of labor discipline, public order, and rules of socialist living,

[16] "Vybory v Sovety," *Sovety Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia,* No. 2 (February), 1959, p. 4.

[17] G. Pantyushenko and E. Griunaev, "Gorodskoi Sovet," *Sovety Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia,* No. 5 (May), 1958, p. 51.

[18] *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* August 21, 1957. See also Leon Lipson, "The New Face of Socialist Legality," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1958, p. 30.

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such as drunkenness, petty hooliganism, insults, slander, obscenity . . . and moonshining" and may render small fines and short sentences of compulsory labor.[19] Still other public organizations in the area of law and order are: various workers' and people's militia to assist the regular police; administrative commissions of local soviets which impose administrative penalties for violations of local ordinances on sanitation, fire prevention, public order, and similar matters; and commissions containing representatives of mass organizations to serve as a public check on the administration of penal institutions and execution of amnesty decrees. Persuasion and the appeal to public opprobrium, supported by the power to impose minor sanctions, are the major instruments of these bodies. Sessions of public courts are usually held after working hours so that the local populace may attend. These tribunals are outside the regular judicial structure. They do not follow any set procedure, but rather are directed to proceed in that manner which will best serve the purpose of instilling in the public the mores desired by the regime.

It is manifest from the nature of these vigilante committees and the absence of legal safeguards that they might easily be subjected to manipulation by local officials to trample roughshod over the rights of citizens. The fact that the militia, KGB, and state courts remain to handle all "serious" crimes and to decide what matters to relegate to public tribunals seems a precarious protection against capricious action. It could be argued that by having the citizenry apprehend, judge and sentence their fellow men, some of the stigma of arrest by the state law enforcement agencies might be diminished, but such reasoning could never stand up—in a free system—against the guarantee of institutionalized and equitable legal procedure.

[19] *Izvestia,* June 23, 1959, p. 3.

The Cushioning Function

From the regime's vantage point, another important function of public institutions is their usefulness as a buffer between the people and the state. The local soviet is such a cushioner. The deputy to the soviet is pictured in the abundant literature on the subject as, *inter alia,* a public counselor and mediator between the people and the administration to whom the ordinary citizen can turn for assistance with grievances and problems. In one of the highly stylized rituals of "socialist democracy," a deputy's constituents present him with petitions, which he in turn is supposed to press on the local administration. Probably more meaningful are the individual services he renders. One deputy in Moscow has written, for example, how she straightened out the morals of a 15-year-old girl, patched up broken marriages, and located housing for those in need.[20] In another case a deputy organized the construction of a "house of rest" for collective farmers who had no place for relaxation.[21]

On the other side of the coin, the deputy acts as a voluntary arm of the soviet executive committee to pro-

[20] E. Ya. Tolochenkova, "Iz Opyta Raboty Deputata," *Biulleten Ispolnitelnovo Komiteta Moskovskovo Gorodskovo Soveta,* No. 2, 1958.

[21] I. A. Azovkin, *Kulturno-Vospitatelnaia Rabota Raionnovo Soveta Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia,* Moscow, 1956, p. 117.

Scene is the office of a soviet executive committee. Document on desk is labeled: "On the Problem of Small Repairs." Official states (center caption): "I am sufficiently important not to have to bother with such trivia." Caption lower right: "For the rest, see the Sverdlovsk and other city soviet executive committees."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), April 10, 1959.

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mote support of its actions among the local populace. He is considered the leading activist of his election district. As such he is admonished to work closely with all mass organizations in the district, to carry out the policies of the government, and to organize the people for local projects. If *ad hoc* committees are necessary for specific tasks, he sees to their formation. If the population needs political education, he arranges a lecture series. Through his regular reports to the people he serves as a mouthpiece for the government. In short, he is supposed to be a priest and a ward-heeler rolled into one.

The soviet deputy is not analogous to an elected representative in a democratic country. He is not a politician with an independent power base, but rather an institutionalized activist. The great majority of local deputies are drawn from the common citizenry on the basis of service and loyalty to the state. Some 54.6 percent of deputies to local soviets are non-Communists. When confronted by an indifferent bureaucracy, the deputy is usually helpless:

> It is no secret that there are bureaucrats who are not at all inclined to heed the comments and recommendations of a deputy, and that a deputy cannot, when he encounters something outrageous, issue instructions of a binding nature. . . . How often his letters to institutions have virtually no effect.[22]

"Public Control"

Although soviets may at times have some influence on the details of policy execution, they are not—as pointed out earlier—policy-making organs, nor do they have much to say in the selection of local administrators. They are, however, encouraged to act as *checks* on the local bureaucracy. Along with other "public organizations," they are also urged to demonstrate "the creative initiative of the masses" in the form of suggestions for improving local plans and administration.

This, in essence, is the meaning of "public control" in the Soviet lexicon. It does not mean that public bodies have any power to impose directives or to demand action from the administration, or that they can independently interfere in state business. It does mean that such bodies or individual citizens can air opinions—at soviet sessions, nomination rallies, *aktiv* meetings, or through public inspections or letters to the press—so long as their opinions are limited to positive suggestions for improving the particulars of local administration, or "constructive criticism" of local bureaucrats when it can be demonstrated that the latter are ineffectively implementing governmental objectives.

Sometimes public control may go so far as to reject a particularly obnoxious candidate proposed by the local party apparatus. *Partinaia Zhizn* (Party Life), the official party journal, in March 1957 cited a few instances where the party-nominated candidates to local soviets, including a *raion* soviet executive committee chairman and a *raion* party secretary, were rejected by mass nominating meetings.[23] Occasionally a soviet refuses to confirm an executive committee member or a department head even though the nomination is presented with the blessing of the party and superior executive committee.[24] Such cases, however, are seemingly rare.

From the leadership's point of view, public control has several advantages: it is another check on the local hierarchy and provides higher officials with information on the operation of the local administration; it funnels criticism away from the upper echelons toward local satraps and thus protects the leadership's sanctity; it serves as a safety valve for popular emotions and frustrations; and it may facilitate a smoother resolution of local problems, by airing viewpoints other than the official line and by pinpointing neglected areas. The party leadership is aware that properly contained public comment is desirable to obtain a reading of public morale. The regime may ignore some, or most, of the pressures from the people—it is indeed its historic and ideologically-sanctioned role to resist undesirable spontaneous sentiments and to educate the people in their true destiny—but it cannot be unaware of the popular mood.

Understandably, local officials are not so enamored of "public control," since they are the objects of criticism. Local bosses frequently have sought to neutralize adverse comments by the staging of meetings, resulting in stultified and innocuous discussions. There is a plentitude of public declarations attesting to the fact that many executive committees, for example, can and do muzzle their soviets.[25] Sessions can be strait-jacketed by prearrangement of speakers and debate. If a report concerns the work of an executive committee or one of its departments, the executive committee has the right to "affirm" the report, constituting in effect the power of censorship. To cite one instance, the procurator of Namstsy *raion*, Yakutsk, complained that the executive committee, in reviewing his report to be delivered before the *raion*

[22] *Izvestia*, March 1, 1959, p. 3.

[23] M. Tarasov, "K Itogam Vyborov v Mestnye Sovety," *Partiinaia Zhizn*, No. 5 (March), 1957, pp. 9-10.

[24] N. T. Savenkov, *Osnovnye Formy Deiatelnosti Deputata Mestnovo Soveta*, Moscow, 1956, pp. 17-18.

[25] Nechitailo, *op. cit.* pp. 60-62; *Sovetskaia Estoniia*, March 10, 1957.

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soviet, deleted critical comments about the committee itself.[26]

The recent pressures from above to encourage public criticism have probably inhibited the local bureaucrat from indulging blatantly in his natural hesitation to permit citizens to speak their minds on his administration. The leadership has made no bones about its attitude:

> The party demands from the leaders of soviet and party organs the creation of such conditions that all deputies may bravely and without fear criticize shortcomings in the work of enterprises, institutions, and organizations.[27]

Nevertheless the evidence suggests that local leaders have far from lost all their ability to bring pressure to bear behind the scenes. The continued power of such local officials is likely to remain a deterrent to criticism from soviet deputies or other citizens who are vulnerable to retaliation.

Broader Aims

An across-the-board view of the current role of public participation reveals that Khrushchev has not only extended its traditional functions to a significant degree but has assigned it a crucial role in his scheme of governance. Popular participation, under the direction of the local party apparatus, has become a part of the effort to rationalize and shrink the state administration and to increase the power of the party apparatus over the professionally-specialized state bureaucracy. By reinforcing the public check over the state bureaucracy, the party has improved its capacity to oversee all state activities. On the other side of the coin, because of the devolution of more implementational authority on local administrators, public control (as heretofore defined) has assumed a new urgency. Moreover, as governmental staffs have been pruned, some minor administrative functions have been assigned to public organizations. Local officials have publicly claimed that "by leaning on" public organizations a number of local governmental departments have been abolished. This was especially the case in the drive led by the local party apparatus to streamline the *raion* government in 1956-1959.[28]

Stepped-up popular participation has also been thrown into the battle to increase the efficiency of the Soviet economic system. In this sense, political and mass-organizational techniques have been substituted for more rational economic measures, such as an adjustment of the price structure to accord more closely with supply and demand. It is hoped that by enlisting local energies and initiative and by using local, frequently marginal resources, more consumer goods may be produced without serious diversion of investment from heavy industry. Of course here, too, a measure of demagoguery is involved; for by directing the attention of the public toward the fallibilities of local management, failures on the way to the good life are laid at the door of local administrators instead of national policy-makers.

Mass participation has also been employed to counteract the increasing embourgeoisement of Soviet society. The encouragement of public criticism and the deliberate increase of workers and collective farmers in local soviets (from 54.8 percent in 1955 to 62.4 percent in 1959) as well as in the party, along with other measures such as adjusting wage scales to reduce the disparity between higher and lower brackets, are designed to impede social stratification and to keep the bureaucracy fluid. Through the democratic format, the leadership is playing the masses off against the more privileged.[29]

Danger Zones

The greater reliance that has been placed on popular participation is not, however, without its problems and even dangers for the leadership. From a practical point of view, one may question the efficacy of encouraging popular control over a complex and technically-specialized state administration. There can be little doubt that the professionally qualified administrator resents this intrusion into his affairs by public organizations ill-equipped to make technical judgments and often motivated by political and propaganda considerations alien to the practical business of administration. One Soviet writer, although a strong advocate of strengthening local soviets, has admitted that public inspections are often useless since the layman does not have the technical and accounting competence to perform such tasks.[30] Overzealous application of public control may be downright disruptive, as in the case of the Riga meat combine which

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[26] "Otvety na Voprosy Chitatelei," *Sovety Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia,* No. 1 (January), 1958, pp. 98-99.

[27] N. T. Savenkov *op. cit.,* p. 25.

[28] K. Pysin, "Sovershenstvovat Apparat Upravleniia," *Partiinaia Zhizn,* No. 16 (August), 1956; P. Liepa, "Chto Pokazyvaet Praktika," *Sovety Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia,* No. 5 (May), 1958; "Uproshchat Raionnyi Apparat—Obzor Pisem," *"Partiinaia Zhizn.* No. 18, 1956; *Kommunist Tadzhikistana.* July 27, 1957.

[29] See "Equality and Inequality Under Khrushchev", by Robert A. Feldmesser, *Problems of Communism.* March-April 1960, 31-40.

[30] A. V. Luzhin, "Vzaimootnosheniia Mestnykh Sovetov Sovnarkhozami I Predpriiatiiami Soiuzno-Respublikanskovo Podchineniia," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo,* No. 4, 1959, pp. 47-48.

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underwent 538 public inspections within one and one-half years. Increased efficiency in a technically and administratively complex economy by such political means remains problematic.

Ironically, there is also the possibility that too much stress on popular participation, too much propaganda about socialist democracy, may only result in skepticism, apathy, and cynicism. Unless the leadership is willing to grant greater influence to local soviets in policy making—an unlikely development which would release a concatenation of unpredictable forces—throwing a bright spotlight on them only shows up their limitations in bolder relief. The American Observer Team to the 1958 Supreme Soviet elections reported that audiences at election rallies were frequently inattentive and appeared primarily interested in the entertainment provided after the speeches. Soviet citizens are becoming increasingly better educated and more sophisticated, and it appears questionable that they will be roused to a very high pitch of civic activity by the rather unartful techniques of mass-organizational work, however refined.



Рисунок Е. ЩЕГЛОВА.

МЕЧТА БЮРОКРАТА

— К товарищу Иванову проходите свободно!..

THE BUREAUCRAT'S DREAM

—Comrade Ivanov? Go right on in! . . .
(Sign on wall reads "Welcome.")

—From Krokodil, February 10, 1959.

Increased emphasis on popular participation also raises other problems whose consequences over the long run are difficult to evaluate. If the party leadership continues to activate public criticism of local administration and the local situation, it should, at least, be better informed about the conditions and attitude of the populace. It does not necessarily follow that the regime will be more responsive to popular pressures, but there would certainly be a tendency in this direction. Communist doctrine cannot admit to any divergence between the plans and policies of the leadership and the interests of the people, which must coincide by definition—as in the following formulation of democratic centralism:

> **Local organs of state power and administration have a two-fold significance: on the one hand these are organs of unified, centralized state power in the USSR, and on the other hand they are organs chosen by the local population and reflect their interests in correspondence with the interests of the state.[31]**

By such doctrinal formulas Soviet casuists paper over disparities between state objectives and popular wishes. However, if the chasm between popular desires and state plans opens too wide, it may be impossible to fill it with words; and to preserve the fictional identification, some concessions must be made to popular pressures. The relaxation of terror, the relatively increased emphasis on housing, food, and consumer goods, and the changes in the collective farm system since 1954 have had several motivations, but public sentiment for greater personal security and a fuller share of the emoluments of their labor have certainly been key factors in the regime's decisions.

While increased public criticism may be beneficial to the leaders in permitting them to tap more successfully the reservoir of public energies, it may also tend to erode the centralist discipline and élan of the party, on which the authority of the party elite ultimately rests. A local party official, though not dependent upon popular approv-

[31] V. I. Popova, *Sotsialisticheskaia Zakonnost V Deyatelnosti Mestnykh Sovetov*, Moscow, 1954, p. 56.

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al for his position, will find the pressures of criticism from below a more important calculation in his decisions.

Moreover, once set in motion, an upsurge of popular participation might be difficult to control. The commonly-accepted but unspoken ground rules of public criticism are that comment must be non-political in nature and directed only against local aberrations of an allwise national policy; yet encouragement of more outspoken comment, in a fluid situation where alterations in administrative methods and procedures are taking place, undoubtedly raises the temptation to stretch the rules, to cross the line between criticism of the implementation of policies and criticism of the policies themselves. That this is true is indicated by the alarms sounded against "subversive" criticism in the party press during 1956-57, and reports even of occasional strikes and slowdowns. Party apprehension over such excesses was evident in *Partiinaia Zhizn's* statement on the eve of the 1957 local elections: ". . . it is not excluded that certain enemy anti-Soviet elements will try to utilize the election campaign to slander the Soviet system."[32]

Any such open manifestations of local discontent probably can be prevented from coalescing into a dangerous, widespread resentment that could threaten the existence of the system. Yet there is a long term danger that, unless criticism is closely regulated, it may gradually undermine the claim of the party elite to omnipotence as the guardian and interpreter of the Communist scriptures and as the infallible leader in setting and enforcing the goals of society.

* * *

The potential long-range effects of increased public criticism are of course a matter of speculation. For the foreseeable future, popular participation will continue in its role as a controlled instrument of the regime, the usefulness of which far outweighs any innate threat it may represent. The reduction of arbitrary terror, the transfer of some functions to mass organizations, the attempts to enliven the moribund soviets, the encouragement of public criticism of the state bureaucracy, and doctrinal modifications about the withering away of the state, have not altered the fact that popular participation is essentially manipulated and carefully circumscribed by the regime. Participation is limited primarily to the grass-roots in villages, *raions*, boroughs and cities. Mass-organization work is directed at local problems, or perhaps more precisely at local manifestations of national problems. The people have not been afforded any choice over their destiny, for true choice involves the ability to dissent. The restricted "right" to criticize a local bureaucrat, and on rare occasions even to reject his appointment, is of a totally different dimension from the right to propose alternate candidates and policies and to organize and agitate for their election. Public participation, Soviet style, remains fundamentally non-political.

It is the vote and the ability to express opposition meaningfully which constitute the nexus of a democratic political system. The monolithic party is the matrix of the Soviet political structure. It is indicative of the operation of totalitarian "democracy" that increased popular participation has been ordered from the top, and that the extent of its implementation will depend on how intently it is pushed by the leadership and nurtured by the centrally-disciplined local party cadres. Perhaps Khrushchev's new course can best be summed up in the difference between control through fiat and control through persuasion. The party elite remains the motive force in society, but instead of the outright imposition of iron-clad and all-embracing regulations, it employs gentler prodding and subtler techniques to achieve its aims, holding the stick in ready reserve.

[32] "Uluchshat Rabotu Mestnykh Sovetov Deputatov Tradiashchikhsia," *Partiinaia Zhizn*, No. 2 (January), 1957, p. 9.

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"Socialist Transformation" in the Countryside

By Victor Meier

ONE OF THE CHIEF GOALS of the postwar Communist regimes in Eastern Europe was the "socialist reconstruction" of agriculture after the Soviet model created by Stalin. During the drive to realize this goal, however, many obstacles were encountered, and as a result three fundamentally different approaches to the "socialist transformation of the countryside" can at present be distinguished. The first method, now followed by all the satellite countries with the exception of Poland, is a more or less schematic imitation of the forced administrative collectivization which Stalin carried out in the Soviet Union. The second course is the one adopted by the Polish Communists, who have rejected the idea of forced collectivization and instead have devised a mixed system of "persuasion" and material-technical incentives. The third approach can be found in Yugoslavia, where the idea of material incentives has actually become the basis of Communist agricultural policy. It should be stressed, however, that the Polish as well as the Yugoslav Communists, despite their divergence from the basic principles of Soviet agricultural policy, continue to cling to the ultimate aim of a collectivized agriculture.

The economic and political difficulties recently experienced in most East European countries as a result of the reintroduction of Stalinist collectivization policies some three years or so ago seem to have given rise to doubts about the correctness of the path that has been followed. At the conference of Communist leaders in Moscow in February 1960, where agricultural problems were the principal topic of discussion, the Soviet leadership adopted a position of "non-interference"—a refuge often taken by the Kremlin in the face of serious difficulties. Consequently, the satellite parties reacted to the Moscow discussions in a very disparate manner. The East German Communists interpreted the conclusions of the conference as giving a green light for the "completion of the socialist transformation of agriculture", whereas the Hungarian party stopped its collectivization drive "until further notice". The Polish Communists simply continued on their charted course.

Nature of the Problems

There can be no doubt that agriculture in Eastern Europe is beset with deepseated problems which have been in urgent need of solution since before the last war. Even democratic governments, if they were allowed to function in this part of Europe today, would have to undertake fundamental reforms in this field. The problem is, first of all, one of production, of how to satisfy the requirements of the satellite national economies for agricultural products. Secondly, as a result of the increase in population and the postwar division of arable land into small plots, there also arose the broader problems of social and economic balance. Had the East European countries been satisfied with their pre-World War II economic standards, these problems would not have presented themselves in such acute form. As it happened, however, the industrialization programs which all of them had embarked upon had graduallly pushed the proportion of the population employed in non-agricultural occupations to 50 percent or higher, thus creating the need for a sharp rise in agricultural

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productivity. To stimulate production and keep the market adequately supplied, the Communists had a choice of resorting either to economic incentives or to coercion. From the very beginning they chose the second alternative.

However, neither in the Soviet Union nor later in the satellites did the consumption requirements of the population constitute the principal reason for collectivization. The primary consideration was political, for Stalin knew full well that unless he destroyed the traditional system of agricultural production based on an independent peasantry, the party could never control the countryside. He also knew that without tight political control of agriculture, he could not exploit the peasantry as a source of "primary accumulation" (*i.e.*, the difference between the state's purchase and retail prices for agricultural products), which during the early period of industrialization had been the principal source of investment funds. Finally, the principle of collectivization reflected also the traditional belief of Marxist intellectuals in Russia and elsewhere that merely by enlarging the size of economic units (*i.e.*, the farms) and introducing modern farm machinery and technology, agricultural production could be transformed into a quasi-industrial process.

Stalin, of course, succeeded in his potitical aim and collectivized Soviet agriculture, but he did so at the cost of a disastrous decline in production. It was not until the middle 1950's that total Soviet agricultural output again reached pre-World War I levels. The process was repeated in the satellite countries where, at the time of Stalin's death, the Communists were still engaged in a hard struggle to collectivize the peasantry, with effects on output similar to those experienced earlier in the Soviet Union. Thus, Czechoslovakia has yet to regain its pre-World War II agricultural production level,[1] while none of the other bloc countries has exceeded its 1939 output by more than about five percent.

Prescription and Reality

The question arises why Khrushchev, who must surely be aware of the harm wrought by Stalinist agricultural policies in Eastern Europe, has nevertheless insisted on resuming and even accelerating the collectivization drive in most of the satellite countries. He has, after all, committed the Soviet Union to an economic race with the West, and his ambition to surpass the United States in industrial production as well as in the standard of living might be seriously compromised if East European agricultural productivity should deteriorate further and thus increase the drain on Soviet economic resources.

Undoubtedly, ideological considerations have again played an important role; the success of the Communist system *universally,* not just in the Soviet Union, is at stake. But quite apart from this, the decisive consideration in the Soviet Premier's mind may well have been the much improved production record of wholly collectivized Soviet agriculture since 1953.

It is important, however, to remember the background of the recent increases in Soviet agricultural output. These have been due, in part at least, to Khrushchev's efforts to bring under cultivation large areas of virgin land where large-scale production by means of the full application of agricultural machinery is possible as well as economical. Unfortunately, the possibilities of applying similar methods in the satellite countries are extremely limited, as a good part of their territory is unsuited for large-scale operations and only an insignificant increase of arable acreage could be gained by improving marginal land not fully exploited at present.

There is yet another reason for the recent upturn in Soviet agricultural production, and Khrushchev touched on it in his speech before the Hungarian Party Congress in Budapest in November 1959. He announced on that occasion that the cash income of Soviet collective farms had increased two-and-a-half times during the preceding six years. The improvement which this implies in the living standard of the Soviet farm population clearly reflects the importance placed upon material incentives in Soviet planning, and the relative success of these measures in the Soviet Union recently has probably led Khrushchev to the conclusion that rapid collectivization can be achieved in the East European countries without serious repercussions on agricultural output, if only the peasants are offered sufficient economic inducements.

A closer look at the not too distant past will show once again why Soviet methods are inapplicable to East European conditions. From the early 1930's until Stalin's death, Soviet peasants went through an ordeal of starvation, oppression and terror unmatched within recent history in any European country, and Soviet agricultural productivity consequently fell to the lowest level in Europe. Given such an inheritance, even a modest boost in material incentives and living standards was sufficient to provide a relatively powerful impetus to the Soviet peasant's productivity. The individualistic East European peasant, however, who continues to fight for independence, remains less susceptible to comparable inducements. The economic incentives offered the peasants by the satellite regimes, particularly in the years 1957-58,

[1] *Mlada Fronta*, October 17, 1959.

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were ineffective because the two aims which they were designed to achieve—improved productivity and more rapid collectivization—proved incompatible. Thus, while such measures as the replacement of compulsory deliveries by contract deliveries at better prices and the partial liberalization of the market for agricultural products helped to improve output, they failed to stimulate the peasants to join collective farms. Indeed, particularly in those countries which lagged behind in their collectivization programs, they even strengthened the position of the remaining independent farmers, since the Communists, in the interest of improved production, could not discriminate too harshly in favor of the collective farms. On the other hand, wherever the incentive system was sharply oriented toward stimulating production within the collectivized sector—for instance, by price differentiation between compulsory basic deliveries and above-quota deliveries—it soon gave rise to serious abuses, as well as to evidences of deficient party control over the newly established collective farms. As a result, such differentiated price systems had to be levelled again—as happened in Czechoslovakia, for instance, at the beginning of this year.

The Fruits of Collectivization

Problems of price structure are indeed just as much a fundamental source of difficulty in satellite agriculture as they are in other sectors of Communist economies. Because most of the East European regimes rely to a certain extent on agriculture for the supply of industrial investment funds, they are limited in the range of material incentives they can offer the peasants. If they were to raise agricultural purchase prices too close to the level of retail prices, they would lose one of their important sources of capital accumulation. This is particularly true of the relatively underdeveloped countries such as Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, where a lack of investment funds is already visible. In the past, such capital deficiencies have been partially alleviated by Soviet credits, but the Kremlin is making it increasingly clearer that this source will not be available forever.

It is not too surprising under the circumstances that Communist leaders have reverted to the conclusion that nothing short of the Stalinist policy of force and terror will bring the peasants into the collective farms; and they have not hesitated to translate this conclusion into reality. The consequences of this policy are already becoming evident.

In Czechoslovakia, for instance, inefficiency and lack of manpower on the collective farms have made the harvesting of crops a chronic and insoluble problem which in 1959 not even the forcible mobilization of non-agricultural workers, students and soldiers for farm work could overcome. The planned agricultural targets for 1959 were not fulfilled, and President Novotny, the First Party Secretary, went so far as to describe last year as a "serious lesson" for Czechoslovak agriculture.[2]

Hungary and Bulgaria have been facing particularly severe difficulties. Both countries reaped only average harvests last year, while neighboring Yugoslavia produced a record crop under similar weather conditions. Hungarian agriculture, indeed, has not recovered from the effects of the 1959 collectivization drive and seemed to be in a state of chaos early this year. In Bulgaria, the setbacks have been particularly serious in animal husbandry. After boasting in 1958 of their "successful completion of socialist reconstruction in the field of agriculture", the Bulgarian Communists went a step farther and, following the Chinese model, began merging their collective farms into larger units and liquidating the private plots and livestock of their *kolkhozniki.* In 1959, however, serious shortages, particularly of meat and dairy products, began developing, and the party had to admit the failure of its ambitious plans. When finally the meat shortage assumed disastrous proportions this year, the regime decided to return the private plots to their owners, who were ordered to satisfy their meat and dairy requirements exclusively from such privately cultivated land.[3]

The only satellite country where agriculture is not in serious difficulties is Rumania. A recent *New York Times* report from Bucharest [4] gives a partial explanation for this rare phenomenon: it now appears that the impressive figure of 75 percent of all arable land officially claimed to have been incorporated into the socialist sector is very much exaggerated since it includes various lower forms of peasant associations no longer in existence in other Communist countries.

The Case of Poland

Unlike their comrades elsewhere in the Eastern bloc the Polish Communists have decided in favor of an economic rather than political solution to their agricultural problem: that is to say, they have concentrated on increasing agricultural production at the cost of political setbacks in their still acknowledged pursuit of socialized

[2] *Radio Prague,* January 1, 1960.
[3] *Rabotnichesko Delo,* May 11, 1960.
[4] March 9, 1960.

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agriculture. After October 1956, virtually all collective farms in Poland were dissolved, compulsory deliveries were reduced, and a free market for agricultural products was reestablished. Soon thereafter Poland became the first East European country to increase its agricultural output.

In spite of this improvement, however, the supply of foodstuffs—meat in particular—could not keep up with the growing demand of the urban population, and the conclusion that Polish agriculture suffered from a deep-seated structural problem, that it was not enough to give the peasants a measure of freedom and let them simply pursue their tasks in the traditional way, finally became inescapable. The urgency of putting into effect a constructive development program became especially apparent under the unfavorable weather conditions of the last two years. The Second Plenum of the Party Central Committee held last summer therefore adopted a new program designed to introduce certain institutional reforms and to promote mechanization and modern technology in Polish agriculture. The reform is based on the transformation of the old "agrarian circles" into public institutions through which the state would put agricultural machinery at the peasants' disposal and help them improve cultivation methods.

The results of the experiment have been rather disappointing thus far. The peasants have been unwilling to cooperate with the agrarian circles since they feel that the institution has been foisted on them by the government and because the equipment now made available to them through the circles remains the property of the state. Many peasants are inclined to view the circles as a revival of the Stalinist machine tractor stations and the first step in a new collectivization campaign. This impression is further strengthened by the continued public adherence of the Polish government and party to the goal of a collectivized agriculture, and by the fact that for lack of reliable cadres the regime is forced to staff the circles with the same people who some years ago tried, successfully or not, to drive the peasants into collectives. The party, on the other hand, is unwilling to relinquish its control of the circles because it well knows that under a system of self-management—as is customary in Western cooperatives—they would soon become dominated by people hostile to the regime and the Communists would lose all political control of the countryside.

The current Polish agricultural program is a typical product of the policy of half-measures carried out by Party First Secretary Wladislaw Gomulka since his accession to power in 1956. The Polish peasant today has little incentive to invest in costly equipment and exert extraordinary effort when the economy of the country has so little to offer him in return. Here is probably the principal cause of the stagnation in Polish agriculture. The reestablishment of free agricultural markets has certainly helped, but the price differentials between agricultural products and industrial consumer goods remain too wide. In addition, consumer goods are in such short supply that even if the peasant earns a considerable cash income, he cannot find an adequate selection of goods to compensate him for his effort. The only approach to a solution of this problem is the institution of a rational, economy-wide price system based on the law of value.

The Yugoslav Example

Although precluded in Poland at the moment by political considerations, a decisive step in this direction has already been taken in Titoist Yugoslavia. As a result, the Yugoslav Communists were in a position last year not only to report an excellent harvest, but also to announce the cessation of all imports of grain—a development which naturally enough provoked uneasy comments in neighboring satellite Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania. What is more, however, the Yugoslavs now appear to be on the way toward a practical solution of the fundamental problems of East European agriculture.

The chief promoter of the "new course" in Yugoslav agriculture has been Vladimir Bakaric, the Secretary of the Croation Communist Party. As far back as 1953, Bakaric came to the conclusion that while collectivization and mechanization may to a certain extent rationalize agricultural production, they do not necessarily increase it. Furthermore, he has argued that mechanization in itself leads to a release of manpower in the countryside, and that in countries with a relatively small industrial base and a limited investment program this in turn results in open or disguised unemployment because the existing industries are unable to absorb the manpower surplus.

After the dissolution of collective farms in Yugoslavia, Bakaric developed his program further. He concluded that under the conditions prevailing in the uncollectivized rural areas of Eastern Europe, the basic problem is how to overcome the natural tendency of small cultivators toward autarchy and interest them in producing for the market. The answer lies, of course, in offering the peasants a sufficient assortment of consumer goods at prices based on sound economic criteria. Such a rational adjustment of the price structure has been carried out in Yugoslavia during the course of the past three or four years.

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As far as mechanization is concerned, Bakaric now believes that it can fulfill its purpose only when the peasant himself becomes economically interested in the further intensification and rationalization of production. At that time the proper moment will have arrived for the state not only to provide the peasant with additional equipment, but also to organize large-scale production on a collective basis. Economic education designed to stimulate such interest is now being carried on through the so-called "general agricultural cooperatives," with which the independent peasants are associated on an individual basis. The Yugoslav peasantry still views the government's agricultural program with a certain amount of distrust, but there is a very good chance that in time the regime's approach will bring fruitful results.

Conclusion

The propaganda campaign currently being waged in the Soviet bloc against Yugoslavia's "revisionist" agricultural policy reflects the uneasiness and lack of conviction with which the Moscow-dominated leaders view their accomplishments and prospects in the field of agriculture. To a certain extent these doubts are probably nourished by the Kremlin's own ambivalent attitude as to the proper course of agrarian policy in Eastern Europe. For ideological and political reasons, Khrushchev would like to see concerted progress towards total collectivization—but not of course at the price of a dangerous breakdown in production. As no one, however, has thus far come forward with a magic prescription for effectively combining a speedup in collectivization with increased production, Moscow has of late allowed the satellite regimes a certain amount of latitude in their programming. How long they will be able to enjoy this measure of discretionary authority is difficult to predict at this time. It is hard to imagine in any case how the Communist planners can afford to disregard the example of Bulgaria, and now also of East Germany, where complete collectivization, instead of ending a period of difficulties, has set off severe food supply crises.

The East European countries can no longer delay a serious effort to increase their agricultural output. Their populations are increasing, and the Soviet Union, already overcommitted at home and abroad, is reluctant to go on making up their agricultural deficits indefinitely. Moreover, neither Moscow nor the satellite regimes can afford major setbacks in East European standards of living, which not only would result in serious political difficulties, but would hamstring Khrushchev's efforts to create the image of a prosperous Communist world successfully competing with the West. On the other hand, all the satellite parties with the exception of the Polish Communists are now too deeply committed to a policy of enforced collectivization to be able to retreat without suffering a heavy loss of prestige. Communist agricultural policy in Eastern Europe thus faces a dilemma for which no solution is in sight.

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Reportage—or Wishful Thinking?

To Moscow—and Beyond,
by Harrison E. Salisbury.
Harper & Brothers, New York, 1959.

Khrushchev's Russia,
by Edward Crankshaw.
Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1959.

Reviewed by Donald W. Treadgold

MR CRANKSHAW is probably the best-known living British journalist who writes on Soviet affairs; Mr. Salisbury occupies the same position in the United States. The position Mr. Salisbury has attained was strikingly demonstrated when his interpretation of the reasons for the summit collapse was instantly echoed by a multitude of officials and newpapers throughout the land.[1] In a country which boasts dozens of qualified specialists on the USSR and communism among academics, journalists, and free-lance writers, such an occurrence may be regarded by readers of Salisbury's last book as a puzzling calamity.

To begin with, Mr. Salisbury sometimes writes shoddily. For instance, he makes Karakorum the capital of the Mongolian "Golden Horde" (p. 211), whereas actually the Horde was the section of the Mongol empire which had its capital in Russia. He speaks of superimposing the hammer and sickle upon the Golden Horde's *"yarlik"* which means a khan's grant of power, not some kind of insignia. He follows no single standard system of Cyrillic transliteration; yet this reviewer counted fourteen errors judged by any accepted system whatsoever.

These, however, might be considered minor errors—perhaps endemic to journalistic reportage in general. But there are worse ones. Mr. Salisbury opens with four chapters contrasting the atmosphere of 1954 with that of 1959 in Moscow and its environs—seeing therein "the decline of a police state." A grimmer note is struck in discussing the position of the Jews. He passes next to comments on the misbehavior of Soviet youth, the Pasternak affair, and other literary and artistic developments; much of this consists of interesting observations of his own and fair expositions of evidence gathered from other sources. From chapter ten, however, we are gently led into the area of politics, beginning with an idyllic chapter on Khrushchev, appropriately entitled "Herdsman of the 'Little Cows'." The theme is further developed in a discussion of the politics of the party Presidium. Then the author takes us on his eastward journeys, with one chapter on Siberia and three on Mongolia. In the third of these he comments on the Chinese Communists, and the succeeding chapters discuss "The Coming Conflict"—that is, between Russia and China. Next, a chapter on Khrushchev's alleged struggle with reactionaries on press policy, and finally a look at "The Shape of the Future"—which turns out to be (or so Salisbury hopes) a Soviet-American alliance against Communist China.

Mr. Salisbury cannot resist the journalist's special pleading: "seeing is better than hearing"—or, for that matter, reading. One can only pity the hapless journalist in the USSR today, who must see but is denied the chance of doing so, and who must thread his conclusions on a thin string of chance encounters, foreign colony gossip, and Soviet press comment. In fact, Mr. Salisbury has not *seen* the meetings of the Presidium whose tenor he so confidently describes (pp. 155-56) or the machinations of the "army" and the "Stalinists" (pp.

[1] According to Salisbury, the "army," the Stalinists, and the "Chinese" forced Khrushchev to scuttle the summit meeting. Professor Alexander Dallin dubbed this theory "The Legend of the Chained Nikita" (*New Leader,* New York, June 20, 1960) —but sensationalism notoriously makes a more saleable article. See also "The Nature of Khrushchev's Power," by Richard Lowenthal, *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1960.

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171 and 175), to whom he was later to ascribe the "chaining of Nikita," or the Chinese mainland to which he devotes a good deal of space. His remarks on these subjects are compounded of gossip exchanged by foreigners in Moscow hotels, and little more. Actually some of his best pages are not straight reporting, but pure evocations of the way things *may* be, and there is a delightful five-page, purely imaginary, yet persuasive account of the purchase of an expensive emerald by a privileged woman.

IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE for Mr. Salisbury to "see" more, but perhaps he should have been more cautious in his forecasts. He predicted that Ignatov would succeed Voroshilov (Brezhnev has since been given the post), and that the now fallen Kirichenko would follow Khrushchev; no matter, anyone can lose in that game. More seriously, one wonders on what basis he can justify his predictions that the presence in Moscow of former labor camp inmates will be a "barrier to the rise of a new police power" (p. 23); that in the struggle for artistic freedom "there could be only one outcome"—success (p. 126); that the alleged and very possibly real Soviet-Chinese conflict over Mongolia will end in "another change of alphabet" to Chinese—never mind that the language has no alphabet—(p. 240); that US recognition of Communist China would result in "first-class first-hand information on every step" of the regime, even though the trained (and frustrated) observers from other Western countries who have sat in Peking for a decade constitute only "dubious diplomatic missions" with nothing important to tell us (p. 287).

Predictions, even implausible ones, may sometimes turn out right. What then shall we make of some of his conclusions about the past and the present? Is it really true that a Shostakovich operetta depicting the dreadful Moscow housing situation in what the author admits is fairy-tale style "faithfully represents what Cheremushki [a housing development] means to Moscow and its citizens" (p. 38); that Khrushchev's "program is the program which the people support" (this quoted approvingly from someone else), while Malenkov, whose popular promise of more consumer goods was damned by the Khrushchevites with the label of "rightist deviation," is said to have been only "able," though "tarred indelibly with deep guilt" in intra-party strife (p. 170); or that Khrushchev, who is generally thought to have accumulated some guilt himself in the purges in the Ukraine, did not have purges as his "job" (p. 151)?

There are times when one wishes the author would agree with himself. We are told that "the Communist government works on a theory of world affairs—the Marxist theory" (p. 259); yet a few pages later we are warned that it is time to "think of the world" not in terms of the Communist passion to transform it, but in terms of old-fashioned "geopolitics" (p. 275), which indeed is the theme of the book, if there is any. We are first given a picture of Salisbury forcing his way through garrulous Russians in a way which persuades him that all Moscow has become a "chatterbox" (p. 14), and then we are told of "brutal and arbitrary" police interference in Russian contacts with foreigners (p. 27). These statements could have been amplified and reconciled, but the optimistic generalities are left pages away from the cautions.

For the fundamental argument of *To Moscow and Beyond* is that Khrushchev is a peaceable, liberalizing chap who might be interested in a little two-power deal to divide the world in a way the American President could accept, and that, in view of Chinese Communist aggressiveness, the democratic powers—and in the first place the United States—would do well to devote to this possibility some "serious talk" (last line of book).

It comes as no surprise that Mr. Salisbury believes that "the greatest defect of the Soviet system" is the lack of a succession law (p. 165). If some American had written this of the Russia of Catherine II (with surely at least as much truth) just before Paul enacted such a law, what might have been Thomas Jefferson's reply? Salisbury's Russia is not a land where (upper-case) Communists are engaged in a permanent effort to extend their control over the rest of the planet and carry the people into (lower-case) communism, with untold past, present, and perhaps future casualties in body and spirit. It is a place where men who are a cross between earthy herdsmen and jovial American politicians try to pull backward bureaucrats "kicking and screaming into the twentieth century" (*sic*), while American diplomats fumble and fail to make friends with these rugged but endearing souls.

UNLIKE MR. SALISBURY, Mr. Crankshaw does not make representations on behalf of the virtues of "seeing"; he sets about describing, as best he can, Soviet internal developments under Khrushchev's direction, seen or unseen. He tries to give his theme a broader setting than that of "thaw" *vs.* "freeze", and indicates the large spectrum of problems which must be examined; he traces the struggle among Stalin's heirs; he analyzes the new policies and new methods of Khrushchev; he examines the dimensions of "the great thaw," particularly with respect to literature; and he asks, finally, "What is

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it all about?" An appendix contains the text of the famous letter of the editors of *Novyi Mir* to Pasternak, rejecting *Dr. Zhivago*.

Crankshaw makes some slips: he gives contradictory dates a few pages apart; he attributes the slogan "neither war nor peace" to Lenin instead of Trotsky (p. 17); he mistakenly gives Lenin's name to the Stalin Industrial Academy, which Khrushchev attended (p. 51); astonishingly, he states that the chief rapporteur at the 19th Party Congress was Khrushchev instead of Malenkov—actually it *was* Malenkov—and then devotes a page to explaining why (p. 35). On more fundamental points, however, he is generally reliable. On Soviet agricultural policy, the *sovnarkhozy*, and the "thaw," for example, his comments are clear and convincing. Unlike Mr. Salisbury, he takes seriously the possibility that Khrushchev might resume the use of terror in the USSR; he makes no incautious claims about Khrushchev's popularity in the country; and he has no illusions about the imminent "withering away" of the police state or of the Communist Party.

Nevertheless, his overall interpretation is hardly exempt from serious criticism. Indeed, many of the strictures that could be levelled against *Khrushchev's Russia* have already been made in regard to the author's earlier writings. As he acknowledges, he has been challenged for "refusing to put the official Marxist-Leninist ideology into the forefront of Soviet society and life" (p. 140); his reply is that the ideology is merely a "doctrinal ragbag," but then goes on to itemize the bag's contents, which turn out to be some of the major Marxist-Leninist propositions. Most curiously, he characterizes the Soviet system as a way ("painful, brutal, and wasteful," yet one that "suited Russians") of "propelling an extremely backward agrarian country into the middle of the industrial twentieth century"—a formulation which (irrespective of its dubious validity and basic amorality) demonstrates that Mr. Crankshaw himself is hardly averse to dipping into the "doctrinal ragbag" of Marxism-Leninism.

The author contrasts the degraded rural Russia, a noxious survival of ancient times, with the progressive urban Russia largely created by Stalin. He sees the degraded rural types as a kind of standing offense to the Russian patriotism which is a major characteristic of the Communist leaders and of those "decent" spirits who object to the methods but subscribe to the ends. Moreover, he contends that "most Russians, in spite of the hot denials of refugees and 'defectors,' have a deep hankering after a stern, remote father-figure . . ." (p. 70). By this route Mr. Crankshaw joins the school that sees communism as Russia's sad, inevitable, and yet yearned-for destiny—a school that, in effect, justifies Stalinism on the ground that it was a phase which—in spite or perhaps even *because* of its cruelty—succeeded in "propelling" Russia "into the twentieth century," from which the dark masses stubbornly hung back. Fortunately, three-quarters of Mr. Crankshaw's book may be used with profit by those who refuse to charge the people of Russia with "hankering" after the system first imposed on them by force and maintained by the use of force without limit, and who do not accept the "inevitability" of the determined Communist effort which drove Russia clear off the road she was traveling toward a pluralistic society.

Mr. Crankshaw is chiefly concerned with Soviet domestic developments. On foreign affairs, he dilates on the "silliness" of Western policy, which allegedly stems from the fact that no one has sat down and figured out that the Kremlin cannot really run the world (p. 145). One wonders if he would have suggested a refusal to resist Genghis Khan, or Hitler and the Japanese military, on the same grounds. He does not discuss recent Communist gains in various Asian, African, and Latin American countries; "Communist," he says, is an "almost meaningless" word, and, one might add, possibly all those countries want propulsion into the twentieth century too. Happily, having neither studied nor visited China, he abstains from telling us all about it, an example others could afford to imitate.

THE JACKET OF *To Moscow and Beyond* quotes the American journalist John Gunther to the effect that Mr. Salisbury's is "a first-rate book about Russia by a first-rate man." First-rate men among students of Soviet affairs, as among other groups, are rare. Mr. Crankshaw's book is certainly more penetrating, and if he thinks we are dealing not with communism but with Mother Russia (Mr. Salisbury gives us Mother China, too), his view is shared to some degree by many Western statesmen past and present and, one fears, by the considerable section of the reading public which derives its conceptions of the Soviet Union from such books as these.

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Communism in Asia

A Short History of Communism in East Asia,
By Captain Malcolm D. Kennedy.
F. A. Praeger, New York, 1957.

Communism in South East Asia: A Political Analysis,
by J. H. Brimmel.
Oxford University Press, London, 1959.

Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy, by A. Doak Barnett.
Harper & Brothers, New York, 1960.

Marxism in Southeast Asia: A Study of Four Countries,
by Frank N. Trager
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1959.

Reviewed by Gene D. Overstreet

AS THE SHELF OF VOLUMES dealing with Soviet and Communist policy in individual Asian countries has grown more ample, broader surveys of communism in the region as a whole have shown a proportionate rise in quality. Earlier compilations, such as Robert Payne's *Red Storm Over Asia* (Macmillan, New York, 1951) and O. O. Trullinger's *Red Banners Over Asia* (Beacon, Boston, 1951), were very weak beginnings in the category of general surveys. By comparison, the later works have shown steady improvement both in the corpus of information and in the sophistication of analysis.

Captain Malcolm D. Kennedy's *A Short History of Communism in East Asia* stands at approximately midpoint in this development. Originally published in Great Britain in 1957, it is an introductory survey of the development of Soviet and Communist policy with respect to the countries of East Asia—and its American title notwithstanding—also South and Southeast Asia. The author's intent is to "outline the main developments in the rise of nationalism and in the spread of communism in this area, to indicate how and why these developments came about, and to interpret Communist tactics and strategy in these strategically important and heavily populated regions in the light of world affairs in general and of Russian politics and policies in particular." He is more successful in the first of these purposes than in the other two.

For many years a news correspondent in prewar Japan, Captain Kennedy displays considerable primary knowledge of that country and evidently engaged in much secondary research on the other countries of the area. His narrative is vivid and, for the most part, scrupulously accurate. It should be added, however, that his sources are, with rare exceptions, generally available English-language books, that he neglects some highly relevant items and makes virtually no use of journal material. Further, he is on occasion curiously negligent, as for example when he reports that at the second Congress of the Comintern both Lenin and Roy "emphasized the role of the national liberation movement as a mighty factor in the struggle against imperialism" (p. 121), making no mention whatever of the crucial disagreement between the two men over the nature and role of the "national liberation movement."

The author's fulfillment of his other stated purposes is much more deficient. He does not analyze systematically how the Asian Communist parties were influenced either by their indigenous environments or by the context of international communism. He also displays a lack of easy familiarity with Communist theory and frequently digresses from his narrative to indulge in anti-Communist polemics. Finally, he at times manifests a bias against certain non-Communist nationalist movements in Asia, as for instance when he condemns the Indian National Congress for its readiness to "pander to the more extreme elements." (p. 225)

MORE DESERVING of serious attention from specialists is J. H. Brimmell's *Communism in South East Asia: A Political Analysis.* Based on field experience (the

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author was formerly in the service of the Government of Malaya), on intensive research in American as well as British library collections, and consultations with specialists on particular Southeast Asian countries, the book is a prodigious accomplishment as a survey of Communist theory and practice in the context of diplomatic and political history. The time span is about 1917-1958, with introductory incursions into the earlier development of Marxist-Leninist thought and of Southeast Asian nationalism; the countries covered are Burma, Thailand, French Indochina and its independent successor states, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines, besides which there is some supplementary discussion of the development of Chinese and, to a lesser degree, of Indian communism. The amplitude of detail is impressive, the analysis frequently acute and always stimulating, and the degree of distortion or oversimplification—considering the scope of the undertaking—remarkably slight. In some passages the author contributes fresh data derived from native informants and, evidently, from confidential government documents.

Specialists, however, may find some aspects of the study rather shallow. On the thought of Mao Tse-tung, for example, it gives only a rather superficial summary of two of Mao's main writings; and it is generally true that the author, in his discussions of Communist theory, tends to select too few documents and subject them to too much—sometimes irrelevant—textual analysis. Further, he is somewhat ambiguous on the relation of Maoism to Leninism and the role of Maoism in Asian Communist evolution. He observes that Maoist strategy for the "new democratic" phase of Communist revolution is merely a repetition of Lenin's formulae of 1905, but on the other hand he speaks of Mao's "peculiar strategic ideas" and concludes that "Maoist strategy accomplished for China what Leninism had accomplished for Russia." (pp. 133-137) A more refined analytical approach, involving precise distinctions between strategy and tactics, would have made for a clearer treatment of such questions of Communist doctrine, but the author makes no reference to, or apparent use of, recent contributions in this particular field, such as John Kautsky's very useful volume, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India.*

As a further example of the author's somewhat fuzzy treatment of ideological questions, he states at one point in his book (p. 137) that Maoism, in conjunction with Lenin's theory of imperialism, "is the real determinant of the Asian variant of communism," whereas he later states (p. 395) that the "contemporary course of action favored by the Communist Parties of the region is the establishment of coalition governments by legal methods, along the lines followed by the Indonesian Communist leader Aidit." But this course bears little resemblance to Maoism in its most important tactical aspects. In regard to forms of organization, the Indonesian CP utilizes the coalition tactic, or the united front from above, which resembles the tactics of "people's democracy" as they emerged in Eastern Europe in 1945-1948, rather than those of Mao's "new democracy." As far as forms of action are concerned, Indonesian Communist policy stresses a peaceful parliamentary struggle for power, and in this respect it resembles neither "people's" nor "new democracy."

Moreover, in his closing pages the author hazards the conjecture that the Southeast Asian Communist Parties, instead of rigidly adhering to Maoism, are likely to generate fresh adaptations of Marxism to their own indigenous environments—syntheses such as a "Marxist Buddhism and Marxist Islam."

THE ROLE OF CHINESE COMMUNISM in the overall development of Asian communism is also examined in A. Doak Barnett's *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy.* This, however, forms only a part of his broadly comprehensive volume, which was prepared in consultation with a study group of the Council on Foreign Relations. The book first sketches briefly the nature of Communist China's political system and then analyzes the major foundations and instruments of its foreign relations: *i.e.,* the influence of ideology upon its external expectations and goals; the economic and military power factors underlying Chinese diplomacy; diplomatic tactics and methods of subversion through the use of local Communist Parties, ethnic groups, and the overseas Chinese; and the techniques of foreign economic policy. It continues with a discussion of the nature of Chinese Communist relations with non-Communist Asian states and with the Communist bloc. Finally, it closes with a consideration of the resulting problems for American foreign policy—indeed, the author's particular concern with these problems pervades the book as a whole. In view of its scope and quality, it is an indispensable companion volume to similar comprehensive studies of Soviet foreign policy.

All these various aspects of Mr. Barnett's book cannot be touched on in this review, but in particular the sections on the relation of Chinese to Asian communism serve to illustrate the great resources of knowledge that can be mobilized through collaboration between a specialist author and a study group combining a variety of competences. In addition to his general discussion of China's role in Asian communism, the author provides

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an appendix containing short histories of the relations between Peking and individual Asian Communist Parties. He concludes that, while Moscow remains the source of general directives for the bloc as a whole, Peking's influence on the Asian parties is extensive and increasing. Under an apparently cooperative arrangement, he says, "Moscow continues to be the primary headquarters of the worldwide Communist movement, but Peking's role appears, in effect, to have become that of a regional headquarters." (p. 158)

ONE COMMON SHORTCOMING of these and other general surveys of Asian communism is that, except in the case of China, they do not give sufficiently detailed treatment to the impact upon individual Asian Communist Parties of their respective indigenous environments. While both Kennedy and Brimmell declare their intent to include this dimension in their portrayal of the Asian Communist movements, they do not in fact do so more than cursorily. This failure seems attributable primarily to a parallel tendency to neglect this dimension even in specialized studies of particular Asian parties. Thorough analysis of these parties would necessarily comprehend their interaction with both their international and their national environments, and hence would take into account not only their overt and central operations but also their internal and local operations.

A useful corrective to the tendency just referred to is supplied by Frank Trager and his associates in their volume, *Marxism in Southeast Asia: A Study of Four Countries*. This work includes introductory and concluding essays written by Trager, and intervening chapters on Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia, written by John S. Thomson, David A. Wilson, I. Milton Sacks, and Jeanne S. Mintz, respectively. Its purpose is to inquire into the interaction between Marxism (primarily communism) and indigenous institutions. However, the authors of the specialized chapters address themselves to this analytical task with varying degrees of effectiveness: some of them, indeed, concentrate almost exclusively on tracing the historical development of Marxist parties in the countries with which they are dealing. Nevertheless, to a greater or lesser degree, there is an attempt in each chapter to judge the compatibility of Marxism with local culture and traditions, and to evaluate the influence which Marxist ideas and organizations have had, or are having, on the formation of transitional institutions on the road to modernization of the indigenous social systems.

The conclusion most generally agreed upon by the contributing authors is that, while communism adapted itself effectively to the revolutionary nationalist phase of Asian modernization, it has not yet succeeded in proving itself of equal relevance for the Asian peoples in the more recent stage of political independence. Lenin accomplished the adaptation of Marxism to nations as well as classes, but no Communist theoretician since Lenin has accomplished its adaptation to the primary social forces in underdeveloped countries. These forces, in their Indian variant, are "casteism," "communalism" and "regionalism"—that is, organic social subdivisions such as the clan, caste, village, and religious and ethnic movements. To the extent that communism continues to regard the underdeveloped countries in terms of the orthodox Western concept of class, and to base political action upon this concept, it will remain profoundly alien to these societies and relatively ineffectual in influencing their modernization.

It might be added, however, that although the Communist model of political action appears definitely incompatible with indigenous reality in the underdeveloped nations, the case is not so clear when it comes to the Communist model of governmental organization. The Communist form of government in its broadest features —namely, elite policy-making coupled with mass participation in the execution and adjudication of policy—may well appear quite appropriate to Asians from the standpoint of achieving rapid modernization, at the same time that it has great mass appeal to a semi-educated electorate by seeming to promise a kind of political participation most meaningful to them.

CURRENT COMMUNIST STRATEGY in Asia is, in conclusion, the four-class strategy first enunciated by Lenin and since applied in East European "people's democracy" and Mao's "new democracy." Under this strategy, the Communists seek to mobilize four main classes of the body politic—proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and middle bourgeoisie—not directly against capitalism *per se,* but rather against foreign capitalist "imperialism" and its indigenous agents (comprador and monopoly capitalists).

Within the framework of the four-class strategy, Communist tactics in Asia are extremely variable. In the field of organizational tactics, the Asian parties may sometimes employ the united front from above in an effort to achieve formal entry into coalition governments, as presently is the case in Indonesia. At other times they may employ the united front from below in an attempt to undermine rival parties from within and eventually draw their members into a single united party under Communist leadership (whether it calls

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itself Communist or by some other name). Finally, they may employ both tactics simultaneously, as in India, forming coalitions with local and regional parties on the one hand and attacking the main national party on the other.

In regard to the other main tactical question, that of forms of action, the Communist Parties in free Asia are, for the time being, generally pursuing parliamentary methods of achieving power. They will continue to utilize them, in Mr. Barnett's opinion, so long as China and the Soviet Union benefit from coexistence; but they have by no means disavowed violent methods and indeed still resort to them sporadically.

There have recently been some signs in Soviet academic journals (where the first inklings of a switch in strategy or tactics usually appear) of a more critical view of the neutralist bourgeois governments of Asia. There have been similar signs in the behavior of the Chinese Communists. It may be conjectured that international Communist policy for Asia is, perhaps, now going through a phase analogous to that of 1946-1947—a phase of confusion and indecision, probably resulting in part from discord within the Communist camp. In 1946-47, the Soviet leadership was apparently under pressure from militant elements in the Communist camp, led by the Yugoslav party, to adopt the three-class anti-capitalist strategy and violent revolutionary tactics; and even though the Yugoslavs were expelled, the militant viewpoint largely prevailed and influenced certain Asian Communist Parties toward the radical revolutionary tactics that they pursued in 1948-1949. Although circumstances today differ in many obvious respects from those of the immediate postwar period, the possibility nevertheless suggests itself that the Chinese Communists are now sparking a similar drive within the Communist bloc for greater militancy, and that these pressures might well produce similar repercussions among the Communist Parties of free Asia.

EN ROUTE TO UTOPIA

In the past few years, and particularly since the 21st Party Congress in January-February 1959, the Soviet press has devoted a great deal of attention to the question of the "transition to communism." According to Soviet spokesmen—foremost among them Khrushchev—Soviet society, having consolidated its "socialist" gains, is finally on the way toward the achievement of complete, full-blown "communism."

But what precisely *is* communism? How did the founding fathers of the Communist movement conceive of it; what changes, if any, have their visions undergone at the hands of the rulers of the Soviet state; and what, specifically, do the current leaders and theorists of Soviet communism have to say about the ultimate society toward which they are striving? More importantly, what is the relationship between the theories and the actual trends of Soviet development—do the latter actually confirm the first, or is there a chasm, as so often in the past, between promise and performance?

These are some of the questions to which the following (November-December) issue of this journal will be devoted. The articles will deal with Marxist theories on the nature of communism, the current prognostications, the role of the party as it is now envisioned, the function of the social sciences in shaping "the new Soviet man," and some pertinent economic developments. Readers interested in obtaining copies of this special issue are advised to address their requests in advance, either to the nearest USIS post (if overseas), or to the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. (See inside back cover for list of overseas posts.)

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Who Pulled the Trigger?

Soviet Historians and the Origins of World War II

ALTHOUGH KHRUSHCHEV'S CRITICISM of the influence of the personality cult on the work of Soviet historians might have been taken as a harbinger of better things to come, all indications are that the Soviet approach to recent history has undergone no fundamental change from what it was in Stalin's day. There is a good reason for this. To take a Marxist view, each ideology produces its own brand of history, and the tasks of Soviet historians remain basically unchanged because there has been no change in the fundamental ideological motivations and practical purposes of Soviet communism. Communist historians have always had the primary task of interpreting the past so as to justify the present. This duty toward the regime which nurtures them has not altered.

For some time now there has been a concerted attempt on the part of Soviet historians to bolster the regime's propagandist interpretation of the origins of World War II with documentary evidence. The Munich crisis of 1939, of course, provides ample scope for accusations against the Western democracies, and Communist historians have built up a case seeking to prove that the British and French governments, aided by President Benes of Czechoslovakia, conspired with Hitler to turn Germany's expansion eastward, and deliberately sacrificed Czechoslovakia to the Nazis as a base for use against the USSR. In the fall of 1958 a collection of documents on the Munich crisis was published simultaneously in Moscow and Prague,[1] and a book by a British Marxist (and pro-Soviet) historian also came out in London, summarizing and commenting on the issue for Western readers.[2]

The case which the Communists seek to make is simple. The published documents concentrate on showing that the Western democratic powers feared the possible long-term effects of Soviet action in Central Europe, thus implying that they regarded Hitler as a lesser danger than Stalin. Subsequent developments show that these fears were not unfounded. Nevertheless there is really no counter-argument to the Soviet thesis that in 1938 fear of the Bolshevik bogey did unduly sway the Western powers and made them more amenable to Hitler's demands.

The Soviet documents and Mr. Rothstein's book also try to show that the Czechoslovak government, Benes in particular, refused to consider the possibility of fighting Hitler with the USSR as their only ally. It is true that Benes had some doubts about the wisdom of joint action with the Soviet Union, fearing that this would provide right-wing circles in Western Europe with an excuse for pressing their governments to abandon Czechoslovakia and for launching an anti-Bolshevik crusade which would be at least partly directed against Czechoslovakia. General Syrovy, appointed Premier by Benes at the height of the Czech-German crisis, told John Wheeler-Bennett, whose report of these events is more reliable than most:

> We shall fight the Germans, either alone, or with you and the French, but we don't want the Russians in here. We should never get them out.[3]

In canvassing the possibility of being reduced to fighting the Germans with the USSR as their sole ally, the Czechoslovak leaders were doing little more than explore a hypothetical situation. Czechoslovakia was allied with both France and the USSR under a tripartite security treaty which provided that, if Czechoslovakia were attacked, both France and the Soviet Union would go to her aid, but that if either of these two powers failed to act, the other would be released from its treaty

[1] *New Documents on the History of Munich*, Orbis, Prague, 1958.

[2] Andrew Rothstein, *Munich Conspiracy*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1958.

[3] J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich, Prologue to Tragedy*, Macmillan, London, 1948, pp. 81-82.

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obligation. In the absence of French readiness to fight Germany in 1938, the Soviet Union could not be asked to take action singlehanded, but there is no doubt whatever that the Russians expressed their readiness to fulfill their commitment to aid in Czechoslovakia's defense if the French also could be brought to oppose Hitler. In that sense the USSR remained loyal to the treaty of alliance, and it was the French Government which went back on its contract.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING this conclusion seems incontrovertible. There is the speech by the then Soviet Ambassador in Washington, A. A. Troyanovsky, who said on May 5, 1938: "We are ready with France to defend Czechoslovakia in the event of an aggression."[4] There is, above all, Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov's statement to the League of Nations Assembly on September 21, 1938, that the Soviet Government had assured Prague that the USSR was prepared to aid Czechoslovakia "if France, loyal to her obligations will render similar assistance."[5] Ten years later, in 1948, the Soviet Government published the exchanges which took place on this occasion between the Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Alexandrovsky, and the Czechoslovak Government.[6] According to these documents, Alexandrovsky told the Czechs that the USSR would honor the tripartite treaty if France would do the same. Litvinov's statement at Geneva, mentioned above, was made the following day and repeated the gist of instructions which he had himself sent to Alexandrovsky. The documents further indicate that Alexandrovsky advised Benes that the USSR, acting as a member of the League of Nations, would support Czechoslovakia if the latter should request the Council of the League to apply Articles 16 and 17 of the League Covenant. (Article 16 provided for the application by League members of punitive measures, or "sanctions", against any member nation held guilty of aggression against another in defiance of a League-proposed settlement. Article 17 extended this provision to cases in which the aggressor nation was a non-member, and was applicable to the German-Czech crisis because Germany had already withdrawn from the League.)

It is at this point, however, that the Communists begin to spoil their excellent case. They attempt to interpret Alexandrovsky's pledge of Soviet support in the event of an appeal to the League as proof that the USSR was prepared to aid Czechoslovakia regardless of French action. When these documents were published in 1948, of course, the floodtide of anti-Western propaganda in Czechoslovakia was at its peak, and the whole Munich episode was the Communists' most telling argument for a strengthening of Czechoslovakia's association with the USSR. But to argue that Alexandrovsky's statement promising Soviet backing of League action under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant represented an unconditional offer of Soviet aid, which Benes rejected out of hand, is to distort the facts and to ignore the limitations of the League of Nations. Surely, the Soviet Government knew that such a promise meant nothing since the likelihood of an effective application of League sanctions against an aggressor in 1938 was virtually nil in the light of the organization's previous failures (Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria, Lithuania, *etc.*). Furthermore, any decision by the League Council to apply sanctions would have been impossible in any case without British and French support. Hence Alexandrovsky's offer to Benes was, in effect, a mere repetition of the known Soviet stand that the USSR would act in Czechoslovakia's defense if France did.

AWARE OF the basic weakness of their argument, the Communists have adduced further evidence purporting to show their determination to oppose Hitler at all costs and Benes' duplicity in depriving them of the opportunity to do so. This evidence was presented in retrospect by Klement Gottwald, the late leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Writing in 1949, he recalled that in the middle of May 1938 Stalin "told me plainly that the Soviet Union was ready to give military aid to Czechoslovakia even if France did not do so . . . Stalin directly commissioned me to transmit the content of the conversation to the then President Benes. And this I did."[7] When this article was first published (it has since been republished in various documentary collections), Benes was dead and there was no one in Czechoslovakia who could challenge Gottwald's testimony. Gottwald personally, the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and the CPSU had a common interest in blackening Benes' reputation and in making propaganda points against the West, and this evidence, which is without substantiation from any other source, cannot be accepted on Gottwald's word alone.

Thus, all that the Communist historians have really succeeded in establishing is that the USSR did not try to welsh on its obligations under the 1935 tripartite treaty. This fact, indeed, has seldom been disputed. By implication, of course, the Soviet documents serve to foster the view that Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler contributed decisively to the outbreak of World War II. They have failed, however, to establish the existence of an anti-Soviet compact among the Western democracies,

[4] *Documents for 1938*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Vol. I, p. 315.

[5] *Verbatim Record of the 19th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations*, Geneva, 1938, pp. 12-13.

[6] *Documents and Materials relating to the Eve of the Second World War*, Moscow, 1948, Vol. I, pp. 203-04.

[7] *Pravda* (Moscow), December 21, 1949.

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Hitler and Benes, notwithstanding the employment of such dubious sources as Gottwald's postwar recollections. If there was indeed a plot to turn Hitler against Russia, why did it fail so dramatically in August 1939? Was it because the Soviet Union's own conspiracy with the Nazis was so much more successful?

DEALING WITH EVENTS still closer to the outbreak of the war, Communist historians allege another instance in which "historical truth" has been "systematically distorted by the West."[8] In particular, they have published their own version of the record of the Anglo-French-Soviet military talks in Moscow in August 1939 in an effort to prove that the Western powers were insincere in their professed desire to conclude an alliance with the USSR.[9] Khrushchev himself has summed up the Soviet argument:

> If in 1939, when the delegations of France and Britain were in the Soviet Union, the French and British had been more serious about the negotiations, there would have been no war.[10]

The Soviet historians contend that the record of the military talks, as published in the official British collection, is "abridged and tendentious."[11] It is true that the British version contains summaries rather than a verbatim record of the more technical exchanges, but on all essentials it is almost identical with the Soviet version.[12] Indeed, there also are omissions in the allegedly full record published in Moscow, although they do not seem to be of momentous import. For example, both the Soviet and British versions, in listing the queries addressed to the Western delegations by Voroshilov, include his question about French defense plans on the Franco-Spanish frontier. The Soviet version, however, completely ignores the French reply, whereas the British account quotes General Doumenc as saying that some of the 200,000 Spanish Republicans in France might be used for this purpose.[13]

In the course of the August 1939 talks, Voroshilov constantly reiterated the valid point that the USSR could not undertake any military obligation to oppose German aggression unless there were some kind of arrangement for Soviet troops to enter and cross Polish and Rumanian territory. The Soviet historians Andreyeva and Dmitriyeva, commenting on this aspect of the talks 19 years later, accuse the British of playing for time while engaged "in secret talks with Nazi Germany in the summer of 1939."[14]

This is a particularly fraudulent argument considering the fact that arrangements for a Soviet-German non-aggression pact were already well under way when the Moscow military talks between the USSR and the British and French Governments began. Moreover, published Western documents contain nothing whatever to support the allegation of these Soviet historians that Britain sought to conclude with Germany "a far-reaching agreement on dividing the world."[15] On the contrary, exchanges between London and Berlin at the time were mainly confined to British efforts at getting Germany and Poland to discuss their differences. The documents further underline Anglo-French recognition of the validity of Voroshilov's point about the necessity of an arrangement permitting the entry of Soviet troops into Poland. The French particularly appear to have been desperately anxious to overcome Polish opposition to such an arrangement: according to the British documents, General Gamelin, the French Commander-in-Chief, expressed himself with "great warmth concerning the folly of the Poles' recalcitrance."[16]

On the other hand, Jozef Beck, then Polish Foreign Minister, insisted that Voroshilov's demand was only a subterfuge whereby the Soviet Union hoped to accomplish in 1939 what it had failed to achieve in 1920.[17] This estimate of Soviet intentions proved to be not far from the truth, but whatever the motives behind Soviet insistence on the right to send troops into Poland as a condition for a military understanding with Britain and France, the Polish attitude on this issue did present an insurmountable obstacle to an accord. The French, having failed to overcome the opposition of the Polish Government and General Staff, realized this and sought to evade the issue by instructing their military delegate in Moscow to inform the Russians that the *French* Government's reply to "the political question" concerning Soviet troops on Polish soil was "affirmative."[18] The British documents record a meeting between General Doumenc and Voroshilov on August 22, 1939, *i.e.*, the day after the military talks had adjourned *sine die* and one day before the arrival of Nazi Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in Moscow. It is clear from Doumenc's note on this meeting that Voroshilov did not believe that the Poles would back France's affirmative reply, and that in any case he also wanted a reply from the British Government, for which the British military mission in Moscow was still waiting. Doumenc himself realized the weakness of the French reply, which had been given, as it

[8] M. Andreyeva and K. Dmitriyeva, writing in *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn* (Moscow), February-March 1959.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] Interview with S. Groussard, in *Le Figaro* (Paris), March 19, 1958.
[11] *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn, loc. cit.*
[12] *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939* (Third Series, Vol. VII, London, 1954), pp. 561-93. (Hereafter cited as *British Documents*).
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 569.
[14] *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn, loc. cit.*
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] *British Documents*, p. 102.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 610 ff.

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were, despite the Poles. Still, it is noteworthy that the published Soviet documents omit any record of Voroshilov's meeting with Doumenc or any mention of the fact that the French did at least produce some kind of reply to the Russians' "political question."

At the final meeting of the military talks, Admiral Drax of Great Britain stated, according to the British official version:

> I agree with the Marshal's [Voroshilov's] suggestion that our meetings be adjourned, but I still have one thing to add: that I shall be surprised if we do not receive an answer to the political question before the 27th.[19]

The Soviet version of Drax's remarks is identical with the above except for the last sentence, which reads:

> I shall be surprised if the reply to the political question is delayed.[20]

The date itself, August 27, is relatively unimportant and irrelevant from the British point of view. However, the Russians perhaps hoped that its omission from their documentary version would help to establish the vague obscurity of the Western attitude, the whole burden of the Communist case in this instance being that the British and French used the Polish refusal to allow Soviet troops into Poland merely as a pretext for dragging out the talks inconclusively. The exchanges between Paris, London and Warsaw show, however, that the Western powers did their utmost to persuade the Poles to adopt a less intransigent attitude.

BY PUBLISHING THE RECORD of the Anglo-French-Soviet military talks out of context and thus obscuring their interconnection with concurrent Soviet-German contacts, the Communists obviously hoped to cover up the fact that there had been collusion between Moscow and Berlin—that they themselves had been plotting with Hitler at the very moment that they were accusing the Western democracies of this self-same crime. For example, on June 29, 1939—several weeks after the first Soviet overtures had been made to the Nazi Government—*Pravda* published an attack by Zhdanov flatly accusing Britain and France of dragging their feet in strengthening political contacts with the USSR in the face of the German danger.

The Soviet decision to come to terms with Hitler might perhaps have been defended on the ground that it was the outcome of a full appraisal by Moscow of the appeasement policies of the Western democratic powers, as exemplified by their conduct in the Spanish Civil War and again in the Munich crisis. Today, however, Soviet historians try to prove that the British and French wrecked the Moscow talks, and that in consequence of their failure the USSR had to turn to Germany in order to avoid being completely isolated. Thus, the commentary published along with the Soviet documents relating to the military negotiations flatly states:

> In the course of the negotiations it became patently clear to the Soviet government that it could not depend on political and military cooperation with Britain and France.

The commentary then refers to Soviet difficulties with the Japanese in the Far East and goes on:

> In these extremely unfavorable circumstances, in order to avert a joint anti-Soviet front of the imperialist powers . . . the Soviet Union had no other choice but to accept Germany's proposal and conclude a non-aggression pact with her in Moscow on August 23, 1939.[21]

The above statement is patently false on at least two counts: first, it was the Soviet Government which made the first overtures to Germany for a non-aggression pact, not the other way around; second, these overtures were initiated long before the Anglo-French-Soviet military talks took place. This piece of historical sleight of hand would have been plainly exposed if the Soviet record of the military talks had been published not alone, but in conjunction with documents revealing other aspects of Soviet diplomacy during this period.

To be more specific, on May 5, 1939, more than three months prior to the military talks, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Berlin, Astakhov, had put out initial feelers in a conversation with Schnurre, of the German Foreign Office, emphasizing in particular the political significance of Molotov's appointment as Soviet Foreign Commissar in place of Litvinov.[22] In another conversation twelve days later, Astakhov pointed to the absence of sources of conflict between the USSR and the Reich, and on May 27 the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count von der Schulenburg, reported to von Ribbentrop that "Molotov wants more than just trade."[23] On August 3, von Ribbentrop instructed von der Schulenburg to inform the Kremlin of Hitler's readiness to negotiate with the Russians, thus giving Germany's affirmative reply to the Soviet approaches.[24]

The Anglo-French-Soviet military talks lasted from August 12 through August 21. All this time the Russians were getting closer to their pact with Hitler, and quite possibly they spun out the military negotiations in order to get better terms from the Germans, although there is no evidence in the German documents that von der Schulenburg or von Ribbentrop rose to the bait. Against this background, it becomes understandable why Voroshilov talked to the British and French military

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 593.
[20] *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn. loc. cit.*
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik 1918-1945* (Series D, Baden-Baden, 1956), Vol. VI, p. 355. (Hereafter *Akten*).
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 444.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 883.

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envoys as if he were the representative of "a victorious power dictating terms to a beaten enemy."[25] Small wonder, too, that State Secretary von Weizsaecker, of the German Foreign Office, in a talk with the British Ambassador to Berlin on August 15, appeared highly confident that "Russian assistance to the Poles would not only be entirely negligible, but that the USSR would even in the end join in sharing in the Polish spoils."[26]

On August 16 Molotov discussed the terms of the proposed Soviet-German pact with von der Schulenburg. The Germans now were pressing for a speedy conclusion of the deal with Moscow, although it seems that they had been surprised by the Soviet overtures almost four months earlier. On August 19 the Soviet Government agreed to receive Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in Moscow to finalize the pact; on August 20 the draft of the agreement was completed; and on August 21 Hitler and Stalin exchanged personal messages of congratulation.[27] The Anglo-French-Soviet military talks came to an abrupt halt on this last date. On the same day that the Germans launched their attack on Poland (September 1) the Soviet radio station at Minsk, obviously by arrangement with the Germans, began sending out directional signals for the benefit of the Luftwaffe.[28]

[25] Admiral Drax dispatch, in *British Documents*, p. 33.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[27] *Akten*, Vol. VII, pp. 63-139.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 400.

To sum up, it is futile for Soviet historians to try to pin the blame for the outbreak of the last war on an Anglo-French-Nazi conspiracy when it was Stalin's own deal with Hitler which opened the way for the Nazi attack on Poland. Certainly no serious Western historian would attempt to whitewash the mistakes made by Britain and France in their policies toward Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1939—mistakes which, it must be admitted, were among the basic contributory causes of World War II. But Soviet historians would do well to put their own buckets and brushes to better use than in trying to whitewash Moscow's role in the events leading up to the war. The Western powers blundered their way to disaster, but the Soviet Union engaged in a conscious and cynical conspiracy which back-fired. Why try to deny that the Stalin-Hitler pact precipitated the outbreak of war by covering Hitler's eastern flank and swinging the balance of power in Germany's favor at the most crucial moment? The facts are easily accessible. All that Moscow's efforts to conceal or distort them prove is that Soviet historians, whether willingly or unwillingly, are still wedded to the old Communist propaganda habit of accusing one's opponent of one's own misdeeds.

Otto Pick

(A British writer on Soviet affairs, Mr. Pick last appeared in these pages with "Moscow and the WFTU" May-June 1959, written with Andrew Wiseman.)

Peaceful Coexistence and Piecemeal Distortions

THE JUNE 1960 ISSUE of the *World Marxist Review* carries a reply to my article, "Lenin and Peaceful Coexistence," (*Problems of Communism*, November-December 1959). The reply, titled "Apropos of a Falsification," contains the following charge:

> Quoting Lenin's words out of context. Pistrak tries to trap the unwary, to instill the idea that Lenin's counsel during World War I concerning the ways and means of bringing the war to an end testifies to the "conspiratorial" tactics of the Bolsheviks.
>
> Lenin, we are told, sought to base relations with capitalist countries not on peaceful coexistence but on "fomenting" revolution in these countries, on the principle of an "armed peace." Pistrak pretends to find confirmation for this in, of all things, Lenin's famous Decree on Peace. Nothing, of course, is farther from the truth.

The international Communist journal did not find it necessary to inform its readers in which publication my article appeared. Why? Were its editors afraid of publicizing *Problems of Communism*, or were they apprehensive that readers might look up the original article and find out that the Communist critic, concealed under the initials S.V., deliberately distorts the points I had made?

In his reply, S.V. followed an old Bolshevik stratagem: if you cannot refute an argument, then misrepresent the opponent's viewpoint and attack him not for what he said, but for what he did *not* say. It is absurd to represent me as saying that Lenin based relations with the capitalist countries not on peaceful coexistence but on "fomenting" revolution in these countries, on the prin-

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ciple of an "armed peace." (Incidentally, none of the expressions put by S. V. in quotation marks appeared in my article.) The point of the article was that Lenin's approach to the problem of "peaceful coexistence" with capitalist countries had been subordinated to the concept of world revolution; that even in the Decree on Peace, which called for peace negotiations on a governmental level and was, therefore, cautiously worded, Lenin linked the conclusion of peace with "comprehensive, determined and supremely energetic actions" on the part of the "class-conscious workers" in the belligerent countries; that when Lenin realized that revolutions in the "capitalist" countries were either not forthcoming or did not follow the Bolshevik path, he was willing to tolerate coexistence with "bourgeois" governments in the hope that they would agree to render economic and technological assistance to Soviet Russia; and finally, that Lenin was determined—as he put it—to take capitalism "by the scruff of the neck" as soon as the Communist regime was strong enough to do so.

These assertions were supported by seven quotations from Lenin and other Communist sources. S.V. did not, of course, take the trouble to inform his readers which of the quotations had been "taken out of context," but instead pictured Lenin as a good-hearted, peace-loving leader who would not even think of "organizing" revolutions—that is, anywhere but in Russia. Why, it might be asked, did not S.V. refute the *facts* proving Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, facts published in the United States by John Reed in 1919, and by the Soviet Ambassador to Germany, Adolf A. Yoffe, in *Izvestia* of December 17, 1918? The answer seems plain: it is far easier to counterattack—particularly if one resorts to falsification by omission. Thus S.V. quotes, for instance, from Lenin's article written on June 20, 1917, titled "Is There a Way to a Just Peace?," the following sentences:

> Only when power is taken by the oppressed classes will Russia be able to address the oppressed classes of the other countries not with empty words or bare appeals but with reference to her own example and with an immediate, precise *proposal* of clear terms for *universal peace*. "Comrade workers and working people of all countries!" the proposal for an immediate peace would say, "Enough blood has been shed. Peace is possible. A just peace is a peace without annexation, without indemnities. . . . The road to peace lies before us." (Lenin's italics)

The ellipsis toward the end of the passage is significant—for the very simple reason that the omitted sentences support the conclusions of my article. Here are some of the omitted sentences:

> Should the capitalists of England, Japan, America try to oppose *such* a peace [without annexation and without indemnities], then the oppressed classes of Russia as well as of other countries would not shy away from a revolutionary war *against the capitalists*. In such a war they will achieve victory not only over the three countries, which are located far away from Russia and which are engaged in rivalry between themselves—they will achieve victory over the capitalists *of the entire world*.[1] (Lenin's italics)

Lack of space makes it impossible to expose the other distortions of Lenin's writings which S.V. was impelled to make in his polemical repartee. There is one interesting development, however, which must be mentioned in the present context. On June 21 (that is, *after* the appearance of S.V.'s article), Khrushchev told the Rumanian CP Congress that Lenin's dictum on the inevitability of war in the epoch of imperialism is no longer valid in our time. Now this was quite a sensational revelation, but for the purposes of this article let me just pose two questions: If Lenin considered wars inevitable, then how could he have established principles of peaceful coexistence on which the present foreign policy of the USSR is allegedly based? Indeed, how can S.V. justify his invocation of Lenin in the light of the following sentence from Khrushchev's speech: "The thesis enunciated at the 20th and 21st Congresses of our party to the effect that war is not inevitable in our time is directly related to the policy of peaceful coexistence."[2]

This may be a bit unfair to S.V. After all, one could hardly expect him, in addition to everything else, to divine so basic a change in the party line. In conclusion, then, I should simply like—with the permission of the editors of this magazine—to make the following offer: let *World Marxist Review* print my article in full, and *Problems of Communism* will then publish in full any reply of the same length. This offer is made in the spirit of Lenin, who wrote:

> The American bourgeoisie deceives people when it brags about freedom, equality, and democracy in its country. But neither this nor any other bourgeoisie, nor any government in the world, can accept—[because] it will be afraid to do so—competition with our government based on actual freedom, equality, and democracy: let us suppose that a treaty guarantees to our government and to any other government the freedom of exchanging . . . pamphlets which contain the text of laws of a given country and the text of its constitution with an explanation of its superiority over all others. Not a single bourgeois government would dare to accept such a peaceable, civilized, free, equal, and democratic [exchange] treaty with us.[3]

This magazine *does* accept a free exchange of ideas. Will *World Marxist Review* consent to be bound by Lenin's offer?

Lazar M. Pistrak

[1] V. I. Lenin. *Sochinenia*. Vol. 25, 4th Russian edition, p. 39-40.
[2] *Pravda*, June 22, 1960.
[3] V. I. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 29, pp. 479-80.

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THE USES OF "SINOKREMLINOLOGY"

In writing to congratulate you on the publication of the brilliant analysis of Sino-Soviet relations by Mr. Donald S. Zagoria (May-June, 1960), I want to use this opportunity to utter a word of caution against those who would dismiss his conclusions on the ground that after the summit Mr. Khrushchev's policy has switched back onto cold war rails.

Mr. Zagoria argued that the Soviet leader was seeking a more or less long-term relaxation—one that would last beyond the summit talks, and for a good many years more. The Russians' deliberate disruption of the summit and of the Geneva talks might appear to have proved Mr. Zagoria wrong almost as soon as the words were out of his typewriter. I believe that those who would argue in this way—and they are many—would be doing a disservice to the cause we have at heart, the relaxation of tension and the establishment of a *modus vivendi* between East and West.

The recent hardening of the Soviet line, far from detracting from Mr. Zagoria's analysis, is in fact explicable in terms of his article. After the article had been published, there was evidence in the Soviet and Chinese press that the strain in the alliance had become almost intolerable. Taking up the neo-Stalinist challenge—and I agree with Mr. Zagoria that this did not come from Peking alone—Mr. Khrushchev has continued to fight it on the ideological level, which is the more important in the long term, while making certain concessions on the short-term political level.

At the Bucharest meeting Mr. Khrushchev secured the acquiescence of the satellite leaders in his line—enthusiastic in the case of some, grudging in the case of others—but the struggle is far from over. My admiration for Mr. Khrushchev as a "fighter for peace" is not as unbounded as some readers of this letter might suspect. If he were to feel his power position threatened, he would give way to his critics' arguments rather than yield his seat of power to a successor. The longer-term policies that might then be adopted really would bring back the cold war with a vengeance, and the brinksmanship that often accompanies the cold war would again put the peace of the world in peril.

This is not a plea that we should hand over Formosa or Berlin to save Mr. Khrushchev from his friends, but only that Western actions in relation to Russia should proceed from an analysis of the internal position in the Sino-Soviet block. I believe that a deliberate attempt to exploit the differences of the Communist leaders would be as obvious—and as misconceived—as an attempt by Mr. Khrushchev to intervene in the American elections.

This is, however, a plea that expertise of the kind implicit in Mr. Zagoria's article should serve those of us who have anything to do with the shaping of Western opinion and policy towards Russia—and I believe that there are many such among your readers—as a basis for informed thought and action. Too often in the past the careful extrapolation of Communist policies from the texts of speeches and press articles has been disregarded or dismissed. Those of us who for the past two years and more have been producing the evidence, in the face of much skepticism, about Sino-Soviet friction might feel only too pleased that our interpretations have been proven correct; but any such pleasure would be misplaced until the method—call it Sinokremlinology, if you like—is accepted as an effective and legitimate aid by those whose task it is to try to understand Soviet policies.

The Guardian,
LONDON, ENGLAND
VICTOR ZORZA

THE USSR AND OUTER SPACE

I have looked at the useful compilation by Andrew Swatkovsky on "The Soviet Attitude on Outer Space," appearing in your Vol. IX, No. 3, May-June 1960. Permit me the luxury of saying that, even within the rather

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narrowly descriptive task that the author appears to have set for himself, it calls forth certain doubts and questions.

1). *Source Coverage and Presentation*

a). The standard Soviet textbooks on international law, which Mr. Swatkovsky mentions, were not written by single authors, but were compiled from chapters written by various, named authors. Thus the 1957 textbook is not written entirely by Kozhevnikov, as footnote 21 seems to assert. Kozhevnikov is listed in the book as the author of some chapters and the responsible editor of the whole book; but Chapter V, the one in question here, was written by S. V. Molodtsov, a less eminent figure, and its importance should be assessed accordingly.

b). While most of the relevant Soviet sources seem to be covered, a few items that would have enriched the article are left out, though others of minor importance are included. Kovalev and Cheprov, in the 1958 *Soviet Yearbook of International Law 128-49* (1959), have published the most thorough Soviet treatment of space law that I have seen. The director of the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, P. S. Romashkin, devoted five pages to space law and space control in "Technical Progress and Soviet Law," in *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo,* 1960, issue No. 1; see especially pp. 19-24.

c). It is a serious error to state (p. 23) that "the proposed committee [the UN *Ad Hoc* Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space] never came to life." It is true, as the author says, that several members refused to take part (but not Sweden, as he mistakenly states). The Committee, however, certainly came to life; it met in the late spring and early summer of 1959 and produced a substantial report, UN Document A/4141, July 14, 1959, with 76 pages of which 10 were devoted directly to questions of space law and rather more than that to questions of space controls and organization for space activities. . . .

2). *Substance*

a). The author exhibits no evidence for his interesting, and perhaps true, statement that "the scientific developments and the advances in technology that sent the first sputnik into space altered profoundly the strategic concepts of the Soviet military leaders. . . ." It seems a rather casual pronouncement of a large generality that is anyhow not central to the article.

b). *Was* Zadorozhnyi "partially refuted" (p. 21) by the 1957 edition of *Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo*? I do not know what "rapid technological developments in the aircraft industry" took place or came to light in the short interval between the time Zadorozhnyi's article was prepared in October 1957, and the time the 1957 edition of *Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo* was signed for the press (ostensibly, November 1957). Developments in *space* prowess in that period favored the Soviet Union, and if they influenced the course of Soviet legal writing at all, they would have tended to pull Soviet doctrine toward a lower, not a higher, boundary for national sovereignty. Would it not be more likely that the book, which (again, ostensibly) was already in manuscript in June 1957, had been prepared with no thought of any high-altitude events more current than the balloon episodes of early 1956?

c). The author's treatment of the inferred clash of the views of Zadorozhnyi, *Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo,* and Galina seems to presuppose that they had a uniform concept of the upper limit of the atmosphere and that that limit was at a very high altitude. Yet some (not all) scientific usage would place the upper boundary of atmosphere (and of the stratosphere) somewhere below the perigee of any known orbiting earth-satellite and somewhere above the altitude of (for example) the 1956 balloon flights. Thus some of the statements contrasted on pages 21 and 22 would seem to be reconcilable. I do, however, agree with the author's emphasis on the interaction in Soviet legal doctrine between the criterion of security and the boundary question.

d). The discussion of outer space and disarmament mentions several of the formulae, not only Soviet but also US and multilateral, advanced in discussion of limitations on the use of outer space. In the interest of accuracy it should, I think, have been pointed out explicitly that the US had first officially referred to "the objective of assuring that future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes" in a proposal made to the United Nations on January 14, 1957. The author refers to this elliptically in footnote 29.

YALE UNIVERSITY
NEW HAVEN, CONN.
LEON LIPSON

HUNGARIAN WRITERS IN OCTOBER

May I comment on Mr. Paul Willen's review (July-August issue) of the Aczel-Meray book *(The Revolt of the Mind)* on the Hungarian revolution?

Mr. Willen says that the authors "treat their own 'awakening' as a natural response to Stalinist horrors, but they are unable to explain how and why it occurred when it did . . ."

Having repeatedly raised the same question to a number of Hungarian intellectuals, mostly Communist or fellow-traveling writers and journalists, before, during and after the revolt, I can assure your distinguished reviewer that we probably never will get a satisfactory answer—unless one of these men will be bold enough to write a mercilessly sincere confession of this metamorphosis.

The most important thing, however, is that it did happen, and not the why and the when: though many

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non-Communists, among them Hungarian exiles, are appalled by it, the hard fact remains that these Communist and fellow-traveling intellectuals fomented the revolution, while the others preferred to watch from the sidelines what they first thought was an intra-party clash.

There is also, I believe, another tormenting question: why did this "awakening" occur only after Stalin's death? Aczel, Meray and the dozens of others, young and old, are highly cultured men: do they want us to believe that they had not seen the same nauseating horrors before 1953, even though every child in Hungary knew about them? Had they not witnessed the over-staged tragicomedies of the show trials, or had they not read Gide, Koestler and Silone? I for myself am most skeptical about the vague explanation Messrs. Aczel and Meray give, and *The Revolt of the Mind* fails to be convincing in this respect.

Nevertheless, I maintain that the democratic world is immensely indebted to these men who prepared the soil for the unprecedented uprising against Moscow's rule. And let me add that, though Mr. Willen is right, we should not expect them to explain the "why". They have purged themselves in 1956.

Actually the writers' role reached its Olympian peak many weeks after the Soviet army crushed the revolt and when not even the most gullible could entertain any hope. The manifesto the Hungarian writers issued in December 1956—if I remember correctly only five or six voted against it—remains one of the noblest and most daring documents ever written in a dictatorship.

Mr. Willen will probably agree with me that there are many more questions to be answered to get a complete picture of this important period which culminated in October-November 1956. We reporters who had the privilege of covering the events in Hungary obviously could not go beyond reporting the facts. The books published since, some of them good, many more mediocre or (see Mr. Willen's review of *The Reluctant Satellites* in the same issue of your journal) ludicrously conceited, give only a fragmentary picture of what happened.

What is needed is a pragmatic history of the revolt, a serious, well-documented study embracing the years 1953-1957. I feel sure that one of the foundations will find the money, and the men to write it.

WASHINGTON, D. C. ENDRE MARTON

(Mr. Marton, a Hungarian himself, covered the revolt for the Associated Press, and fled the country after its suppression—Editors.)

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